Swedish international development cooperation agency
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- 1.3 How are Institutions Related
22 SupportINg the DevelopmeNt of INStItutIoNS – formAl AND INformAl ruleS – utv WorkINg pAper 2005:3 domestic and external trade – such as bans on cross-regional food trade; bureaucratic intervention in the operational decisions of parastatal enterprises. 21
traditional ownership rules, user and inheritance rights to land, and customary land tenure in Africa. 22
Another example is offered by the Tanzanian socialist system. During its establishment in the 1970s, an informal rule gradually emerged within the public sector through interaction between the parastatals and other state organs, referred to as the soft budget constraint. 23 The soft budget constraint implied that in situations when parastatals faced financing gaps – which were constantly reproduced and had to be dealt with – parastatal managers turned to various state organs for bail-out finance, and those organs provided it in one way or another. 24 It emerged as a logical consequence of the socialist institutional system requir- ing a solution to a recurrent problem created by that very system. Social or socio-cultural institutions regulate social and cultural interaction, and mostly include informal rules determining for instance mutual rights and obligations between society members. Reference, once again, may be made to Tanzania and what Göran Hydén has referred to as the ‘economy of affection’ which involves informal networks for social interaction. These networks are largely based on kinship and char- acterised by certain values and behavioural rules, reflected for instance in the two concepts ujamaa and
25 The caste system in India is another obvious example of informal socio-cultural rules. It may be worth noting, as Kasper and Streit do, that ‘[i]nstitutions – and underlying values – which are widely shared by a community define that community’. 26 Socio-cultural rules form part of the culture of a cer- tain society, and thereby define group identities and social belonging. Hence institutions apply to the interaction among actors within a certain group or society. A categorisation of rules can be made on the basis of their domain of applicability, in terms of geographical area or level. There are global institutions (such as international conventions within the United Nations system), pluri-lateral rules (as within the European Union), bilateral rules (for instance, development co- operation agreements between two countries). Within countries, there are laws at national level, regional decrees, municipal regulations and by-laws, contracts between organisations and statutes and routines within an organisation etc. Institutions prevail at all levels. Hence, there is no reason to restrict the preva- lence of rules to the external context of organisations, as implicitly implied by Sida’s policy for capacity development. 2
partly by rules within the organisation, and partly by the rules of the external context. Among the rules that define the behavioural opportunities and constraints of public sector actors, for instance, there are rules that apply generally within public administration, concerning perhaps relationships between vari- 21 For an account of the elements and character of the socialist political and economic institutional system of Tanzania, see Eriksson Skoog (2000), Chapters III and IV. 22 See for instance Jean Ensminger (1997) for an overview of land rights and changes in these in Africa. 23 The term was coined by the Hungarian economist János Kornai (see, for instance, 1979) in his study of the socialist system. 24 Eriksson Skoog (2000) studies the emergence, persistence and logic of the soft budget constraint – an informal institution – during Tanzanian socialism. Chapter III analyses the emergence of this informal rule. 25 Hydén (1980) 26 Kasper and Streit (1998), p. 32 2 Sida (2000), p. 21. This restriction may seem to be implied by North’s definition of organisations, related above. However, North (1995, p. 18) recognises that institutions also may prevail within organisations and further clarifies his distinction between institutions and organisations through the following statement: ‘Modeling institutions is modeling the man-made constraints on human interaction that define the incentive structure of the society. Modeling organizations is theorizing about the struc- ture, governance (including the constraints defining the incentive structure internal to the organization), and policies of purposive entities.’
SupportINg the DevelopmeNt of INStItutIoNS – formAl AND INformAl ruleS – utv WorkINg pAper 2005:3
ous levels, or for procurement and appointment. At the sectoral level, there are sector specific rules, stipulating for instance the tasks of various organisations and concerning the procedures to be applied when carrying out these tasks. Within individual organisations, there are more detailed rules of both substantial and administrative nature, such as policies, guidelines and routines etc. 28 The existence of rules at various levels implies that rules may be structured hierarchically. Ostrom, for instance, distinguishes between constitutional-choice rules at the policy-making or constitutional level, collec- tive-choice rules that regulate interaction in collective-choice situations, and operational rules that affect day- to-day decisions. 29
The hierarchical structuring of rules implies that there is a hierarchical relationship between institutions. Higher level rules regulate rule setting at lower levels, in terms of who is eligible to decide those rules, and which procedures shall be followed when changing lower level rules. Hence, rules at the operational level are set within the frames of the collective-choice and constitutional rules. ‘All rules are nested in another set of rules that define how the first set of rules can be changed.’ 30
31 The func- tion of each rule is to govern behaviour not governed by other rules, so that one rule takes over where other institutions cease to apply. This is recognised by several scholars. 32 Institutions complement one another if there is a good fit between them – which is not always the case. Hence Kasper and Streit note that ‘[r]ule systems work better in ordering human actions if they form a hierarchy running from general to specific rules.’ ‘Such hierarchies make it easier for individuals to understand the rules, because they serve to create an order among different rules and maintain consistency over time.’ 33 Also the relationship between formal and informal institutions is largely complementary. Since it is neither pos- sible nor desirable to design detailed formal rules for all possible and specific recurrent situations informal rules are needed to complement the formal ones. Informal rules emerge spontaneously to take care of recurrent interaction problems that are not regulated by the formal rules. These problems often occur as a result of the formal rules, so that informal rules become adaptations to the formal rules. This happens, for instance, when working routines and practices that enable us to perform our tasks according to internal policies and regulations in our work places evolve over time. The soft budget constraint in the Tanzanian parastatal sector, related above, is another example. Moreover, informal institutions are important for the effective enforcement of formal rules, which cannot rely on formal enforcement mechanisms alone. If the formal rules are not consistent with the informal socio-cultural rules of society, they will lack legitimacy in the eyes of the members of that society, and are likely to be ignored unless they are enforced by coercion. Formal rule adherence then partly relies on informal enforcement. 34 Institutional inter-relatedness and complementarity implies that individual rules cannot be studied in isola- tion. A certain rule must be examined in relation to other complementary formal and informal rules at 28 See, for instance, Gustafsson (2004). 29 Ostrom (1999), p. 58 30 Ostrom (1999), p. 58 31 Hence, the term ‘institutional system’ stresses the inter-relatedness of institutions, whereas the term ‘institutional framework’ stresses the relationship between institutions and actors, to be discussed below. 32 See, for instance, Neale (1988) and Bush (1988). 33 Kasper & Streit (1998), p. 137 34 Kasper & Streit (1998), p. 139 Yüklə 267,75 Kb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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