and social alignment with liberal norms. Strictly speaking, the ‘liberal way
of war’ deserves no longer the appellation ‘war’ – hence the commotion
around the ill-chosen term ‘war on terror’ – but is transformed into a
series of policing actions, including the bio-politicization of populations,
otherwise known as humanitarian intervention. Furthermore, the ‘war
against terror’ after 9/11 does not constitute a departure from more law-
based cosmopolitan forms of international politics, but represents an
intensification of the logic of liberal world-ordering – the ‘neo-conservative
turn’ in the United States Administration notwithstanding. In the end, the
argument is that the contemporary period presents a return to the civil wars
of the pre-Westphalian period, even though American ‘world unity’ has
immeasurably expanded the efficacy of universal law in a global age, defined
as a ‘spaceless universalism’ driven by the ideology of ‘pan-interventionism’.
All of this, according to neo-Schmittians, is inscribed in the long-term
logic of the world-historical departure from Schmitt’s golden age of limited
interstate wars, which then appears in retrospect as – and is accordingly
elevated to the status of – the highest achievement of European civilization:
the genius of European jurisprudence. Beyond this deployment of Schmitt,
some neo-Schmittians re-mobilize, normatively, Schmitt’s idea of
Großraum –
a greater territorial space or a pan-region – as the elementary building
block for an anti-cosmopolitan, anti-universal organization of inter-
national order, based on a plurality of coexisting
Großra¨ume, each one
under the leadership of an imperial nation. Against the imminent threat of
a ‘spaceless universalism’, pan-regions are meant to provide guarantees
against the homogenization of the world into a liberal flatland – essential
for the maintenance of difference and pluralism – indeed essential for the
very possibility of the political, the friend/enemy distinction, encased in
mutually exclusive regional blocs. Viewed synthetically, this account
presents a powerful counter-narrative and conceptual apparatus to the
reigning discourse of liberal cosmopolitanism and requires a careful
re-examination.
Schmitt’s method: from political decisionism to concrete-order-thinking
Any critique of this Schmittian argument will have to start from Schmitt’s
context-bound method and his shifting position during the mid-30s from
political decisionism to concrete-order-thinking. Schmitt famously rede-
fined sovereignty from the angle of the emergency situation, captured by
Schmitt’s decisionism, forged during the early Weimar period in his cri-
tique of Kelsen’s legal normativism (Kelsen 1967). ‘Sovereign is he who
decides on the emergency situation’ (Schmitt 1985b). As legal norms
could only function in normal situations, legal normativism was liable to
Fatal attraction: Schmitt’s international theory 191
a de-personalized, apolitical, and ahistorical blindness. Sovereignty,
according to Schmitt, is not invested in the state as an impersonal and
objective legal subject (an aggregate of rules and statutes), but inter-
mittently crystallizes if and when political crises and social disorder –
liminal situations – escape constitutional norms. Such constitutional crises
require an extra-legal and eminently political executive decision by a
single authority for the reassertion of order, grounded in the state’s right of
self-preservation. Moments of indeterminacy and indecision in the objective
legal order require rapid and firm, essentially discretionary if not arbitrary,
fact-setting acts of subjective decision. Decisionism captures the idea that
sovereignty resides ultimately in that power that can declare and enforce
the state of exception, suspending the constitution in an emergency, whose
declaration cannot be derived from extant legal norms and standard
procedures of decision making.
Auctoritas, non veritas facit legem. The
sovereign decision is a self-referential and unmediated act of authority –
singular, absolute, and final. Jurisprudentially, it appears
ex nihilo. This
discretionary element of ‘political surplus-value’ re-established the primacy
of politics over the rule of law. Legality does not exhaust legitimacy.
Decisionism was complemented by Schmitt’s concept of the political. It
was formally defined in terms of an intensification of antagonisms that
escalated towards the friend/enemy distinction (Schmitt 1996), which
demanded at some unspecifiable point a political decision on the identi-
fication of the internal and external enemy to forge a decisive political
unit and to maintain existential autonomy. The decision activated the
differentiation between the inside and the outside and, within the inside,
that which had to be externalized. This precipitated a redefinition of the
meaning of democracy. For Schmitt, ‘democracy requires therefore, first
homogeneity and second – if the need arises – elimination or eradication
of heterogeneity’ (Schmitt 1985a, 9), rather than the ‘perennial discussions’
of parliamentarian democracy grounded in liberal pluralism. This instan-
tiated the consolidation of an otherwise intensely fragmented industrial and
mass-democratic society into a socially homogeneous political community –
an ethnically defined
demos – through the joint first principles of autono-
mous executive sovereignty: external war and internal repression. By
appealing to the
prima ratio of self-preservation, the overriding threats to
security and national independence demote and flatten all domestic differ-
ences and generate the required unity and unanimity. Democracy, according
to Schmitt, is thus redefined in identitarian terms as the direct representation
of a unified people (
Volk) by the political leadership, possibly weakly
mediated by irregular acts of spontaneous acclamation and plebiscitary
elements that intermittently renew the bond between the leader and the
led – the national myth of direct democracy.
192
B E N N O G E R H A R D T E S C H K E