enough “inside” not to have the right to any practical or epistemological independence. And
vice versa.
3.In “The Word” (already cited) : “. . . it is from speech that one should always start in order
to understand the real nature of human language” (p. 53) [p. 54].
4.And finally and above all in “La double articulation du langage,” La linguistique
synchronique, pp. 8 f. and 18 f.
20. “On the Principles of Phonematics” (1955), Proceedings of the Second Inter-national
Congress of Phonetic Sciences, p. 51.
21. Louis Hjelmslev and H. J. Uldall, Etudes de linguistique structurale organisées au sein du
Cercle linguistique de Copenhague (Bulletin 11, 35, pp. 13 f.) .
22. « Langue et parole » (1943 ), Essais linguistiques [Copenhagen, 1959], p. 77.
23. Omkring sprogteoriens grundlaeggelse, Copenhagen (1943 ), pp. 91–93 (translated as
Prolegomena to A Theory of Language, [by Francis J. Whitfield (2
nd
edition, Baltimore, 1961)
] pp. 103-04.
Cf. also « La stratification du langage » (1954), Essais linguistiques (Travaux du Cercle
linguistique de Copenhague, XII [1959]). The project and the terminology of a
graphematics,
science of the substance of graphic expression, are there presented (p. 41) . The complexity of
the proposed algebra aims to remedy the fact that, from the point of view of the distinction
between form and substance, “Saussure’s terminology can lead to confusion” (p. 48).
Hjelmslev demonstrates how “one and the same form of expression can be manifested by
diverse substances: phonic, graphic, flag-signals, etc.” (p. 49).
24. “Speech and Writing,” 1938, Acta Linguistica 4 (1944) : 11 f. Uldall refers also to
((328))
a study by Dr. Joseph Vachek, “Zum Problem der geschriebenen Sprache”
(Travaux du Cercle
linguistique de Prague 8, 1939) in order to indicate “the difference between the phonologic
and glosseamtic points of view.”
Cf. also Eli Fischer-Jorgensen, « Remarques sur les principes de l’analyse phonémique, »
Recherches structurales, 1949 (Travaux du Cercle linguistique de Prague, vol. 5, pp. 231. fi);
Bertha Siertsema, A Study of Glossematics ( [The Hague] 1955), (especially ch. VI), and
Hennings Spang-Hanssen, “Glossematics,” Trends in European and Amer-can Linguistics,
1930—60 [ed. Christine Mohrmann (Utrecht,] 1961), pp. 147 f.
25.And already, in a
very programmatic manner, in the
Prolegomena (English trans-lation, pp.
114—15). Cf. also Adolf Stender-Petersen, « Esquisse d’une théorie structurale de la
littérature, » and Stevan Johanson, « La notion de signe dans la glossématique et dans
l’esthétique, » Travaux du Cercle linguistique de Copenhague 5 (1949)
26.Omkring, p. 9 (Prolegomena, p. 8).
27.Page 14. Which does not prevent Hjelmslev from “venturing to call” his directing principle
an “empirical principle” (p. 12, English translation, p. 11) . “But,” he adds, “we are willing to
abandon the name if espistemological investigation shows it to be inappropriate. From our
point of view this is merely a question of terminology, which does not affect the maintenance
of the principle.” This is only one example of the terminological conventionalism of a system,
which, in borrowing all its concepts from the history of the metaphysics that it would hold at a
distance (form/substance, context/ expression, etc.), believes it can neutralize its entire
historical burden by means of some declaration of intention, a preface or quotation marks.
28.As for this critique of the concept of origin in general (empirical and/or transcendental) we
have elsewhere attempted to indicate the schema of an argument (Introduction to Husserl’s
L’origine de la géométrie, p. 6o) .
29.Op. Cit., p. 111. Hjelmslev formulates the same reservations: “It is curious that linguistics,
so long on guard against any suspicion of ‘psychologism,’ seems here, even if only to a
certain extent and in very cautious proportions, to be on its way back to Saussure’s ‘acoustic
image,’ and equally to ‘concept,’ as long as that word is interpreted in strict conformity with
the doctrine that I have just elaborated, in short to recognize, with however many necessary
reservations, that, with the two aspects of the linguistic sign, one is in the presence of the
‘purely psychological phenomenon’ (Course, p. 28) [p. 11]. But it is rather a partial
coincidence of nomenclatures than a real analogy. The terms introduced by Saussure, and the
interpretations given in the Course, have been abandoned because they can be equivocal, and
it is better not to make the same mistakes again. I too hesitate when I ask myself how much
the researches advocated here may be considered as belonging to the psychological order: the
reason being that psychology seems to be a discipline whose definition still leaves much to be
desired” (“La stratification du langage” Essais linguistiques [1954], p. 56). Hjelmslev, posing
the same problem, already evoked those “numerous nuances that the Genevan master could be
fully aware of, but which he did not find it useful to insist upon; the motives behind this
attitude naturally escapes us” (p. 76) .
30.I have attempted a reading of Freud from this point of view (“Freud et la scène de
l’écriture,” L’écriture et la différence) . It sets forth the relationship between the concept of
the trace and the structure of “a-retardation” which I mention above.
31.This theme inhabits more than one mythological system. Among many other examples,
Thoth, the Egyptian god of writing evoked in Phaedrus, inventor of the technical ruse, the
analogue of Hermes, also performed essential functions in funeral rites. When the opportunity
offered, he was the conductor of the dead. He inscribed the accounts before the Last
Judgment. He also occupied the function of the secretary/ substitute who usurped first place;
of the king, the father, the sun, of their eye. For ex-ample: “As a general rule, Horus’ eye
became the lunar eye. The moon, like everything that touched the astral world, intrigued the
Egyptians greatly. According to one legend, the moon was created by the Sun-god to replace
itself at night: it was Thoth whom Rê designated for the exercise of this high function of