2
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‘good’ or not. Creating or building institutions ‘from scratch’ can mean different things. It may refer to
the establishment of rules for activities that were not previously taking place (such as market exchange in
a certain sector). Or it may imply the shift from a situation where interaction was governed by personal
‘rule’ and discretionary power to one where behaviour and activities become governed by rules. When
donors talk about institution building they may refer to establishment of the rule of law.
Institutional development and change may be more or less comprehensive, involving more or less change
in many or few rules within a single or several levels and areas. Whole-scale transition of the entire eco-
nomic and political system of former socialist countries are among the most dramatic institutional changes
experienced – as well as the ‘revolutions’ that preceded them. Small-scale institutional change and devel-
opment takes place more frequently, for instance within organisations, as reflected in reformulation of
working procedures and modification of routines.
When we talk about institutional development and change here, we refer to effective change. Hence, nom-
inal change in formal rules does not count as effective change, unless the rule also is actually implemented,
enforced and used. No rule effectively applies or is valid, and thus exists as a rule, unless it actually guides
human behaviour and is adhered to by actors. Consequently, institutional change may occur in the form
of change in the enforcement of a formal rule, whereby the rule may shift from only being nominally in
place to eventually becoming effective.
2.3 What are the Types of Institutional Change?
Institutions are man-made rules. However, they may be created in different ways. It is common to distinguish
between two major types of institutional change, which by and large are considered to apply to two types of
institutions, as already suggested above. Formal rules are created as a result of plan and conscious design (or
pragmatically). Change in formal rules normally requires some kind of collective action and decision making.
40
It often involves change through the political system of decision making – a political process
41
– whether within
the state, a municipality or individual organisation. In other cases, formal change in rules takes place through
the collective action outside established political structures but within a community, as a means to solve a
common problem or reach a common goal. The building of institutions for governance of common pool
resources studied by Ostrom and her colleagues provides a wealth of examples.
42
In this context it is worth
noting that change and creation of formal rules may happen at local community level and not only at central
level. Informal rules, by contrast, tend to emerge organically, spontaneously, as the unintended outcome of
individual behaviour and social interaction.
43
Any economic and political system has come about through a
combination of spontaneously evolved and intendedly designed institutions.
2.4 What are the Causes of Institutional Change?
According to North there are two basic sources of institutional change: changes in preferences and in relative
prices.
44
Change in people’s preferences may stem from new values, attitudes and ideas – perceptions of
40
Kaspar & Streit (1998), p. 395. Formal rules may be decided by a single individual – a dictator or supreme ruler – for instance
through presidential decrees, but then rather resemble personal rule and discretion.
41
Alston (1996), p. 27
42
Ostrom (1990) is a standard reference.
43
The terminology used here is inspired by Menger (1963), Book 3, Chapters 1–2, pp. 129–159. He refers to two different but
complementary approaches to understanding social phenomena – pragmatically versus organically. A parallel may also be
drawn to the distinctions between planned versus spontaneous order. For a recent discussion, drawing on the works of Carl
Menger and Friedrich Hayek among others, see Kaspar and Streit (1998), pp. 142–155.
44
North (1990), pp. 84–86
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how the world is and how it should be. The role of ideology in shaping institutional change is perhaps
most clear within the former socialist system.
45
Changes in relative prices come from changes in the ratio
of prices of production-factors (due to changes in ratio of land to labour, labour to capital or capital to
land), in information costs and technology. Relative prices and costs reflect the relative scarcity of resources
and alter power structures and the bargaining power of actors. And it is the continuous competition for
scarce resources between economic and political actors (individuals and organisations) that is the key to
institutional change, North argues.
46
Changes in African land rights may illustrate the role of price change. Jean Ensminger shows that in areas
where there was demographic pressure, expanded commercial opportunities and new technologies, agricul-
tural land became increasingly scarce and its value consequently increased. As a result of the increased price
of land, demand for land privatisation arose and changes in property rights from customary land tenure
towards individual and exclusive rights took place.
4
Wolfgang Kaspar and Manfred E. Streit, in turn, exem-
plify how organisational competition may cause institutional change. Globalisation – in terms of intensified
trade and greater factor mobility – has led governments to compete for market shares and mobile produc-
tion factors by actively making institutional adjustments. Related causes of change may be challenge to
political leaders from new potential leaders or external force or threat thereof.
48
Hence, institutional change can be set-off by events external or internal to society. The role of technological
change is recognised by several authors. Bush, for instance, contends that the driving force behind institu-
tional change is growth in the fund of human knowledge, ‘generated by the community-wide problem-solv-
ing processes’.
49
This suggests that many – if not most – impulses for institutional change emanate from
within the institutional system itself. For instance, economic decline or poor performance may cause institu-
tional change.
50
If the existing institutional system does not favour sustainable development, but creates
incentives for non-productive behaviour, society’s economic performance is likely to decline over time, due
to the self-reinforcing tendencies of the institutional system. At a certain point, relative pay-offs will have
declined to the extent that rule-following behaviour no longer produces the benefits to actors that it used to,
which may create incentives for and initiate a process of institutional change. Adherence to existing rules
that proved to be successful in the past may no longer do so when the context changes. Hence a need to cope
with changed circumstances may cause institutional change. An additional source of change inherent in the
system may be change in another rule, which leads to institutional inconsistency.
51
Change can thus be initi-
ated as a
response to a changing context where past behaviour no longer works well.
Institutional change may also be the result of a more active initiative. Some actors prefer to experiment with
breaking the prevailing rules, and are willing to accept the risk of sanctions, because they believe the
advantages may be greater. If they are successful, other actors may imitate their behaviour and if a criti-
cal mass of actors change behaviour a new rule replaces the old one. Kaspar and Streit argue that ‘insti-
tutional evolution is propelled by those “million little mutinies” and the evaluation of these “million little
mutinies” by numerous other people.’
52
Both formal and informal rules may be altered through such
entrepreneurial behaviour. One source of change that is increasingly recognised is changes in
beliefs, ideas and
45
For the case of Tanzania, see Eriksson Skoog (2000), Chapter III, passim.
46
North (1995), pp. 15–16
4
‘[N]ew social norms and property rights emerge[d] to internalize the beneficial and harmful effects and adjust to the new
cost-benefit position.’ (Ensminger, 1997, p. 167)
48
Kaspar & Streit (1998), pp. 399–404
49
Bush (1988), p. 153
50
Cf. Kaspar & Streit (1998), pp. 397–399.
51
Cf. Kaspar & Streit (1998), p. 395.
52
Kaspar & Streit (1998), pp. 390–392 & 396–397, quotation from p. 391