Pivovarov

7

be particularly stressed, power structures seek financial support of the lobbyist groups. So to

say, they compete for possibility of becoming an object of lobbyism.

In the Soviet Union the lobbyist groups protecting interests of the military-industrial

complex (MIC) and heavy industry in general traditionally enjoyed the greatest influence).

Nowadays, under conditions of collapse and disentegration of Russia's economy, the influence

of these groups has drastically decreased. The only serious achievement of these forces in the

1990s was that in 1996 Avto VAZ (the largest Russian automobile concern) general director

Vladimir Kadannikov was appointed, the first vice-premier of the Russian government. But he

did not occupy this post long.

The 1997 liquidation of the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Defence Industry and

Armaments testified to falling influence of MIC generals and of heavy

industry.

On the contrary, lobbyist groups, representing interests of raw materials branches of the

Russian economy, have recently become much stronger, first and foremost, those of the oil-gas

complex, giving the country about half of hard currency

and 40 percent of tax receipts.. Gas lobbies' position is especially strong. And it is no mere

chance. Russia possesses 36 per cent of explored world gas reserves. It makes the owners of

Russian gas a powerful political grouping. The elite of gas industry is the most disciplined and

hierarchical. The peak of its influence is the period of Victor  Chernomyrdin's  premiership

(December 1992-March 1998).

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8

III. DIVISION OF POWERS IN RUSSIA

The principle of division of powers is constitutive for contemporary democracy.

Metaphorically speaking, it is so indisputable today as the God's existence was indisputable in

the Middle Ages. At the same time, we cannot but agree with the opinion of  A.Valenzuela,

famous American scholar and professor of Georgetown University, who writes that many

people believe that all democratic laws and procedures are built according to one and the same

pattern, independent of where they are realized, that all structural characteristics of

representative power are constants and their realization leads to the same (equal) results in all

communities. These assumptions merely have no right to existence. Ways of formal and informal

political organizing of democratic regimes are various, as well as those conditions in which these

regimes are functioning. And farther he adds: Various modes of institutional organization of

society are not neutral: they may correspond to different social conditions to a greater or less

degree, increasing of diminishing probability of democratic consolidation and manageability of

society.

The Constitution of the Russian Federation has clearly and precisely fixed the principle of

power division. Art.1 says: The Russian Federation — Russia is a democratic federal law —

governed state with a republican for of government. Art.10 reads as follows: State power in the

Russian Federation is exercised on the basis of its division into legislative executive, and judicial

authority Leading Russian jurists (it seems!) also understand the essence of the principle clearly

and precisely. Thus, the authors of the Commentaries to the Constitution of the Russian

Federation, prepared by the influential and authoritative (competent) Institute of Legislation and

Comparative Jurisprudence at the Russian Federation Government, write: Democratic political

regime can be established in a state if functions of state power are divided among independent

government bodies. Since there are three main functions of state power — legislative, executive,

and judicial, each of these functions should be exercised independently by an appropriate

government body. The combining of legislative, executive, and judicial functions in the work of a

single government body leads, however, to the excessive concentration of power which creates

a breeding-ground for establishing a dictatorial political regime in a country.

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9

However, everything is not so simple, both in the theory (developed by Russian lawyers

and  politologists) and in Russian practice (political and legal). We can read in the above-

mentioned Commentary to the Constitution the following: The President of the Russian

Federation is outside the system of the power division. Specialists from the Institute of

Legislation and Comparative Jurisprudence (and their opinion in fact represents the newpoint of

the Russian leaders, only presented in the legal form) assert that the institute of presidency, being

outside or over the system of power division, ensures necessary coordination of various

branches of authority enabling an unceasing operation of the whole government apparatus.

It stands to reason that it is a gross violation of the principle of the power division. It is

worth mentioning James Madison's words (Federalist, N 18, February 1, 1788) who is one of

the pillars of contemporary  constitutionalism: To maintain in practice the degree of power

division which is required to preserve free governing, it will be necessary to combine and mix

these departments in such a way so that each of them has a constitutional control over others

Powers befitting one department should not be directly and in full volume exercised by

one of other departments. It is equally evident that no government department should have

overwhelming influence, either direct or indirect, on other departments in exercising powers

relevant to each of them Authority is inclined, by its very nature, to interfere into alien spheres,

and, to keep it from overstepping its established limits, grave methods and measures are

required. It is evident that within the system of power division, not a single official (or

personified by him authority, or simply authority) cannot stand outside or over this system.

We can state that the Constitution of the Russian Federation includes and fixes two

power systems: the division of power and super-presidency, the last one being over all the

authorities, so to say a super-authority personified by one person and supported by special

institutions created, in most cases, ad hominem. Undoubtedly, such a structure cannot but be a

constant source for instability of the political regime. And of course leading Russian scholars

cannot but understand this fact which is illustrated by the following example: Art.90 of the

Constitution indicates that the president's lawmaking is, so to say, of by-law character.

Obviously, it is far from being so in practice. That is why the authors of the already cited

Commentary cautiously acknowledge that the constitutional formulation of the given requirement

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