METROPOLITAN CHURCH OF BESSARABIA
27
AND OTHERS v. MOLDOVA JUDGMENT
interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are
respected (see Kokkinakis, cited above, p. 18, § 33).
116. However, in exercising its regulatory power in this sphere and in its
relations with the various religions, denominations and beliefs, the State has
a duty to remain neutral and impartial (see Hasan and Chaush, cited above,
§ 78). What is at stake here is the preservation of pluralism and the proper
functioning of democracy, one of the principle characteristics of which is
the possibility it offers of resolving a country’s problems through dialogue,
without recourse to violence, even when they are irksome (see United
Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 30 January
1998, Reports 1998-I, p. 27, § 57). Accordingly, the role of the authorities
in such circumstances is not to remove the cause of tension by eliminating
pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups tolerate each other (see
Serif v. Greece, no. 38178/97, § 53, ECHR 1999-IX).
117. The Court further observes that in principle the right to freedom of
religion for the purposes of the Convention excludes assessment by the
State of the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the ways in which those beliefs
are expressed. State measures favouring a particular leader or specific
organs of a divided religious community or seeking to compel the
community or part of it to place itself, against its will, under a single
leadership, would also constitute an infringement of the freedom of religion.
In democratic societies the State does not need to take measures to ensure
that religious communities remain or are brought under a unified leadership
(see Serif, cited above, § 52). Similarly, where the exercise of the right to
freedom of religion or of one of its aspects is subject under domestic law to
a system of prior authorisation, involvement in the procedure for granting
authorisation of a recognised ecclesiastical authority cannot be reconciled
with the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 9 (see, mutatis mutandis,
Pentidis and Others v. Greece, judgment of 9 June 1997, Reports 1997-III,
p. 995, § 46).
118. Moreover, since religious communities traditionally exist in the
form of organised structures, Article 9 must be interpreted in the light of
Article 11 of the Convention, which safeguards associative life against
unjustified State interference. Seen in that perspective, the right of believers
to freedom of religion, which includes the right to manifest one’s religion in
community with others, encompasses the expectation that believers will be
allowed to associate freely, without arbitrary State intervention. Indeed, the
autonomous existence of religious communities is indispensable for
pluralism in a democratic society and is thus an issue at the very heart of the
protection which Article 9 affords (see Hasan and Chaush, cited above,
§ 62).
In addition, one of the means of exercising the right to manifest one’s
religion, especially for a religious community, in its collective dimension, is
the possibility of ensuring judicial protection of the community, its
28
METROPOLITAN CHURCH OF BESSARABIA
AND OTHERS v. MOLDOVA JUDGMENT
members and its assets, so that Article 9 must be seen not only in the light
of Article 11, but also in the light of Article 6 (see, mutatis mutandis,
Sidiropoulos and Others v. Greece, judgment of 10 July 1998, Reports
1998-IV, p. 1614, § 40, and Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, judgment of
16 December 1997, Reports 1997-VIII, pp. 2857 and 2859, §§ 33 and 40-
41, and opinion of the Commission, p. 2867, §§ 48-49).
119. According to its settled case-law, the Court leaves to States party to
the Convention a certain margin of appreciation in deciding whether and to
what extent an interference is necessary, but that goes hand in hand with
European supervision of both the relevant legislation and the decisions
applying it. The Court’s task is to ascertain whether the measures taken at
national level are justified in principle and proportionate.
In order to determine the scope of the margin of appreciation in the
present case the Court must take into account what is at stake, namely the
need to maintain true religious pluralism, which is inherent in the concept of
a democratic society (see Kokkinakis, cited above, p. 17, § 31). Similarly, a
good deal of weight must be given to that need when determining, as
paragraph 2 of Article 9 requires, whether the interference corresponds to a
“pressing social need” and is “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”
(see, mutatis mutandis, among many other authorities, Wingrove v. the
United Kingdom, judgment of 25 November 1996,
Reports 1996-V, p. 1956,
§ 53). In exercising its supervision, the Court must consider the interference
complained of on the basis of the file as a whole (see Kokkinakis, cited
above, p. 21, § 47).
(b) Application of the above principles
120. The Government submitted that the interference complained of was
necessary in a democratic society. In the first place, to recognise the
applicant Church the State would have had to give up its position of
neutrality in religious matters, and in religious conflicts in particular, which
would have been contrary to the Moldovan Constitution and Moldovan
public policy. It was therefore in order to discharge its duty of neutrality that
the Government had urged the applicant Church to settle its differences with
the Metropolitan Church of Moldova first.
Secondly, the refusal to recognise, in the Government’s submission, was
necessary for national security and Moldovan territorial integrity, regard
being had to the fact that the applicant Church engaged in political
activities, working towards the reunification of Moldova with Romania,
with the latter country’s support. In support of their assertions, they
mentioned articles in the Romanian press favourable to recognition of the
applicant Church by the Moldovan authorities and reunification of Moldova
with Romania.
Such activities endangered not only Moldova’s integrity but also its
peaceful relations with Ukraine, part of whose present territory had been