Inter-American Court of Human Rights
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A) Beneficiaries204. The Court will now determine which persons should be deemed “injured parties” pursuant to Article 63(1) of the American Convention and, as such, entitled to such reparations as the Court may decide. First, the Court considers Hugo Muñoz-Sánchez, Dora Oyague-Fierro, Marcelino Rosales-Cárdenas, Bertila Lozano-Torres, Luis Enrique Ortiz-Perea, Armando Richard Amaro-Cóndor, Robert Edgar Teodoro-Espinoza, Heráclides Pablo-Meza, Juan Gabriel Mariños-Figueroa, and Felipe Flores-Chipana “injured parties,” in their capacity as victims of the violations found to have been committed to their detriment (supra paras. 112, 116 and 161); accordingly, they are entitled to such reparations as the Court may establish for pecuniary and non pecuniary damage. 205. The Court also considers that the next of kin of the above-named persons, in their own capacity as victims of the violation of the rights recognized in Articles 5(1), 8(1) and 25 of the American Convention, in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 thereof (supra paras. 129 and 161) are “injured parties.” 206. The victims’ next of kin are entitled to the reparations to be set by the Court for non pecuniary and/or pecuniary damage, in their own capacity as victims of the declared breaches of the Convention, as well as to the reparations set by the Court in their capacity as successors of Hugo Muñoz-Sánchez, Dora Oyague-Fierro, Marcelino Rosales-Cárdenas, Bertila Lozano-Torres, Luis Enrique Ortiz-Perea, Armando Richard Amaro-Cóndor, Robert Edgar Teodoro-Espinoza, Heráclides Pablo-Meza, Juan Gabriel Mariños-Figueroa, and Felipe Flores-Chipana. Consequently, in addition to the aforementioned ten victims, the following persons are deemed “injured parties:”
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207. The Court considers that the irregular transfer of the investigation to the military jurisdiction amounted to the State’s failure to comply with its duty to investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute and punish, those responsible for the facts, as well as a breach of the right to fair trial, embodied in Article 8(1) of the Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment of the victims’ next of kin (supra para. 145). Nevertheless, the Court cannot disregard the fact that the judgment issued by the CSJM on May 3, 1994 also ordered, inter alia, payment of compensation in the amount of 300,000.00 (three hundred thousand) Peruvian New Soles per each one of the ten victims, “as civil damages to the legal heirs of the aggrieved parties.” Thus, between 1996 and 1998, the State made payment of said amount to the legal heirs of the aforementioned ten victims (supra para. 80(56)). In this regard, the Court is aware of the principle under which compensation may neither enrich nor impoverish the victim or the victim’s beneficiaries (supra para. 202), and therefore this aspect needs to be analyzed. 208. Due to the fact that the aforementioned CSJM judgment did not clearly state on what account the victims’ heirs had been awarded said “civil damages,” the Court requested the parties to submit information and clarifications in that regard, to be used as evidence to facilitate adjudication of the case (supra para. 36). In this regard, the State argued that, even though the judgment failed to expressly mention the legal grounds on which such damages were awarded, “in Peruvian military criminal law, civil damages cover both the pecuniary damage and moral prejudice inflicted upon the victim and the victim’s representatives.” The State further contended that “ordinary criminal law provisions also apply[, in respect of which,] in the event of civil damages awarded in a criminal action, compensation for the damage caused to the aggrieved party is covered, in addition to the restitution of property.” On the other hand, the Commission stated that the compensation paid had been awarded “to the victims, but not to their next of kin, as civil damages to compensate for the harm caused.” 209. In their final plea, the representatives stated that “such payment does not mean that the State has in [any] way fulfilled its international obligation to make reparation for the damage caused through adequate compensation[; that such payment] failed to meet the requirements established by the Inter-American Court’s case law for damages compensation […] as […] it was effected on a partial basis[,] since it is yet unclear on what account it was made [and] because the compensation thus paid does not cover the damage caused after the awarding judgment was issued[, i.e. it only accounted] for the timespan between the occurrence of the facts and the issue of the judgment.” Moreover, in its final plea, the State claimed that “in the Peruvian legal system, civil reparation awarded through a criminal judgment is payable [only] to the aggrieved party’s legal heirs.” In turn, in its final plea, the Commission merely noted that the payment ordered to be made to the victims’ legal heirs through the CSJM’s Judgment was actually effected, even though such heirs were prevented from appearing as civil parties in the military proceeding. 210. In this regard, the Court considers that the civil reparation awarded through said CSJM judgment was granted on account of the damage caused to the ten victims that were executed and caused to disappear –the “aggrieved parties,” in the language of the judgment– and that said compensation did not provide redress for damage directly caused to their next of kin, who were paid the aforementioned amounts in their capacity as the victims’ next of kin. Moreover, it is the Court’s opinion that the elements of the body of evidence do not show on what account such “civil damages” were awarded, as the legislation invoked before the Court deals with “pecuniary damage or moral prejudice” – in the case of military criminal law – and “damages” – in civil legislation. Put differently, said legislation does not clearly show which specific damage was sought to be redressed through the payment ordered. However, and due to the fact that payment has already been made, the Court will take it into consideration for the purposes of setting reparations in this Judgment, as compensation for the monetary aspects of both the pecuniary and non pecuniary damage sustained by the ten victims that were executed or caused to disappear. Therefore, the timespan covered by said civil damages is irrelevant, as indicated by the representatives. * * *
212. In this regard, notwithstanding the above statements (supra para. 211), there is no evidence that Law No. 28592, “creating the comprehensive reparations program – PIR,” of July 29, 2005, which was relied upon by the State, has been applied at all in the instant case. Furthermore, under Section 4 thereof, “victims who have been awarded reparations by virtue of other decisions or State policies […] shall not be deemed victims and, accordingly, shall not benefit from the programs addressed herein.” Therefore, this Court will not go into the analysis of the scope of said Law. Yüklə 0,88 Mb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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