Pivovarov

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personally (in practice under the pressure of his surrounding), without representative democratic

institutions and norms, significant decisions of national scale appealing to people's will.

The regime is inwardly unstable being a hybrid mixture of institutions hardly combined

with each other (charismatic and bureaucratic ones), thus reflecting their weakest sides. The

desire of the  plebiscit president to play the role of a charismatic leader leads to that his

administration staff is formed (first of all) on the principles of personal devotion, while their

technical training is of secondary importance. The regime rejects the system of formal rules

(abstract legal principles), as well as rational law-making based on the mentioned principles.

Generally, this regime it is suspicious to legal thinking.

The grounds for the shaping and transformation of the given regime are connected with

material and status interests of president's surrounding, his administrative staff, favorites, party

functionaries, etc. The modern Russian regime uses the so-called tactics of oriented corruption.

The phenomenon of oriented corruption serves as technical means to consolidate power in

hands of the clique that has won (the term clique is used in the neutral and scientific meaning),

and not only distributes the posts in reward for fidelity, but also stimulates the just desire of its

adherents to be doing well in their new places.

IV. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CENTER AND THE REGIONS.

The problem of the relations between the Center and the regions is of crucial importance

for the contemporary political process in Russia. It is precisely through the  prysm of these

relations one can adequately understand the transformation of the nature of Russian power in the

1990s.

In fact during the last years their occured several  microrevolutions in the course of which

the relations between the Center and the subjects of federation changed substantially. Within the

framework of the regional policies (and politics) one can fix several periods connected with

these microrevolutions and their consequences. In each of these periods there was established a

certain balance in relations between the centers of power in the regions, a redistribution of

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powers between the regions and the Center, took place and the way of legitimization of the

regional power changed.

The first revolution took place in 1990. It was connected with the elections in the new

soviets on the alternative basis and with the strengthening of the power of the soviets at the

expense of power of CPSU in the regions. The revolution of 1991 (a second one) demolished

communist power as such; instead of this one there was established power of the Head of

Administration appointed by Moscow. But this led in the regions to the «two powers» situation

of, because the soviets as the legislative power had much power. There emerged a contradiction

and a conflict between the soviets and executive power (Heads of Administration), which was

an element of the power Presidential vertical (in the republics-subjects of the Russian Federation

step by step Presidential form of rule was being introduced).

As a result of the third revolution, that of 1993, the Soviet power was destroyed and

changed by a new legislative power which had less rights than the soviet did. New center of

power became a governor appointed by the President.

In 1996 a new revolution - a «quite» one took place in the regions. In Moscow a new

Soviet of Federation was convoked. Soviet of Federation is an upper chamber of the Russian

Parliament. According the Constitution it’s members are the highest representatives of legislative

and executive power of the subjects of federation. This event became a stimulus for the

transformation of the regional elite into autonomous and consolidated subject of political

process. After this event in the majority of the regions new elections of the heads of executive

power took place. Thus the governors were transformed from  Yeltzin’s appointees into

“minipresidents”. It was a serious change of their political quality; more than that from the point

of view of legitimacy of power the provinces (oblast) and territories (kraj) caught up with the

republics. It was a beginning of a new period of regional political process, the main agents of it

were from now on were governors elected by all population of their respective regions. Among

such governors there were many came to power being in opposition to  Yeltzin and supported

by the Communist party and its allies.

Direct elections of the heads of executive power in the regions created absolutely new

conditions for the further development of relations between the Center and the subjects of

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federation. Today’s governors feel themselves much more free in the relations with Moscow.

Their legitimacy is confirmed by the fact of their election “by all people”, and that is why they

are “responsible” before the voters. Real life makes the governors to pursue autonomous social

and economic policy and defend their «territories» from Moscow’s interference.

During the last three years the Russian regional elite changed its character also on the level

of personalities, there appeared many new figures. Injection of “a fresh blood” made regional

groups more dynamic.

There is a significant change in the political-ideological structure of the governors’ corps.

As I said earlier the majority of the new governors were supported by communists and

nationalists. It is also should be noted that many «acting» governors, who won the new

elections, and kpt their office did this by «appropriating» the slogans the Left. That is why the

weakening of the liberals’ positions in the Russian regional elite characterizes not only those

regions where the elections were won by the candidates nominated by the Communist party. In

some cases elite more dynamic and oriented onto defence of their own interests. More than fifty

out of eighty eight of the regional leaders took their positions after the elections of 1999. The

renovation of the regional leaders was especially pronounced in the «Russian» regions of

federation (forty out of fifty five). The real problem of the relations between the Center and the

new governors is that, first, the last ones are not under the control of  Moscovian groups and

groupings, and, second, the majority of the governors do not take part in any of the largest - on

and of the federal level - political and economic groups of interest; the governors have no

obligations to these the victors had to take in their administrations the representatives of the

opposition as a payment for their support.

     As a result extremely swiftly the regional elite transformed itself into real subject of the

Russian political process. Having acquired such a new quality it began to look for a uniting

platform to present itself as an autonomous force. Of special importance is the fact that the

«growth of selfconsciousness» of the regional power elite is developing from below. Earlier the

attempts of integration of regional elite were made from above to strengthen the federal power

in the eve of the elections and in the interests of certain Moscovian groups.

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