Ligjërata master 2012-2013 syllabusi 2012-2013

One lesson that the world has learned since the financial crisis of 2008 is that a contractionary fiscal policy means what it says: contraction. Since 2010, a Europe-wide experiment has conclusively falsified the idea that fiscal contractions are expansionary. August 2011 saw the largest monthly decrease in eurozone industrial production since September 2009, German exports fell sharply in October, and now-casting.com is predicting declines in eurozone GDP for late 2011 and early 2012.

A second, related lesson is that it is difficult to cut nominal wages, and that they are certainly not flexible enough to eliminate unemployment. That is true even in a country as flexible, small, and open as Ireland, where unemployment increased last month to 14.5%, emigration notwithstanding, and where tax revenues in November ran 1.6% below target as a result. If the nineteenth-century “internal devaluation” strategy to promote growth by cutting domestic wages and prices is proving so difficult in Ireland, how does the EU expect it to work across the entire eurozone periphery?

What is needed to save the eurozone in the medium term is a central bank mandated to target more than just inflation – for example, unemployment, financial stability, and the survival of the single currency. A common framework for regulating the financial system is also required, as is a common banking-resolution framework that serves the interests of taxpayers and government bondholders, rather than those of banks and their creditors. This will require a minimal fiscal union; a full-scale fiscal union would be better still. Yet none of this was on the summit’s agenda.

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The Euro in a Shrinking Zone
Robert Skidelsky
15-12-2011

…Robert Skidelsky, a member of the British House of Lords, is Professor Emeritus of Political Economy at Warwick University.

The recent European Union summit was a disaster. Both Britain and Germany played the wrong game: British Prime Minister David Cameron isolated Britain from Europe, while German Chancellor Angela Merkel isolated the eurozone from reality.

The agreement reached in Brussels forecloses any possibility of Keynesian demand management to fight recession. “Structural” budget deficits would be limited to 0.5% of GDP, with (as yet undisclosed) penalties for violators.

[Marrëveshja e arritur në Bruksel perjashton çdo mundësi të menaxhimit Keynesian të kërkesës për të luftuar recesionin. Deficitet buxhetore "strukturore" do të kufizohen në 0.5% të PBB-së, me gjobat (ende të pazbuluara) për shkelësit.]

This is the wrong cure for the eurozone crisis. The Merkel doctrine holds that the crisis is the result of government profligacy (leshim), so only a “hard” balanced-budget rule can prevent such crises from recurring.

But Merkel’s analysis is utterly wrong. It was not deficit spending by governments that fueled the economic collapse of 2007-2008, but excessive lending by banks. Government’s mounting debts have been a response to the economic downturn, not its cause. What ought to have been hard-wired into the EU’s institutional structure was not permanent fiscal austerity, but tough financial regulation. Of this there is little sign.

The idea that a country can achieve a trade surplus by importing nothing is as fanciful (e çuditshme) as the idea that a government can repay its debt by starving itself of revenue. One person’s spending is another person’s income. In insisting that its main trade partners cut their spending, Merkel is cutting Germany off from the main sources of its own growth.

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Fragile and Unbalanced in 2012
NourielRoubini
2011-12-15

Nouriel Roubini is Chairman of Roubini Global Economics and professor at the Stern School of Business, New York University.

Restoring robust growth is difficult enough without the ever-present specter of deleveraging (the process or practice of reducing the level of one’s debt by rapidly selling one’s assets) and a severe shortage of policy ammunition. But that is the challenge that a fragile and unbalanced global economy faces in 2012. To paraphrase Bette Davis in All About Eve, “Fasten your seatbelts, it’s going to be a bumpy year!”

[Rivendosja e rritjes së fuqishme është mjaft e vështirë pa spektrin gjithnjë të pranishem të deleverazhit (proces ose praktikë e reduktimit të nivelit të borxhit përmes shitjes së shpejtë të aseteve respektive) dhe një mungesë intensive e armëve (municionit) të politikës. Por kjo është sfida që një ekonomi e brishtë dhe e pabalancuar globale përballet në vitin 2012. Ta parafrazoj Bette Davis në “All About Eve ": “Lidhni rripin tuaj, sepse do të jetë një vit me gunga!”]

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Gordon Brown: Why we need tougher regulation of our financial system

There is an urgent need to reshape financial regulation in Britain and across the world to meet the new challenges of the 21st century.

By Gordon Brown

15 Mar 2009

The new challenge is that with global financial flows so large and so interlinked, we live in a world where a bad bank anywhere is a threat to good banks everywhere; where financial products have become so complex that the senior management of banks often did not understand the risks they were taking on; and where selling assets around the globe did not diversify risk but instead spread contagion.

