United states court of appeals for the second circuit

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state.  The ban was designed to combat both actual corruption and the appearance of corruption

caused by contractor contributions.  See Green Party I, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 303.  

Such an “anticorruption” interest, see Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903, has been recognized as

a legitimate reason to restrict campaign contributions.  Beginning with Buckley, the Supreme Court

has repeatedly held that laws limiting campaign contributions can be justified by the government’s

interest in addressing both the “actuality” and the “appearance” of corruption.  424 U.S. at 26; accord

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143 (“Our cases have made clear that the prevention of corruption or its

appearance constitutes a sufficiently important interest to justify political contribution limits.”).  

The record before us, moreover, shows that the General Assembly had good reason to be

concerned about both the “actuality” and the “appearance” of corruption involving contractors.

Connecticut’s recent corruption scandals showed that contributions by contractors could lead to

corruption.  And it took no great leap of reasoning to infer that those scandals created a strong

appearance of impropriety in the transfer of any money between contractors and state

officials—whether or not the transfer involved an illegal quid pro quo.  The scandals reached the

highest state offices, leading to the resignation and eventual criminal conviction and imprisonment

of the state’s governor.  They were, as a result, covered extensively by local media and garnered the

attention of national media outlets as well.  See Green Party II, 648 F. Supp. 2d at 307 n.9 (providing

examples of newspaper articles covering Connecticut’s corruption scandals).  Thus, corruption

spurred by state contractors became a salient political issue in Connecticut, and there arose an

appearance of impropriety with respect to all contractor contributions.  See Meadow Decl. ¶ 30 (May

24, 2007) (describing a public opinion poll in which 76% of Connecticut voters believed that

“campaign contributions Governor Rowland received influenced him in awarding government

contracts”).

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Accordingly, we conclude that the CFRA’s ban on contractor contributions furthers

“sufficiently important” government interests.  See Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162.  There is sufficient

evidence in the record of actual corruption stemming from contractor contributions, and in light of

the widespread media coverage of Connecticut’s recent corruption scandals, the General Assembly

also faced a manifest need to curtail the appearance of corruption created by contractor

contributions.

2.

Are the Bans on Contractor Contributions “Closely Drawn” to Achieve

the State’s Interest?

The more difficult question, however, is whether each aspect of the CFRA’s ban on

contractor contributions is closely drawn to achieve the state’s anticorruption interest.  See Beaumont,

539 U.S. at 162.  We first describe the standard for determining whether a statute is closely drawn to

achieve the state’s interest, and we then apply that standard to the provisions of the CFRA banning

contributions of state contractors, prospective state contractors, principals of state contractors, and

the spouses and dependent children of state contractors.

a.

The Standard for Determining Whether a Statute is “Closely

Drawn”

On only one occasion has the Supreme Court held that a contribution limit was not closely

drawn to the government’s interests.  In Randall v. Sorrell, the Supreme Court applied a multifactor

test and struck down a Vermont law that limited the amount of money that any single individual

could contribute to a campaign for state office.  See 548 U.S. at 253-62.  A plurality of the Court

found the law “too restrictive” because, among other things, its limits were so low that they

“prevent[ed] candidates from ‘amassing the resources necessary for effective [campaign] advocacy.’” 

Id. at 248, 253 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21) (second alteration in Randall).  

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The District Court relied extensively on Randall’s multifactor test in determining whether the

CFRA’s contribution bans were “closely drawn” to the asserted government interests.  See Green

Party I, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 309-16.  We disagree with that approach.  Randall addressed general

contribution limits that applied to all citizens.  The law in Randall, for instance, prohibited any

Vermont resident from contributing more than $400 to a candidate for governor.  See 548 U.S. at

238.  Thus Randall’s multifactor test was concerned primarily with the effect the contribution limits

would have on the electoral system as a whole.  See, e.g., id. at 248-49 (“[C]ontribution limits that are

too low can . . . harm the electoral process by preventing challengers from mounting effective

campaigns against incumbent officeholders, thereby reducing democratic accountability.” (emphasis

added)). 

Here, however, plaintiffs are not challenging the provisions of the CFRA that impose

general contribution limits on all Connecticut citizens.  See generally Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-611

(imposing, for instance, a limit of $3500 on any individual’s contributions to a gubernatorial

campaign).  Rather, plaintiffs are challenging the provisions of the CFRA that impose contribution

bans on discrete groups of Connecticut citizens.  And unlike the situation in Randall, there is no

serious argument here that the challenged contribution bans will harm the electoral process by

stifling candidates’ ability to raise sufficient campaign funds.  See 548 U.S. at 248-49.  Indeed,

contributions by contractors and lobbyists have, in the past, made up only a small fraction of the

total amount of money given as campaign contributions in Connecticut.  See Green Party I, 590 F.

Supp. 2d at 316.

Accordingly, the First Amendment inquiry in this case does not focus on the electoral process,

for the issue is not—as it was in Randall—whether the law in question “prevent[s] candidates from

‘amassing the resources necessary for effective [campaign] advocacy.’”  Randall, 548 U.S. at 248

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