11.Cf.
Das Wesen der Sprache [
”The Nature of Language”], and
Das Wort [”Words”], in
Unterwegs zur Sprache [Pfüllingen], 1959
[On the Way to Language, tr. Peter D. Hertz (New
York, 1971) ].
12.[Martin Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik (Tübingen, 1953) translated as An
Introduction to Metaphysics by Ralp Manheim (New Haven, 1959).] Tr. French Gilbert Kahn
[Paris, 1967], p. 50.
13.Introduction d la métaphysique, tr. fr. p. 103 [Einführung p. 70; Introduction, p. 92]. “All
this points in the direction of what we encountered when we characterized the Greek
experience and interpretation of being. If we retain the usual interpretation of being, the word
‘being’ takes its meaning from the unity and determinateness of the horizon which guided our
understanding. In short: we understand the verbal substantive
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‘Sein’ through the infinitive, which in turn is related to the ‘is’ and its diversity that we have
described. The definite and particular verb form ‘is,’ the third person singular of the present
indicative, has here a pre-eminent rank. We understand ‘being’ not in regard to the ‘thou art,’
‘you are,’ ‘I am,’ or ‘they would be,’ though all of these, just as much as ‘is,’ represent verbal
inflections of ‘to be.’ . . . And involuntarily, almost as though nothing else were possible, we
explain the infinitive ‘to be’ to ourselves through the ‘is.’
“Accordingly, ‘being’ has the meaning indicated above, recalling the Greek view of the
essence of being, hence a detenninateness which has not just dropped on us accidentally from
somewhere but has dominated our historical being-there since antiquity. At one stroke our
search for the definition of the meaning of the word ‘being’ becomes explicitly what it is,
namely a reflection on the source of our hidden history.” I should, of course, cite the entire
analysis that concludes with these words.
14.dem Statarischen, an old German word that one has hitherto been tempted to translate as
“immobile” or “static” (see [Jean] Gibelin, [tr. Leçons sur la philosophie de la religion (Paris,
1959),] pp. 255-57.
15. »La parole soufflée, » ED.
Part I: Chapter 2
1.Diogène 51, 1965, [p. 54]. [Parallel English, French, and Spanish editions of this journal are
published simultaneously. My references are to the English Diogenes.] André Martinet
alludes to the “courage” which would formerly have been “needed” to “foresee that the term
‘word’ itself might have to be put aside if . . . researches showed that this term could not be
given a universally applicable definition” (p. 39) [p. 39]. “Semiology, as revealed by recent
studies, has no need of the word” (p. 40) [p. 391. “Grammarians and linguists have long
known that the analysis of utterances can be pursued beyond the word without going into
phonetics, that is, ending with segments of speech, such as syllables or phonemes, which have
nothing to do with meaning” (p. 41) [p. 40]. “We are touching here on
what renders the notion
of the word so suspect to all true linguists. They cannot accept traditional writing without
verifying first whether it reproduces faithfully the true structure of the language which it is
supposed to record” (p. 48) [p. 48]. In conclusion Martinet proposes the replacement “in
linguistic practice” of the notion of word by that of “syntagm,” any “group of several minimal
signs” that will be called “monemes.”
2.Let us extend our quotation to bring out the tone and the affect of these theoretical
propositions. Saussure puts the blame on writing: “Another result is that the less writing
represents what it is supposed to represent, the stronger the tendency to use it as a basis
becomes. Grammarians never fail to draw attention to the written form. Psychologically, the
tendency is easily explained, but its consequences are annoying. Free use of the words
‘pronounce’ and ‘pronunciation’ sanctions the abuse and reverses the real, legitimate
relationship between writing and language. Whoever says that a certain letter must be
pronounced a certain way is mistaking the written image of a sound for the sound itself. For
French oi to be pronounced wa, this spelling would have to exist independently; actually wa
is written oi.” Instead of meditating upon this strange proposition, the possibility of such a
text (“actually wa is written oi”), Saussure argues: “To attribute the oddity to an exceptional
pronunciation of o and i is also misleading, for this implies that language depends on its
written form and that certain liberties may be taken in writing, as if the graphic symbols were
the norm” (p. 52) [p. 30].
3.Manuscript included in the Pléiade edition under the title Prononciation (11, p. 1248). Its
composition is placed circa 1761 (cf. editors’ note in the Pléiade) . The sentence that I have
just cited is the last one of the fragment as published in the Pléiade. It does not appear in the
comparable edition of the same group of notes by [M. G.] Streckeisen-Moultou, under the title
of « Fragment d’un Essai sur les langues » and « Notes détachées sur le même sujet, » in
Oeuvres et correspondances inédites de J. J. Rousseau ([Paris], 1861), p. 295.
4.Text presented by Jean Starobinski in « Les anagrammes de Ferdinand de Saussure:
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textes inédits, » Mercure de France (February 1964), [vol. 350; now published as Les mots
sous les mots: les anagrammes de Ferdinand de Saussure, ed. Starobinski (Paris, 1971)].
5.Rousseau is seemingly more cautious in the fragment on Pronunciation: “Thought is
analyzed by speech, speech by writing; speech represents thought by conventional signs, and
writing represents speech in the same way; thus the art of writing is nothing but a mediated
representation of thought, at least in the vocalic languages, the only ones that we use” (p.
1249; italics added). Only seemingly, for even if, unlike Saussure, Rousseau here forbids
himself to speak in general of the entire system, the notions of mediacy and of “vocalic
languages” leave the enigma intact. I shall be obliged to return to this.
6.Cf. L’origine de la géométrie, 1962.