2
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values: changing perceptions of how to interpret the world and how it works, as well as changing values of
how the world should be.
2.5 What are the Processes of Institutional Change?
Institutional change takes place through a process in which actors and institutions interact. By process we
do not just mean anything that goes on over time, but more precisely, a sequence of events in causal and
chronological stages over time. One may distinguish between the processes of change in formal and
informal rules, although they have a lot in common. In order to understand specific processes of institu-
tional change, it is important to identify the actors: both those who promote (change agents) and those
who resist change, their specific problem situation, their wider context – in particular the institutional
structure and perceptional legacy – as well as the behavioural incentives this context gives rise to. It is also
important to understand the behavioural uncertainties that actors face, as will be clarified below, the
sequence of events and the causal relationship between them.
2.5.1 Emergence and Change of Informal Rules
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An informal rule may emerge spontaneously and unintentionally as a solution to a recurrent problem in
the following way. When confronted with a new problem and facing uncertainty
about how to handle it,
an actor is likely to rely on past experience and ‘thinking’ (subjective perceptions – ideas as well as values)
to interpret the situation and experiment with behaviour to deal with the problem. The way she goes
about will thus be influenced by the legacy of her past and the present institutional and ideological con-
text in which she finds herself. By making trials, eliminating errors and repeating successful behaviour as
the problem recurs, the actor will gradually learn how to handle it. Over time she will develop a behav-
ioural rule that offers a solution to the recurrent problem. When her behaviour has been repeated suffi-
ciently often to display a regularity, it becomes exactly what others will expect from her in similar situa-
tions. This is now a social rule for interaction – an institution.
Once established, informal rules are self-reinforced. There are several reinforcement and maintenance
mechanisms.
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First of all, it is easier (and cheaper) to adhere to an already existing rule than to set up
a new one, which is associated with considerable costs. The existing rule offers a ready solution to the
recurrent problem in question. Secondly, over time, actors learn to better adhere to the rule and ben-
efit from the opportunities it offers, whereby incentives to adhere to it increase. Thirdly, adherence to
an existing rule is beneficial because others do so – it offers a standard practice that makes it easier to
interact with other actors. Fourthly, the rule is reinforced by the fact that it is consistent with and func-
tionally complements the other rules, so adherence to one rule reinforces the other ones and vice versa.
Fifthly, a rule is reinforced by its very application, since every time it is adhered to, actors’ expectations
of its validity are reconfirmed. Finally, at least in certain cases, a rule may contribute to the reproduc-
tion of the problem it actually helps to solve, by being an integral part of the institutional system that
repeatedly produces the problem.
Now consider a change in the external context of the actor. She may at first not recognise that the situation
has changed and requires an adjustment of behaviour. When she eventually does recognise the change, she
will face uncertainty about how to behave successfully. In those situations humans tend to adhere to the old
53
Unless otherwise indicated, this section draws on Eriksson Skoog (2000), pp. 51–56.
54
North (1990), pp. 93–95, identifies self-reinforcing mechanisms of institutions, drawing largely on Arthur (1988). Eriksson
Skoog (2000), Chapter IV, elaborates on and adds to these in the case of the soft budget constraint. The final mechanism
mentioned here is identified by her.
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2
rules even more strictly than in the past,
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which may be her initial response to change. North recognises that
once people have adapted their behaviour to the institutional structure, they face incentives to maintain it
intact.
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They have learnt to take advantage of the opportunities provided and depend on it for their well
being. Or they may believe that they do, fearing that they would do worse in a new set-up, where their
uncertainty about how to behave successfully would increase. Learning to adapt to and benefit from new
rules takes time. Hence actors may face incentives to try to prevent change of rules from taking place or
becoming effectively implemented. Besides, change in formal rules may be ambiguous, and so produce
inconsistencies with other rules. This may create uncertainty about the validity of formal change, hence
about which rules apply (old or new?) which will add to actors’ slow adaptation.
The institutional structure thus creates interest groups with a stake in its existence. They ‘will evolve an ide-
ology that not only rationalizes the society’s structure but accounts for its poor performance’.
5
Conse-
quently, ideas and values may contribute to delaying the process of institutional change, by slowing learning,
adaptation, adjustment and behavioural change.
58
Hence, old rules and dysfunctional behaviour may persist
for some time before the actor recognises this and before the outcome has deteriorated sufficiently to moti-
vate a behavioural change. Eventually, when she believes she may do better by changing behaviour than by
maintaining status quo, she will begin searching for new behaviour that is more appropriate to the new situ-
ation. She will innovate and eventually develop a new rule in the way suggested above.
The process of informal institutional change depicted here has a lot in common with the process of
change in formal rules, to which we now turn.
2.5.2 Effective Change in Formal Rules
In the case of formal rules, we may distinguish between two sub-processes. There is, firstly, the process
that results in the creation or change of a nominal formal rule and, secondly, the process that renders the
nominal formal rule effective in practice.
As mentioned above, much formal institutional change takes place within the political system at different
levels. Hence, Eggertsson notes that ‘[t]o explain changes in formal rules it is necessary to understand the
decision processes and structures of political organizations that produce formal rules.’
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However, it is
important to remember that such change can take place at any level of the political system of the state
and its organisations, as well as within other organisations – whether economic, political or social, public
or private. As noted earlier, change or creation of formal rules may also take place through collective
action outside existing formal organisations.
Lee J. Alston sees formal institutional change as a result of supply and demand forces in society and the
bargaining between them. He identifies three different situations (which may be overlapping in prac-
tice).
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In the first situation, change is not pushed by the specific interest of either demanders or suppliers
of change, but is nonetheless caused by forces within the system itself. In this case, the change in formal
rules is merely an adaptation to a general consensus that has emerged in society, and thus codifies the
preferences of the population. This means that new formal rules codify already existing informal rules,
and thus bring consistency between them. In other situations, there are certain actors who would benefit
from new formal rules, and thus face incentives for and demand change. To succeed, they must have
55
Heiner (1983), p. 570
56
North (1990), p. 6
5
North (1990), p. 99
58
Cf. Etzioni (1988), pp.68–69.
59
Eggertsson (1996), p. 11
60
Alston (1996), pp. 26–28