I have learned from this financial crisis that the disciplines we expect of markets cannot be guaranteed without strengthened supervision. This government and governments everywhere have to respond to the huge wave of global financial flows that spawned new trillion dollar markets outside the regulatory net.

Faced with these new realities, we must reshape our financial and regulatory system internationally and at home.

The starting point must be the five core principles I set out last October – transparency, accountability, responsible risk-taking, prudential regulation and international co-operation.

While the 1997 supervisory system was right for the circumstances we faced then, it is now clear that the detailed regulation of financial markets across the world did not keep up with the pace of change in the global economy.

In the coming weeks we will discuss with our G20 partners how we take the first and most critical steps towards more co-ordinated global financial supervision. And in the next few days Lord Turner will set out his review of financial regulation for Britain.

First, transparency means bringing the so-called 'shadow banking system' into the regulatory system, not operating parallel to it. And across the world, financial institutions need to be supervised not on what name they give themselves – be it banks, hedge funds or investment funds – but on what they do. We also need to ensure that all jurisdictions – such as offshore havens – and all important markets are covered by global supervision.

Second accountability means boardroom integrity, where boards of directors must understand and be held responsible for the risks they undertake. And credit rating agencies need to be free of conflicts of interest and be properly licensed.

Third, responsible risk taking means an end to the excesses from short-termism, instead rewarding people for long term success not short term deals. But to be most effective it has to be done internationally. A race to the bottom is in no ones interest. So we should agree a new international approach to pay and bonus structures.

The fourth principle of prudential regulation means taking into account the effect of a bank's capital, liquidity, solvency and conduct on the whole financial system.

The complex and strengthened supervision we require does not mean a return to the pre-1997 system, as some have suggested, which was undermined by Barings, BCCI and the scandal of the mis-selling of personal pensions. Indeed to end the pre-1997 mismatch of patchwork self regulation, it was right to set up – as it is to continue – with a unified regulator with strong powers to impose fines and curb market abuse.

Some say that prudential supervision – managing liquidity and solvency – and the conduct of business – the selling of products – should now be separated, what is called the twin peaks approach. In fact separating the regulation of conduct from the prudential supervision of financial institutions in the US. Hid for too long the scandal of subprime mortgages. Not surprisingly, a unified regulator – once criticised by some as too heavy-handed, too intrusive and too powerful – was subsequently copied by many countries around the world.

And just last week Ben Bernancke the chairman of the federal reserve said that he believed "the US needs an overarching regulatory authority to prevent a repeat of risks building up unchecked across the financial system." So the answer is not to abolish our single, expert regulator – the FSA – as some have suggested, but to strengthen it.

As we do so, we will need to do more to make sure banks put aside more capital during the good times so that they are better insulated from downturns. And as Alistair Darling has said, we need a workable means of ensuring that the FSA can tighten regulation if debt levels get too high.

And we must ensure that our regulators examine not just the solvency of our financial institutions but their liquidity as well. The reason that banks such as Northern Rock faced difficulty was because when global markets froze, they could no longer raise the short-term cash they needed to fund the obligations they had taken on.

Lastly, international co-operation lies at the heart of all our changes – recognising that financial institutions that work across borders need to be under cross border supervision too and regulators in one country must co-operate far more closely with regulators in other countries to create a global network of regulation that captures the risks to us all.

The world has changed beyond recognition not just in the past 10 years, but in the past 10 months too. Our system for financial regulation must change with it. This means a new tougher approach, addressing the new challenges, with a reformed, tougher and better-resourced Financial Services Authority at its core.

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Europe’s Time to Learn

Harold James

03 12 2010

PRINCETON – Crises are a chance to learn. For the past 200 years, with the exception of the Great Depression, major financial crises originated in poor and unstable countries, which then needed major policy adjustments. Today’s crisis started in rich industrial countries – not only with sub-prime mortgages in the United States, but also with mismanagement of banks and public debt in Europe. So what will Europe learn, and what relevance will those lessons have for the rest of the world?

[Krizat janë një shans për të mësuar. Për 200 vitet e fundit, me përjashtim të Depresionit të Madh, krizat e mëdha financiare janë të krijuara në vendet e varfra dhe të paqëndrueshme, të cilat pastaj kanë nevojë për ndryshime të mëdha politike. Kriza e sotme ka filluar në vendet e pasura industriale - jo vetëm me hipotekat më kryesore në Shtetet e Bashkuara, por edhe me keq-menaxhimin e bankave dhe të borxhit publik në Evropë. Pra, çfarë do të mësojë Evropa dhe çfarë rëndësie do të kenë këto mësime për pjesën tjetër të botës?

Europe’s contemporary problems offer striking parallels with previous problems on the periphery of the world economy. In successive waves of painful crisis – in Latin America in the 1980’s, and in East Asia after 1997 – countries learned a better approach to economic policy and developed a more sustainable framework for managing public-sector debt. Today it is Europe’s turn.

