still remaining legible, is destroyed while making visible the very idea of the sign. In as much
as it de-limits onto-theology, the metaphysics of presence and logocentrism, this last writing is
also the first writing.
To come to recognize, not within but on the horizon of the Heideggerian paths, and yet in
them, that the sense of being is not a transcendental or trans-epochal signified (even if it was
always dissimulated within the epoch) but already, in a truly unheard of sense, a determined
signifying trace, is to affirm that within the decisive concept of ontico-ontological difference,
all is not to be thought at one go; entity and being, ontic and ontological, “ontico-
ontological,” are, in an original style, derivative with regard to difference; and with respect to
what I shall later call differance, an economic concept designating the production of
differing/deferring. The ontico-ontological difference and its ground (Grund) in the “tran-
scendence of Dasein” (Vom Wesen des Grundes [Frankfurt am Main, 1955], p. i6 [p. 29]) are
not absolutely originary. Differance by itself would be more “originary,” but one would no
longer be able to call it “origin” or “ground,” those notions belonging essentially to the
history of onto-theology, to the system functioning as the effacing of difference. It can,
however, be thought of in the closest proximity to itself only on
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one condition: that one begins by determining it as the ontico-ontologica’ difference before
erasing that determination. The necessity of passing through that erased determination, the
necessity of that trick of writing is irreducible. An unemphatic and difficult thought that,
through much unperceived mediation, must carry the entire burden of our question, a question
that I shall provisionally call historiai [historiale]. It is with its help that I shall later be able
to attempt to relate differance and writing.
The hestitation of these thoughts (here Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s) is not an “incoherence”:
it is a trembling proper to all post-Hegelian attempts and to this passage between two epochs.
The movements of deconstruction do not destroy structures from the outside. They are not
possible and effective, nor can they take accurate aim, except by inhabiting those structures.
Inhabiting them in a certain way, because one always inhabits, and all the more when one
does not suspect it. Operating necessarily from the inside, borrowing all the strategic and
economic resources of subversion from the old structure, borrowing them structurally, that is
to say without being able to isolate their elements and atoms, the enterprise of deconstruction
always in a certain way falls prey to its own work. This is what the person who has begun the
same work in another area of the same habitation does not fail to point out with zeal. No
exercise is more wide-spread today and one should be able to formalize its rules.
Hegel was already caught up in this game. On the one hand, he undoubtedly summed up the
entire philosophy of the logos. He determined ontology as absolute logic; he assembled all the
delimitations of philosophy as presence; he assigned to presence the eschatology of parousia,
of the self-proximity of infinite subjectivity. And for the same reason he had to debase or
subordinate writing. ‘When he criticizes the Leibnizian characteristic, the formalism of the
understanding, and mathematical symbolism, he makes the same gesture: denouncing the
being-outside-of-itself of the logos in the sensible or the intellectual abstraction. Writing is
that forget-ting of the self, that exteriorization, the contrary of the interiorizing memory, of the
Erinnerung that opens the history of the spirit. It is this that the Phaedrus said: writing is at
once mnemotechnique and the power of forgetting. Naturally, the Hegelian critique of writing
stops at the alpha-bet. As phonetic writing, the alphabet is at the same time more servile, more
contemptible, more secondary (“alphabetic writing expresses
sounds which are themselves
signs. It consists therefore of the signs of signs [’aus Zeichen der Zeichen’,” Enzyklopädie, §
459]) * but it is also the best writ-ing, the mind’s writing; its effacement before the voice, that
in it which respects the ideal interiority of phonic signifiers, all that by which it sub-
xxx fotnote start xxx
•
Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften in Grundrisse, Suhrkamp edition
(Frankfurt am Main, 1970), pp. 273-76).
xxxx fotnote slutt xxx
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limates space and sight, all that makes of it the writing of history, the writing, that is, of the
infinite spirit relating to itself in its discourse and its culture:
It follows that to learn to read and write an alphabetic writing should be regarded as a means
to infinite culture (unendliches Bildungsmittel) that is not enough appreciated; because thus
the mind, distancing itself from the concrete sense-perceptible, directs its attention on the
more formal moment, the sonorous word and its abstract elements, and contributes essentially
to the founding and purifying of the ground of interiority within the subject.
In that sense it is the Aufhebung of other writings, particularly of hieroglyphic script and of
the Leibnizian characteristic that had been criticized previously through one and the same
gesture. (Aufhebung is, more or less implicitly, the dominant concept of nearly all histories of
writing, even today. It is the concept of history and of teleology.) In fact, Hegel continues:
“Acquired habit later also suppresses the specificity of alphabetic writing, which consists in
seeming to be, in the interest of sight, a detour [Umweg] through hearing to arrive at
representations, and makes it into a hieroglyphic script for us, such that in using it, we do not
need to have present to our consciousness the mediation of sounds.”
It is on this condition that Hegel subscribes to the Leibnizian praise of nonphonetic writing. It
can be produced by deaf mutes, Leibniz had said. Hegel:
Beside the fact that, by the practice which transforms this alphabetic script into hieroglyphics,
the aptitude for abstraction acquired through such an exercise is conserved [italics added], the
reading of hieroglyphs is for itself a deaf reading and a mute writing (ein taubes Lesen and
ein stummes Schreiben). What is audible or temporal, visible or spatial, has each its proper
basis and in the first place they are of equal value; but in alphabetic script there is only one
basis and that following a specific relation, namely, that the visible language is related only as
a sign to the audible language; intelligence expresses itself immediately and unconditionally
through speech (ibid.).
What writing itself, in its nonphonetic moment, betrays, is life. It menaces at once the breath,
the spirit, and history as the spirit’s relation-ship with itself. It is their end, their finitude, their
paralysis. Cutting breath short, sterilizing or immobilizing spiritual creation in the repetition
of the letter, in the commentary or the exegesis, confined in a narrow space, reserved for a
minority, it is the principle of death and of difference in the becoming of being. It is to speech
what China is to Europe: “It is only to the exegeticism 14 of Chinese spiritual culture that