[
274 ] Notes on Sources
was established which precluded the influence of private business interests on the
conduct of foreign affairs; and it is only by the end of this period that chancelleries
again consider such claims as admissible but not without stringent qualifications
in deference to the new trend of public opinion. We submit that this change was
due to the character of trade which, under nineteenth-century conditions, was no
longer dependent for its scope and success upon direct power policy; and that the
gradual return to business influence on foreign policy was due to the fact that the
international currency and credit system had created a new type of business inter-
est transcending national frontiers. But as long as this interest was merely that of
foreign bondholders, governments were extremely reluctant to allow them any
say; for foreign loans were for a long time deemed purely speculative in the strict-
est sense of the term; vested income was regularly in home government bonds; no
government thought it as worthy of support if its nationals engaged in the most
risky job of loaning money to overseas governments of doubtful repute. Canning
rejected peremptorily the importunities of investors who expected the British
government to take an interest in their foreign losses, and he categorically refused
to make the recognition of Latin-American republics dependent upon their ac-
knowledgment of foreign debts. Palmerston's famous circular of 1848 is the first
intimation of a changed attitude, but the change never went very far; for the busi-
ness interests of the trading community were so widely spread that the govern-
ment could hardly afford to let any minor vested interest complicate the running
of the affairs of a world empire. The resumption of foreign policy interest in busi-
ness ventures abroad was mainly the outcome of the passing of free trade and the
consequent return to the methods of the eighteenth century. But as trade had now
become closely linked with foreign investments of a nonspeculative but entirely
normal character, foreign policy reverted to its traditional lines of being service-
able to the trading interests of the community. Not this latter fact, but the cessa-
tion of such interest during the hiatus stood in need of explanation.
T O C H A P T E R T W O
3. The Snapping of the Golden Thread
The breakdown of the gold standard was precipitated by the forced stabiliza-
tion of the currencies. The spearhead of the stabilization movement was Geneva,
which transmitted to the financially weaker states the pressures exerted by the city
of London and Wall Street.
The first group of states to stabilize was that of the defeated countries, the cur-
rencies of which had collapsed after World War I. The
second group consisted of
the European victorious states who stabilized their own currencies mainly after
the first group. The
third group consisted of the chief beneficiary of the gold stan-
dard interest, the United States.