Problemet bashkëkohore të Evropës ofrojnë paralele të mrekullueshme me problemet e mëparshme në periferi të ekonomisë botërore. Në valët e njëpasnjëshme të krizës së dhimbshme - në Amerikën Latine në vitin 1980, dhe në Azinë Lindore pas 1997 - vendet kanë mësuar një qasje më të mirë ndaj politikave ekonomike dhe kanë zhvilluar një kuadër më të qëndrueshëm për menaxhimin e borxhit në sektorin publik. Sot kjo është faqja e Evropës.

The European crisis is coming full circle. Initially a financial crisis, it morphed into a classic public-debt crisis after governments stepped in to guarantee banks obligations. That, in turn, has created a new set of worries for banks that are over-exposed to supposedly secure government debt. Sovereign debt no longer looks stable.

Kriza Evropian po vjen në rreth të plotë. Fillimisht kriza financiare u shndërrua në një krizë klasike të borxhit publik, pasi që qeveritë u pozicionuan për të garantuar detyrimet e bankave. Kjo, nga ana tjetër, ka krijuar një seri të re të shqetësimeve për bankat që janë të mbingarkuara për gjoja siguruar borxhin e qeverisë. Borxhi shtetëror nuk duket më i qëndrueshëm.

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If Europe could show – in the worst possible scenario of sovereign default – how such a process might operate, uncertainty would be reduced and markets would be reassured. And, in the longer term, we would have a viable international model of how to tackle severe sovereign-debt problems.

Në qoftë se Evropa mund të tregojë - në rastin më të keq të mundshëm të dështimit shtetëror (sovereign default) – se si një proces i tillë që mund të veprojë, pasiguria do të reduktohet dhe tregjet do të risigurohen. Dhe, në afat të gjatë, ne do të kemi një model të qëndrueshëm ndërkombëtar se si duhet trajtuar problemet e rënda të borxhit shtetëror.

Harold James is Professor of History and International Affairs at Princeton University and Marie Curie Professor of History at the European University Institute, Florence. His most recent book is The Creation and Destruction of Value: The Globalization Cycle.

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The Euro at Mid-Crisis

Kenneth Rogoff

02 12 2010

CAMBRIDGE – Now that the European Union and the International Monetary Fund have committed €67.5 billion to rescue Ireland’s troubled banks, is the eurozone’s debt crisis finally nearing a conclusion?

Tani ajo që Bashkimi Evropian dhe Fondit Monetar Ndërkombëtar kanë zotuar 67.5 miliardë € për të shpëtuar bankat me probleme të Irlandës, a është afër përmbylla e krizë së borxhit të eurozonës?

Unfortunately, no. In fact, we are probably only at the mid-point of the crisis. To be sure, a huge, sustained burst of growth could still cure all of Europe’s debt problems – as it would anyone’s. But that halcyon scenario looks increasingly improbable. The endgame is far more likely to entail a wave of debt write-downs, similar to the one that finally wound up the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980’s.

Për fat të keq, jo. Në fakt, ne jemi ndoshta vetëm në pikën e mesme të krizës. Për të qenë të sigurtë, një hov i qëndrueshëm, i madh, i rritjes ende mundet për të kuruar të gjitha problemet e borxhit të Evropës – siç janë edhe të të tjerëve. Por se skenari i qetë duket gjithnjë e më i pamundshëm. Fundi i lojës është shumë më e mundshme të sjellë një valë të borxhit të pacaktuara, ngjashëm me atë që e kishim përfundimisht si një plagë në krizën e Amerikës Latine të borxhit, të viteve 1980-së.

For starters, there are more bailouts to come, with Portugal at the top of the list. With an average growth rate of less than 1% over the past decade, and arguably the most sclerotic labor market in Europe, it is hard to see how Portugal can grow out of its massive debt burden.

Për fillestarët, ekzistojnë më shumë raste që po vijnë që kanë nevojë për t’i ndihmuar (bailouts), me Portugalinë në krye të listës. Me një rritje mesatare prej më pak se 1% gjatë dekadës së kaluar dhe, ndoshta, me tregun më sklerotik të punës në Europë, është e vështirë për t’u parë se si Portugalia mund të përballojë barrën e madhe të borxhit.

This burden includes both public debt (owed by the government) and external dent (owed by the country as a whole to foreigners). The Portuguese rightly argue that their situation is not as dire as that of Greece, which is already in the economic equivalent of intensive care. But Portugal’s debt levels are still highly problematic by historical benchmarks (based on my research with Carmen Reinhart). With a baseline scenario of recession or sluggish growth amid budget austerity for years ahead, Portugal will likely seek help sooner rather than later.

