METROPOLITAN CHURCH OF BESSARABIA
25
AND OTHERS v. MOLDOVA JUDGMENT
For domestic law to meet these requirements, it must afford a measure of
legal protection against arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the
rights guaranteed by the Convention. In matters affecting fundamental rights
it would be contrary to the rule of law, one of the basic principles of a
democratic society enshrined in the Convention, for a legal discretion
granted to the executive to be expressed in terms of an unfettered power.
Consequently, the law must indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of any
such discretion and the manner of its exercise (see Hasan and Chaush
v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 30985/96, § 84, ECHR 2000-XI).
The level of precision required of domestic legislation – which cannot in
any case provide for every eventuality – depends to a considerable degree
on the content of the instrument in question, the field it is designed to cover
and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed (see Hashman
and Harrup, cited above, § 31, and Groppera Radio AG and Others
v. Switzerland, judgment of 28 March 1990, Series A no. 173, p. 26, § 68).
110. In the present case the Court notes that section 14 of the Law of
24 March 1992 requires religious denominations to be recognised by a
government decision and that, according to section 9 of the same law, only
denominations whose practices and rites are compatible with the Moldovan
Constitution and legislation may be recognised.
Without giving a categorical answer to the question whether the above-
mentioned provisions satisfy the requirements of foreseeability and
precision, the Court is prepared to accept that the interference in question
was “prescribed by law” before deciding whether it pursued a “legitimate
aim” and was “necessary in a democratic society”.
3. Legitimate aim
111. At the hearing on 2 October 2001 the Government submitted that
the refusal to allow the application for recognition lodged by the applicants
was intended to protect public order and public safety. The Moldovan State,
whose territory had repeatedly passed in earlier times from Romanian to
Russian control and vice versa, had an ethnically and linguistically varied
population. That being so, the young Republic of Moldova, which had been
independent since 1991, had few strengths it could depend on to ensure its
continued existence, but one factor conducive to stability was religion, the
majority of the population being Orthodox Christians. Consequently,
recognition of the Moldovan Orthodox Church, which was subordinate to
the patriarchate of Moscow, had enabled the entire population to come
together within that Church. If the applicant Church were to be recognised,
that tie was likely to be lost and the Orthodox Christian population
dispersed among a number of Churches. Moreover, under cover of the
applicant Church, which was subordinate to the patriarchate of Bucharest,
political forces were at work, acting hand-in-glove with Romanian interests
favourable to reunification between Bessarabia and Romania. Recognition
26
METROPOLITAN CHURCH OF BESSARABIA
AND OTHERS v. MOLDOVA JUDGMENT
of the applicant Church would therefore revive old Russo-Romanian
rivalries within the population, thus endangering social stability and even
Moldova’s territorial integrity.
112. The applicants denied that the measure complained of had been
intended to protect public order and public safety. They alleged that the
Government had not shown that the applicant Church had constituted a
threat to public order and public safety.
113. The Court considers that States are entitled to verify whether a
movement or association carries on, ostensibly in pursuit of religious aims,
activities which are harmful to the population or to public safety (see
Manoussakis and Others, cited above, p. 1362, § 40, and Stankov and the
United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria, nos. 29221/95 and
29225/95, § 84, ECHR 2001-IX).
Having regard to the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that
the interference complained of pursued a legitimate aim under Article 9 § 2,
namely protection of public order and public safety.
4. Necessary in a democratic society
(a) General principles
114. The Court refers to its settled case-law to the effect that, as
enshrined in Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of
the foundations of a “democratic society” within the meaning of the
Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements
that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of life, but
it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the
unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which
has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it.
While religious freedom is primarily a matter of individual conscience, it
also implies, inter alia, freedom to “manifest [one’s] religion” alone and in
private or in community with others, in public and within the circle of those
whose faith one shares. Bearing witness in words and deeds is bound up
with the existence of religious convictions. That freedom entails, inter alia,
freedom to hold or not to hold religious beliefs and to practise or not to
practise a religion (see Kokkinakis v. Greece, judgment of 25 May 1993,
Series A no. 260-A, p. 17, § 31, and Buscarini and Others v. San Marino
[GC], no. 24645/94, § 34, ECHR 1999-I). Article 9 lists a number of forms
which manifestation of one’s religion or belief may take, namely worship,
teaching, practice and observance. Nevertheless, Article 9 does not protect
every act motivated or inspired by a religion or belief (see Kalaç v. Turkey,
judgment of 1 July 1997, Reports 1997-IV, p. 1209, § 27).
115. The Court has also said that, in a democratic society, in which
several religions coexist within one and the same population, it may be
necessary to place restrictions on this freedom in order to reconcile the