United states court of appeals for the second circuit

 We use the term “principal” in this opinion to mean those individuals and entities defined

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in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(F)(i)-(iv), (vi).  Although it is included in the statutory definition,

we do not use the term “principal” to mean the “spouse” or “dependent child” of a contractor.  See

id. § 9-612(g)(1)(F)(v).  We analyze the CFRA’s effect on a contractors’ spouses and dependent

children separately from the statute’s effect on “principals.”  The opinion will refer to the “spouses”

or the “dependent children” of contractors by using those terms or by using the term “families.”

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As we describe in our first opinion, the CFRA was enacted in 2005 as a comprehensive

effort to bring about campaign finance reform in Connecticut.  In our first opinion, which we file

separately, we consider a challenge to the Citizens Election Program (CEP), a part of the CFRA that

provides public funds to candidates running for state office.  See Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, No.

09-3760-cv(L), __ F.3d __ (2d Cir. July 13, 2010).  We consider here a challenge to provisions of the

CFRA that ban campaign contributions and the solicitation of campaign contributions by state

contractors, lobbyists, and their families.

Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the United States District Court for the

District of Connecticut (Stefan R. Underhill, Judge) determined that each of the challenged

provisions was consistent with the First Amendment.  See Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 590 F. Supp.

2d 288 (D. Conn. 2008) (“Green Party I”).  We affirm part of that decision, as we hold that the CFRA

comports with the First Amendment insofar as it bans contributions by state contractors,

“prospective” state contractors, the “principals” of contractors and prospective state contractors,

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and the spouses and dependent children of those individuals.  

We also reverse part of the District Court’s decision, as we hold that the CFRA violates the

First Amendment insofar as it bans contributions by lobbyists and their families and insofar as it

prohibits contractors, lobbyists, and their families from soliciting contributions on behalf of

candidates.

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BACKGROUND

We first describe the history of the CFRA.  We then outline the challenged provisions and

briefly recount the procedural history of this action.

I.

The History of the CFRA

In our first opinion addressing the CFRA, we summarized the history of the statute:

The CFRA . . . was passed in response to several corruption scandals

in Connecticut. [See Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 648 F. Supp. 2d 298, 306-

07 (D. Conn. 2009) (“Green Party II”).]  The most widely publicized of the

scandals involved Connecticut’s former governor, John Rowland.  In 2004,

Rowland was accused of accepting over $100,000 worth of gifts and services

from state contractors, including vacations, flights on a private jet, and

renovations to his lake cottage.  Rowland accepted the gifts, it was alleged, in

exchange for assisting the contractors in securing lucrative state contracts. 

Rowland resigned amidst the allegations, and in 2005 pleaded guilty—along

with two aides and several contractors—to federal charges in connection

with the scandal.  Rowland was fined and sentenced to a year and a day in

federal prison.  See id. at 307.

Sadly, the ignominy of public corruption was not limited to Rowland. 

As the District Court discussed in detail, the “Rowland scandal was but one

of the many corruption scandals involving elected officials in state and local

government that helped earn the state the nickname ‘Corrupticut.’”  See id. at

307-08 (cataloging the scandals); see also id. at 307 & n.9 (discussing the

decline of the reputation of Connecticut’s state government). 

It was in the wake of those scandals that Connecticut lawmakers

resolved to enact “expansive campaign finance reforms.”  Id. at 309.  In the

summer of 2005, Governor M. Jodi Rell established the Campaign Finance

Reform Working Group (the “Working Group”), a collection of six state

representatives and six state senators who were charged with drafting a new

campaign finance reform law.  After holding televised hearings for three

months, the Working Group proposed an expansive bill, much of which

would be incorporated into the final version of the CFRA.  See id. at 309-10.

In the fall of 2005, Governor Rell called a special session of the

General Assembly for the sole purpose of considering the Working Group’s

proposed bill.  After a month of debate, the General Assembly passed the

CFRA, and Governor Rell signed it into law.  See id. at 310-11.  As the

District Court set forth in detail, several contemporaneous statements from

General Assembly members, as well as Governor Rell, explain that the CFRA

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 The prohibition on contributions by dependent children applies only to “a dependent child

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who is eighteen years of age or older.”  Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(F)(v).

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was passed “to combat actual and perceived corruption in state government.” 

Id. at 311.

Green Party, No. 09-3760-cv(L), at __ , __ F.3d at __ .

 II.

The Challenged Provisions

The CFRA is a broad-ranging and complex statute, and plaintiffs challenge only parts of the

law.  Put succinctly, the challenged provisions of the CFRA prohibit state contractors and certain

lobbyists from (1) making campaign contributions to candidates for state office and (2) soliciting

campaign contributions on behalf of candidates for state office.  Violations of those prohibitions are

punishable by civil penalties and criminal sanctions.  See Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 9-610(j), 9-622(8),

9-622(10), 9-623(a).

A.

Contribution Bans

First, the CFRA prohibits state contractors and lobbyists from making campaign

contributions to candidates for state office.  See Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 9-610(g), 9-612(g)(2)(A)-(B).

The CFRA’s ban on contractor contributions applies to any “person, business entity or

nonprofit organization that enters into a state contract.”  Id. § 9-612(g)(1)(D).  It also applies to any

“prospective” contractor; to any “principal” of a contractor or prospective contractor; and to the

“spouse” or “dependent child”  of a contractor, a prospective contractor, or a principal of a

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contractor or prospective contractor.  Id. § 9-612(g)(2).  (We discuss these terms in detail below.)

In addition, the ban on contractor contributions is what might be called “branch specific.” 

If the contract in question is “with or from a state agency in the executive branch,” the contractor

may contribute to a candidate for the General Assembly but not to a candidate for an executive

office (i.e., a candidate for “Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, State Comptroller,

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