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close to Derrida’s vocabulary. But in fact that thought rests on a set of hierarchized
oppositions, is defined always as anterior rather than posterior, pre- rather than post-verbal,
pre- rather than postfigurative. It is an ambitious and valuable book, but it does not articulate
or perform the “sous rature.” It is not surprising, then, that Kristeva uses her long-standing
dyad—the génotexte and the phénotexte—when she reads individual poems, reverting to the
recognizable scientistic structuralist idiom, closing the book with a confidently
compartmentalized “Synoptic Table” arranged under “Lautréamont,” “Mallarmé,” “Political
Events and the Social Situation,” “Scientific Events-Discoveries,” and “French Colonialist
Expansion”—material for those general laws that differance would not countenance.
70.Paris, 1961; Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, tr.
Richard Howard, Plume Book edition (New York, Toronto, and London, 1971).
71.Ibid., p. ii, xi.
72.Ibid.
73. An early and vitriolic expression of this is to be found in “La chose freudienne,”
Ecrits
(Paris, 1966) : 401–36 (hereafter cited in the text as Ec) .
74.Scilicet I (Paris, 1968), (hereafter cited in the text as Sc), p. 47.
75.For example, Lacan’s “delightful play of homonyms” (Pos F 115, Pos E II 43) in “La
chose freudienne” (Ec, pp. 420–23) is discounted by Derrida as an ellipse that allows Lacan to
escape responsibility!
76.Les Séminaires de Jacques Lacan, Livre XI, Les Quatre concepts fondamentaux de la
psychanalyse (Paris, 1973), p. 132.
77.Ibid., p. 137.
78.This paper was presented at the johns Hopkins University as early as 1966. Later Derrida
will come to distrust such terms as “the totality of an era.”
79.Jeffrey Mehlman relates this project—the desire that word be one with meaning—with
Narcissus’s desire to be one with his image, and with the child’s narcissistic desire to be one
with the mother in his Structural Study of Autobiography: Proust, Leiris, Sartre, Lévi-Strauss
(Ithaca, London, 1974). I am indebted to Michael Ryan for an illuminating discussion of the
relationship between such a narcissism and Derrida’s project of “unbalancing” the equation.
In “La dissémination” (Dis pp. 322–407), Derrida presents the structure of the square with an
open (yet presupposed) fourth side—Ryan relates this to the forever active triangularity of the
oedipal position, which intervenes to resolve the unfulfilled narcissistic desire for self-
enclosure (review forthcoming, in Diacritics, of Mehlman’s book.) For a somewhat restricted
yet interesting discussion of Derrida’s tetrapolarity (logic of the open square, rather than the
Hegelian triplicity or circularity, and rather than the longed-for narcissistic self-enclosed
dyad) see Robert Greer Cohn, “Nodes,” I, Diacritics 4, i (Spring 1974) : 39.
80.See J. Hillis Miller, “The Geneva School: the Criticism of Marcel Raymond, Albert
Béguin, Georges Poulet, Jean Rousset, Jean-Pierre Richard, and Jean Starobinski,” Modern
French Criticism: From Proust and Valéry to Structuralism, ed. John K. Simon (Chicago and
London, 1972), pp. 277–310. For descriptions specifically of Maurice Blanchot and Georges
Poulet, see de Man, “Impersonality in the Criticism of Maurice Blanchot,” “The Literary Self
as Origin: the Work of Georges Poulet,” Blindness and Insight, op. cit., pp. 6o-78, 79–101.
Paul Ricoeur’s Le Conflit des interprétations: essais d’herméneutique (Paris, 1969) (The
Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics, tr. Don Ihde [Evanston, 1974]) should be
of particular interest to readers of this book, since Ricoeur delivers hermeneutic
interpretations of several texts that Derrida deconstructs. A most influential German text on
hermeneutics is Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer
philosophischen Hermeneutik, second edition (Tübingen, 1965), English translation
forthcoming from Seabury Press, New York.
81.Derrida refers to Gregory Bateson’s theory of schizophrenia. See, for example, “Toward a
Theory of Schizophrenia,” and “Double Bind, 1969,” Steps to an Ecology of Mind, Ballantine
Books edition (New York, 1972), pp. 201–27, 271–78.
82.Critique, 223 (December 1965) : 1017–42 (hereafter cited in the text as Crit I); and 224
(January 1966) : 23–53 (hereafter cited in the text as Crit II) .
((323))
83.“Die endliche and
unendliche Analyse,“ GW XVI: 59—99;
SE XXIII: 209—53.
84.For a cogent discussion of the problems relating to these two words as used by Derrida, see
“White Mythology” 5.
85.For a cogent discussion of translation and intertextuality, see Jeffrey Mehlman, “Portnoy in
Paris,” Diacritics 2, iv (Winter 1972) : 21.
Preface
1. It may be read as an essay published in the review Critique (December 1965—January
1966) . Three important publications provided me the opportunity: Madeleine V.-David, Le
débat sur les écritures et l’hieroglyphe aux xvii° et xviii° siècles (1965) (DE) ; André Leroi-
Gourhan, Le geste et la parole (1965) (GP) ; L’écriture et la psychologie des peuples
(Proceedings of a Colloquium, 1963) (EP) .
Exergue
1.Cf. for example, the notions of « secondary elaboration » or « symbolism of second
intention » in Edmond Ortigues, Le discours et le symbole (Aubier, 1962) pp. 62 and 171.
“Mathematical symbolism is a convention of writing, a scriptural symbolism. It is only by an
abuse of vocabulary or by analogy that one speaks of a ‘mathematical language.’ Algorithm is
actually a ‘characteristics,’ it is composed of written characters. It does not speak, except