_________________________
5 Although the two equations provide robust empirical tests, I conducted preliminary mediation model tests using
AMOS Version 26.0 to explore whether the immigration policy–FDI relationship could be explained with labor costs.
As shown in Figure A1 in Appendix 2, the refugee ceiling per capita is positively and significantly
(β = 15.38, P =
0.05) correlated with FDI inflows; higher refugee ceiling per capita predicts lower labor costs (β =
–133.77, P =
0.10), which in turn, predict more FDI inflows (β =
-0.03, P = 0.05). As shown in Figure 2, the alternative measure of
immigra
tion policy, restrictive immigration law, is negatively and significantly (β =
–0.12, P = 0.10) associated with
FDI; more restrictive immigration law predicts higher labor costs (β = 6.17, P = 0.10), which in turn, predict less FDI
inflows (β =
–0.02, P = 0.05). Overall, liberal immigration policies directly increase FDI inflows and decrease labor
costs.
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15
Table 4.
The Impact of Immigration Policy on FDI Inflows in the U.S.
Variables
Refugee ceiling per
capita
Restrictive immigration
law
Lawful permanent
resident
FDI
t–1
–0.553**
–0.545***
–0.273**
–0.759***
–0.304**
–0.676**
(0.245)
(0.206)
(0.140)
(0.259)
(0.144)
(0.298)
∆
Immigration
policy
t
18.159**
34.224**
–0.147**
–0.351**
0.988**
1.780**
(9.266)
(13.02)
(0.225)
(0.184)
(0.372)
(0.653)
Immigration policy
t–1
–2.615
107.913***
–0.219**
–0.935***
0.655
1.307*
(4.609)
(28.785)
(0.352)
(0.271)
(0.719)
(0.883)
∆
Labor cost
t
–0.047
0.006
–
0.044
–0.005
–0.044**
0.028
(0.020)
(0.087)
(0.020)
(0.037)
(0.017)
(0.043)
Labor cost
t–1
–0.026*
–0.114*
–0.002**
–0.039***
–0.001*
–0.060***
(0.017)
(0.087)
(0.004)
(0.009)
(0.004)
(0.014)
∆
Corporate tax
t
–15.761**
–8.831**
–10.298
(8.842)
(4.628)
(6.086)
Corporate tax
t–1
6.235
4.903**
4.697
(9.646)
(2.616)
(2.807)
∆
Regulation
t
–0.00001
0.0001**
0.0004
(0.00004)
(0.00002)
(0.00002)
Regulation
t–1
–0.00002
–0.00003
0.00001
(0.00003)
(0.00002)
(0.00001)
∆
Government
expenditures
t
1.607*
–0.062
–0.037
(0.956)
(0.303)
(0.383)
Government
expenditures
t–1
0.277
–0.456***
–0.304
(0.605)
(0.154)
(0.195)
∆
Economic growth
t
0.541*
0.032
0.115
(0.322)
(0.062)
(0.074)
Economic growth
t–1
0.570*
0.016
0.030
(0.339)
(0.060)
(0.064)
∆
Market size
t
76.748
88.302**
132.247
(169.010)
(49.208)
(87.667)
Market size
t–1
–8.273
9.075
4.048
(11.660)
(9.709)
(9.925)
∆
Interest rate
t
0.094
0.161***
0.116
(0.220)
(0.063)
(0.081)
Interest rate
t–1
0.188
0.160**
0.252**
(0.241)
(0.093)
(0.102)
∆
Inflation
t
–0.190
–0.148**
–0.026
(0.215)
(0.083)
(0.081)
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Inflation
t–1
–0.507*
0.045
0.010
(0.297)
(0.079)
(0.102)
∆
Trade openness
t
–0.052
0.178**
0.040
(0.176)
(0.101)
(0.131)
Trade openness
t–1
0.022
–0.137**
–0.107
(0.142)
(0.080)
(0.117)
∆
Union membership
t
–0.514
–0.059
–0.088
(0.534)
(0.146)
(0.103)
Union membership
t–1
–0.946*
–0.149***
–0.158**
(0.649)
(0.044)
(0.060)
Constant
178.046
–162.086
0.335
–69.133
(227.875)
(185.431)
(0.368)
(191.851)
R–Squared
0.538
0.929
0.515
0.831
0.505
0.774
Durbin–Watson
1.766
2.811
1.873
2.488
1.793
2.197
Note
: Prais–Winsten (PW) estimation is used here.
*p
< .10,
**p
< .05,
***p
< .01; one-tailed test. Semirobust
standard errors are in parenthesis.
