United states court of appeals for the second circuit

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d.

Spouses and Children of Contractors

The CFRA not only bans contributions by contractors, prospective contractors, and the

principal of any contractor or prospective contractor; it also bans contributions by the “spouse” or

“dependent child” of any of those covered individuals.  See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(F)(v),

(1)(G), (2)(A)-(B).  Defendants do not attempt to justify the ban on family-member contributions by

arguing that a contractor’s family members will themselves attempt to exert improper influence over

a state official.  See Appellees’ Br. 80-83, 98.  That is for good reason, as there is no record evidence

to suggest that the spouses or dependent children of state contractors have been in any way involved

in Connecticut’s recent corruption scandals (or, for that matter, any other corruption scandals of

which the parties have made us aware).  Rather, defendants attempt to justify the ban on family-

member contributions by arguing that it is a “reasonable measure to avoid circumvention of the

prohibition of contributions by [contractors].”  Id. at 80.  That is, defendants argue that contractors

and other covered individuals will avoid the CFRA’s ban on contractor contributions by siphoning

their improper contributions through their spouses and children.  

The Supreme Court has recognized that, in regulating campaign contributions, the legislature

must be given “room to anticipate and respond to concerns about circumvention of regulations

designed to protect the integrity of the political process.”  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 137; see also

Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 155.  Nonetheless, the Court has struck down so-called anti-circumvention

provisions where the government has put forward only “scant evidence” of a particular “form of

evasion.”  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 232.

Here, the record in support of the ban on contributions by contractors’ spouses and

dependent children is by no means overwhelming.  There is little direct evidence suggesting that

contractors will use their spouses or children to circumvent the CFRA’s contribution bans. 

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Nevertheless, the recent corruption scandals in Connecticut have shown that contractors are willing

to resort to varied forms of misconduct to secure contracts with the state.  That, we think, is far

more than the “scant evidence” required by McConnell.  See id.  

In light of the recent corruption scandals, therefore, the General Assembly must be given

“room to anticipate and respond to concerns about” the “circumvention” of the bans on contractor

contributions.  Id. at 137.  Indeed, were we to affirm the ban on contributions by contractors but

strike down the ban on contributions by their family members, we would invite the very

circumvention that the General Assembly was trying to prevent.

Thus, we conclude that the CFRA’s ban on contributions by contractors’ spouses and

dependent children, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(F)(v), (1)(G), (2)(A)-(B), is “closely drawn” to

avoid the circumvention of the ban on contractor contributions.

e.

A “Ban” as Opposed to a “Limit”

Finally, we consider the fact that the CFRA imposes an outright ban—not a mere limit—on

contributions made by contractors, prospective contractors, and their principals.  That fact, as

discussed above, does not require us to review the law under the strict scrutiny standard.  But we

must nevertheless determine whether an outright ban on contractor contributions is closely drawn to

the state’s anticorruption interest.  See Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162 (“It is not that the difference

between a ban and a limit is to be ignored; it is just that the time to consider it is when applying

scrutiny at the level selected, not in selecting the standard of review itself.”). 

The majority of campaign laws reviewed by the Supreme Court—and other courts—have

involved limits on contributions, not bans.  See, e.g., Randall, 548 U.S. at 246; Nixon, 528 U.S. at 381;

Cal. Med. Ass’n v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 453 U.S. 182, 184 (1981); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13.  The Court

has, however, upheld the longstanding federal “ban on direct corporate contributions.”  Beaumont,

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539 U.S. at 154.  That is enough to demonstrate that laws banning contributions by a discrete group

are not unconstitutional per se.  

Yet a ban is a drastic measure.  A limit on contributions causes some constitutional damage,

as it “restrict[s] ‘one aspect of the contributor’s freedom of political association.’”  Randall, 548 U.S. at

246 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24-25) (emphasis added).  But a ban on contributions causes

considerably more constitutional damage, as it wholly extinguishes that “aspect of the contributor’s

freedom of political association.”  A limit, moreover, leaves intact the contributor’s right to make

“the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution.”  Id. at 247 (quoting Buckley, 424

U.S. at 21).  But a ban infringes that constitutional right, as it precludes the “symbolic expression”

that comes with a small contribution.

There are, therefore, undoubtedly many situations in which a strict contribution limit—as

opposed to an outright contribution ban—will adequately achieve the government’s objectives.  In

those situations it will be difficult for the government to establish that a contribution ban is “closely

drawn” to its asserted interests.  Instead, such a ban risks being struck down as unconstitutionally

overbroad.

Here, for example, a limit—as opposed to a ban—would likely be sufficient to address the

General Assembly’s interest in addressing actual corruption.  If, for example, the CFRA were to

allow contractors to make small contributions (say, $50 per election) to state officials, it is unlikely

that a contractor could exert any influence over an official with the promise of such a modest sum. 

Yet such a limit would not wholly extinguish a contractor’s associational rights, and it would allow

the contractor to make “the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution.”  Id. at 247

(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21).  Thus, if the state’s only interest in this case were combating actual

corruption, the CFRA’s outright ban on contractor contributions would likely be held overbroad.

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