tendency to provide a de-contextualized and de-politicized account of
Schmitt’s recasting of international thought, dissociated from his concrete
intellectual project, contradicts and remains unaligned to Schmitt’s own
method of concept-formation.
What constituted the polemical object of Schmitt’s interventions?
During the Weimar period, Schmitt formulated his definition of sover-
eignty in terms of political decisionism as an ultra-authoritarian solution
to the intractable crisis of the Weimar Republic, destabilized by
coup d’E´tats,
strikes, civil unrest, and revolutions. The option for defining sovereignty in
terms of the exception was not the result of a dispassionate and scholarly
observation on the ultimate locus of sovereignty, but a politicized and
normative intervention into the jurisprudential debates on the interpretation
of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution – the scope of presidential emer-
gency powers and executive government by decree for the restoration of
social order. Similarly, the attempt to define the political in terms of an
existentialist, ontological, and agonal friend/enemy grouping served the
purpose to unify a fragmented industrial and mass-democratic society as a
homogeneous community against outside threats and to redeem Weimar
Germany’s lost right to conduct war.
Equally, Schmitt’s reinterpretation of the history of international law
during the 1930s and 1940s is bound to the concrete situation of the
intellectual and political crisis of legitimacy generated by Hitler’s spatial
revolution, for which Schmitt offered the most incisive and comprehensive
politico-jurisprudential justification, grounded in concrete-order-thinking.
This prepared the formulation of an alternative geopolitical order, pre-
dicated on ‘land-appropriation’, conceptualized in
Großraum. Consequently,
Schmitt’s research-organizing
Leitmotiv revolves around the central axis of
the pre-juridical and legitimacy-constituting act of ‘land-appropriation’ that
establishes a radical title to land and, by extension, a new
nomos of the
earth.
The Nomos, written between 1942 and 1945, and Land and Sea,
published in 1942, were conceived as long historico-legal detours to accu-
mulate the intellectual resources and arguments to legitimize Hitler’s
Raumrevolution – a rewriting of history by one of the leading intellectuals of
the ascendant axis-power. Schmitt pursues the dual strategy of developing a
conceptual counter-vocabulary to rewrite international history geopolitically
as a series of ‘spatial revolutions’, inserting Hitler’s
Großraumpolitik into a
transhistoricized continuum of ‘land-appropriations’; and, inversely, mobi-
lizing this reconstructed history to ascribe historical legitimacy and direction
to Nazi-Germany’s wars of conquest. The conjunction of both strategic
moves generates a perfect argumentative circularity. History is rewritten in
the light of Schmitt’s (geo-)politics and Schmitt’s historical revisionism jus-
tifies German imperialism. Although the recovery of the ideological purpose
Fatal attraction: Schmitt’s international theory 187
that motivated the conception of Schmitt’s political and international ana-
lytics does not
per se invalidate his account in an aprioristic manner, it
demands nevertheless a careful re-examination of its implications for his
theoretically informed history.
Against the background of this working hypothesis, the article starts with
a survey summary of the neo-Schmittian argument, followed by an expo-
sition of Schmitt’s theoretical premises – political decisionism, concept of the
political, and concrete-order-thinking. In the three substantive historical
sections, the article deconstructs Schmitt’s account of the Discoveries, the
age of absolutism and the
ius publicum, and the specificity of England. This
is followed by a critique of his interpretation of early modern international
law and warfare. The third historical section interrogates Schmitt’s inter-
pretation of Versailles, the League of Nations, the Monroe-Doctrine and his
concept of the
Großraum – notably against the background of his shift from
concrete-order-thinking towards an international political economy (IPE) of
capitalism. The penultimate section returns to the critique of Schmitt’s
theoretical premises, whereas the conclusion draws out some implications of
the deficiencies in Schmitt’s thought for the neo-Schmittian revival in IR.
The (neo-)Schmittian history and theory of international law and order
What is the secret behind Schmitt’s contemporaneity? The essential line
taken by neo-Schmittians (Kerve´gan 1999; Rasch 2004; Mouffe 2005,
2007; Odysseos and Petito 2007) relies on a broad endorsement of Schmitt’s
interpretation of the age of the
ius publicum – the body of maxims and
praxes of early modern international law that prevailed, roughly, through-
out the period from 1492/1648 to WWI – as a functioning system of legal
norms, regulating the excesses of interstate anarchy in a geopolitical plur-
iverse without erasing the essence of sovereign statehood: the public decision
to conduct war
. This unity of space and law – termed by Schmitt as nomos
in contradistinction to the universal medieval and liberal-capitalist cosmos –
revolved around the core categories of the state as the only legitimate subject
of war and peace, secularized and absolute state sovereignty, the executive
as the final arbiter over the state of exception, the idea of
iustus hostis (just
enemy) and the associated concept of ‘non-discriminatory war’. According
to Schmitt, the monopolization of warfare by states (
ius belli ac pacis)
removed violent conflict from the ideological struggles of ‘civil society’
and re-concentrated on organized violence at the level of the state. This
arrogation of the monopoly of violence by plural absolutist states for-
malized a double distinction – between public and private, de-legitimizing
and de-militarizing private actors (lords, cities, estates, pirates, military
orders) while elevating the public state to the only subject of international
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