United states court of appeals for the second circuit

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Combating actual corruption, however, is not the state’s only interest here; the CFRA is also

meant to address the appearance of corruption caused by contractor contributions.  See Green Party I,

590 F. Supp. 2d at 303.  As discussed above, Connecticut’s recent corruption scandals were widely

publicized, and corruption involving state contractors became a major political issue in Connecticut

in recent years.  See subsection I.B.2.e, ante.  A limit on contractor contributions would have partially

addressed the perception of corruption created by those incidents, but such a limit still would have

allowed some money to flow from contractors to state officials.  Even if small contractor

contributions would have been unlikely to influence state officials, those contributions could have

still given rise to the appearance that contractors are able to exert improper influence on state

officials.

The CFRA’s ban on contractor contributions, by contrast, unequivocally addresses the

perception of corruption brought about by Connecticut’s recent scandals.  By totally shutting off the

flow of money from contractors to state officials, it eliminates any notion that contractors can

influence state officials by donating to their campaigns.  Thus, although the CFRA’s ban on

contractor contributions is a drastic measure, it is an appropriate response to a specific series of

incidents that have created a strong appearance of corruption with respect to all contractor

contributions.

We hold, as a result, that in light of Connecticut’s recent experience with corruption scandals

involving state contractors, the CFRA’s imposition of an outright ban on contributions by

contractors, prospective contractors, and their principals, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-612(g), is closely

drawn to the state’s interest in combating the appearance of corruption.

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B.

The Ban on Contributions by Lobbyists and Their Families

The CFRA’s ban on contributions by lobbyists presents markedly different considerations

than the CFRA’s ban on contributions by contractors.  The distinction centers on the fact that the

recent corruption scandals in Connecticut in no way involved lobbyists.  See, e.g., Green Party I, 590 F.

Supp. 2d at 321 (“[L]obbyists ha[ve] not been directly linked to the pay-to-play scandals, which

primarily involved state contractors offering bribes in exchange for preferential treatment . . . .”

(emphasis added)).

As a restriction on campaign contributions, not campaign expenditures, we review the CFRA’s

ban on lobbyists contributions under the closely drawn standard.  See Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162;

subsection I.A, ante.  We will uphold the ban against plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge only if it

is closely drawn to achieve sufficiently important government interests.  Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162.

Defendants seek to justify the ban on lobbyist contributions as necessary to combat both

actual corruption and the appearance of corruption.  We decline to decide whether those interests

are sufficiently important in this context, see id., for “[e]ven assuming, arguendo, the Government

advances an important interest,” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 232, the CFRA’s ban on lobbyist

contributions is not closely drawn to the asserted interests.

As set forth above, see subsection I.B.2.e, ante, an outright ban on contributions is a drastic

measure that substantially infringes “one aspect of the contributor’s freedom of political

association.”  Randall, 548 U.S. at 246 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24-25).  As opposed to a

contribution limit, which merely restricts those First Amendment freedoms, see id., a contribution ban

utterly eliminates an individual’s right to express his or her support for a candidate by contributing

money to the candidate’s cause.  Indeed, a contribution ban cuts off even the “symbolic expression

of support evidenced by” a small contribution.  Id. at 247 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21).  Thus, if

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 We reiterate that we are not applying strict scrutiny, and thus we acknowledge that the ban

14

on lobbyist contributions need not be narrowly tailored to achieve the state’s anticorruption interest. 

Nonetheless, the ban must be closely drawn to the state’s interest, a standard that requires some

measure of tailoring.  In this context, if a contribution limit would suffice where a ban has been

enacted, the ban is not closely drawn to the state’s interests.

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the state’s interests in this case can be achieved by means of a limit on lobbyist contributions, rather

than a ban, the ban should be struck down for failing “to avoid unnecessary abridgment of

associational freedoms,” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.

14

We have upheld the CFRA’s ban on contractor contributions because the recent corruption

scandals in Connecticut have created an appearance of corruption with respect to all exchanges of

money between state contractors and candidates for state office.  We have held that an outright ban

on contractor contributions was justified (i.e., closely drawn to meet the state’s anticorruption

interest) because even a severe limit on contractor contributions would allow a small flow of

contributions between contractors and candidates and would, as a result, likely give rise to an

appearance of corruption. 

The situation is different with lobbyists.  The recent corruption scandals had nothing to do

with lobbyists, see Green Party I, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 321, and thus there is insufficient evidence to infer

that all contributions made by state lobbyists give rise to an appearance of corruption.  Plaintiffs

have submitted some evidence suggesting that many members of the public generally distrust

lobbyists and the “special attention” they are believed to receive from elected officials.  See, e.g.,

Meadow Decl. ¶¶ 13-14, 26.  But as the Supreme Court has recently clarified, the anticorruption

interest recognized by Buckley and other cases is “limited to quid pro quo corruption” and does not

encompass efforts to limit “[f]avoritism and influence” or the “appearance of influence or access.” 

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909-10 (quotation marks omitted).  “The fact that speakers may have

influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt,” and

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