Kjo barrë përfshin borxhin publik (borxh i marrë nga qeveria) dhe borxh i jashtëm (borxh i vendit, si tërësi, ndaj të huajve). Portugezët thonë se gjendja e tyre nuk është aq e tmerrshme si ajo e Greqisë, e cila është tashmë në ekuivalencë ekonomike me kujdesin intensiv. Por nivelet e borxhit të Portugalisë janë ende mjaft problematike nga provat historike (bazuar në hulumtimet e mia me Carmen Reinhart). Me një skenar bazë të recesionit apo rritjes së ngadaltë dhe shtrëngesave në buxhet, për vite në vijim, Portugalia ka të ngjarë të kërkojë ndihmë sa më shpejt.

Spain is a more difficult case. The central government is arguably solvent, but a significant chunk of municipal and provincial bank debt seems underwater. The big question in Spain is whether, as in Ireland, the central government will allow itself to be gamed into taking on private (and also municipal) debt. Here again, history gives no cause for optimism. It is very difficult for a central government to sit on the sidelines when the economy’s key players are on the brink of collapse.

Spanja është një rast më i vështirë. Qeveria qendrore është ndoshta më solvente, por një pjesë e konsiderueshme e borxhit të bankave komunale dhe provinciale duket nënujë (underwater). Pyetja e fortë në Spanjë është nëse, si në Irlandë, qeveria qendrore do t'i lejojë vetes të futet në lojë në marrjen përsipër të borxhit privat (dhe të komunave). Këtu përsëri, historia nuk na jep asnjë arsye për optimizëm. Është shumë e vështirë për një qeveri qendrore për t'u ulur mënjanë, ndërsa lojtarët kyç të ekonomisë janë në prag të kolapsit.
But bailouts for Portugal and Spain are only the next – and not necessarily final – phase of the crisis. Ultimately, a significant restructuring of private and/or public debt is likely to be needed in all of the debt-distressed eurozone countries. After all, bailouts from the EU and the IMF are only a temporizing measure: even sweetheart loans, after all, eventually must be repaid.

Por shpëtimet për Portugalinë dhe Spanjën janë vetëm fazat e ardhshme të krizës – dhe jo domosdoshmërisht përfundimtare. Në fund të fundit, një ristrukturim i rëndësishëm i borxhit privat dhe/ose publik, ka të ngjarë të jetë i nevojshëm në të gjitha vendet e euro-zonës. Në fund të fundit, dhënia e ndihmës nga BE-ja dhe FMN-ja janë vetëm një masë e përkohshme: madje, edhe kredia më e ëmbël, në fund, duhet të paguhet.

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As European policymakers seek to move from one stage of denial to another, perhaps it is time to start looking ahead more realistically. As any recovering alcoholic could tell them, the first step is admitting, with Merkel, that Europe has a problem.

Siç politikanët evropianë kërkojnë për të lëvizur nga një fazë e mohimit (të problemit) në një tjetër, ndoshta është koha të fillojnë të shikojnë përpara më realisht. Sikurse që çdo alkoolist i shëruar mund t’u thotë atyre, hapi i parë është pranimi, me Merkel, se Evropa e ka një problem.

Kenneth Rogoff is Professor of Economics and Public Policy at Harvard University, and was formerly chief economist at the IMF.

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The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)¹

To guide countries in meeting these objectives, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) identified and published 30 principles of securities regulation in 1998. The principles are grouped under the following eight categories:

Për t’i drejtuar vendet në përmbushjen e këtyre objektivave, Organizata Ndërkombëtare e Komisioneve të Letrave me Vlerë (IOSCO) i ka identifikuar dhe botuar 30 parime te rregullimit (ligjor) të letrave me vlerë, në vitin 1998. Këto parime janë të grupuara në tetë kategori:

1. Regulators (Rregullatorët). Regulators should be suitably empowered, independent, and accountable (Rregullatorët duhet të jenë në masë të përshtatshme të autorizuar, pavarur dhe të përgjegjshëm)

2. Self regulation (Vetërregullimi). Self-regulatory organizations (SROs)—such as exchanges, trade associations, and private agencies—should observe standards of fairness and confidentiality and be overseen by regulators [Organizatat vetërregullatore (OVRR) - të tilla si bursat, shoqatat tregtare dhe agjencitë private - duhet të respektojnë standardet e korrektësisë dhe konfidencialitetit dhe të mbikëqyren nga rregullatorët].

3. Enforcement of regulation (Zbatimi i rregullores). Regulators should have comprehensive inspection, investigation, surveillance, and enforcement powers [Rregullatorët duhet të kenë inspektim të plotë, hetim, mbikqyrje dhe kompetenca të zbatimit].