Next, Columns 2, 4, and 6 report the result estimations testing the impact of immigration
policy on FDI inflows, with all control variables. As shown in Column 2, the coefficient
estimates of the differenced value of annual refugee admission per capita are positively and
statistically significant at the 0.05 level in the short term. This indicates that, holding all else
equal, where the annual refugee ceiling per total population increases 1%, the FDI growth rate
increases by 34.2%. The lagged measure of the annual refugee ceiling in relation to total
population, which indicates the long-term relationship to FDI, is also positive and significant at
the 0.01 level. The actual magnitude, the so-called long-term multiplier, suggests that the
growth rate for FDI will continue to change a total of 196% following a one% increase in the
annual refugee ceiling. The error correction rate (–0.55) indicates that FDI growth rate will
change 107.8% after one year, another 59.3% after two years, 32.6% after three years, and so
on, until the two series come back to equilibrium. These results suggest that when it has more
expansive immigration law, the U.S. will receive more FDI. Column 4 shows the results of the
alternative model, which tests the impact of reforms of U.S. immigration law on FDI inflows.
The coefficient of the differenced term of immigration laws is negative and significant,
suggesting that an immigration restriction leads to an immediate 0.4% decrease in FDI growth
rate. Furthermore, the coefficient for the lagged level is also negative and statistically significant
at the 0.01 level. This suggests that immigration restrictions lead to a 1.2% decrease in predicted
FDI growth rate over the long term. Additionally, Column 6 reports that both the differenced
and lagged terms of the lawful permanent resident variable are positively and statistically
significantly associated with FDI. The results suggest in particular that lawful permanent
residents leads to a 1.9% increase in predicted FDI growth rate over the long term. Although the
three measures of immigration policies show significantly different impacts on FDI growth rate,
together they indicate a strong positive impact of expansive immigration policies on FDI.
As expected, Columns 2, 4, and 6 show that the mediating variable, unit labor costs, is
negative and statistically significant (at the 0.10, the 0.01, and the 0.01 levels, respectively)
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17
particularly over the long term. In the ECM model, which includes the annual refugee ceiling, a
1% increase in unit labor costs leads to a 0.2% decrease in predicted FDI growth rate over the
long term. Further, in the long-term expectation, a 1% increase in unit labor costs causes a
0.05% in FDI growth rate in the model that includes years of restrictive immigration laws, and a
0.09% decrease in FDI growth rate in the model that includes the number of lawful permanent
residents per capita. The results indicate a strong negative relationship between labor costs and
FDI, particularly over the long run.
For the other key control variables, the results from both models shown in Table 4 indicate
that most of the control variables perform largely as expected. The coefficients for the corporate
tax variable are negative and statistically significant in the short term. The empirical results for
the impact of government expenditure on FDI show different results for the different measures
of immigration policy. Both the differenced and lagged values in the model that measures
immigration policy as annual refugee admission ceiling per capita are positively associated with
FDI inflows, but the effect is only marginally significant with the differenced value. However,
the coefficients for government consumption expenditure variables are negatively correlated
with FDI inflows in the model that measures immigration policy with immigration law, but only
the effect of the lagged value of expenditure on FDI is statistically significant.
6
As expected, the
economic growth variable is positive and significant both in the short- and long-term
expectations. The inflation rate is negative and significant only over the long term. However,
these three variables are only statistically significantly different in the ECM model that includes
the annual refugee ceiling per capita. Last, the coefficients for union membership indicate a
negative and statistically significant long-run effect on FDI growth rate. These results indicate
that high unionization may signal a less friendly business climate.
As alternative specifications of the models that omit control variables, Table 5 reports
findings from ECMs that investigate the link between immigration policies and the mediating
variable of labor costs. The results from Columns 1 and 3 indicate that liberal immigration
policies increase FDI inflows, suggesting that the refugee ceiling and the restrictive immigration
law variables are negatively and positively correlated, respectively, with unit labor costs,
particularly for long-run expectations. These results are all statistically significant at the 0.05
level. Additionally, the results from Column 5 indicate that the lagged measure for lawful
permanent resident is negatively and significantly associated with unit labor costs. The results
from the full models with all control variables (Columns 2, 4, and 6) are substantively
unchanged: the lagged values for all three indicators of the federal immigration policy are
statistically significantly correlated with unit labor costs. Specifically, Column 2 indicates that
unit labor costs change by a total of 196% following a 1% increase in the annual refugee
admission ceiling per population. The results from Columns 4 and 6 indicate that a year of
restrictive immigration reform and a 1% increase in lawful permanent resident per capita will
lead to a 13.4% increase and a 26.9% decrease in unit labor costs, respectively, over the long
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