United states court of appeals for the second circuit

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(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21) (second alteration in Randall).  We will not, therefore, look to

Randall’s multifactor test as a means of evaluating whether the CFRA’s ban on contributions is

closely drawn to the state’s interests.  

The issue, instead, is whether the CFRA’s contribution bans impermissibly infringe the First

Amendment rights of the discrete groups of citizens it regulates—contractors, lobbyists, and

associated individuals.  To address that issue, we are required to examine how the CFRA applies to

the different groups of individuals it regulates and determine, in each case, whether the law is 

closely drawn to the state’s interest in combating corruption and the appearance of corruption.

The CFRA’s ban on contractor contributions, in particular, applies not only to individuals who

currently have contracts with the state, but also to “prospective” state contractors who seek (but do

not currently have) state contracts.  See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(E), (2)(A)-(B).  It also applies

to any “principal” of an entity that has (or is seeking) contracts with the state, see id. § 9-612(g)(1)(F),

(2)(A)-(B), and it applies to any “spouse” or “dependent child” of a covered individual, see id.

§ 9-612(g)(1)(F)(v), (1)(G), (2)(A)-(B).  To survive First Amendment scrutiny, the CFRA’s contractor

contribution bans must be “closely drawn” to the state’s anticorruption interest with respect to each

of those groups of individuals.

b.

Current and “Prospective” Contractors

The CFRA applies to contributions made by any current state contractor, as well as any

“prospective state contractor,” id. § 9-612(g)(2)(A)-(B), which is defined to include, in essence, any

individual or entity that “submits a response” to a call for bids on state contracts, see id.

§ 9-612(g)(1)(E).  That aspect of the CFRA is, without question, “closely drawn” to meet the state’s

interest in combating corruption and the appearance of corruption.  It is undisputed that nearly all

of the corruption scandals that gave rise to the CFRA—including the scandal involving Governor

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  We note that many state contractors are likely artificial entities, so the provisions

10

governing the behavior of “principals” of contractors are particularly important.

 Although in most cases, the CFRA applies equally to for-profit and nonprofit

11

organizations, the definition of “principal” does not include “an individual who is a member of the

board of directors of a nonprofit organization.”  Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(F)(i). 

 If the entity is “not a business entity,” the CFRA applies to the “chief executive officer” of

12

the entity or “the officer who duly possesses comparable powers and duties.”  Conn. Gen. Stat.

§ 9-612(g)(1)(F)(iii). 

 “Principal” is also defined to include the “spouse” or “dependent child” of a contractor. 

13

See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(F)(v).  We discuss that aspect of the definition separately.  See note

1, ante.

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Rowland—involved both current and prospective state contractors offering bribes in exchange for

assistance in winning new state contracts.  See Green Party I, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 304-06. 

Contributions by current and prospective state contractors, therefore, lie at the heart of the

corruption problem in Connecticut.  

Thus, insofar as it applies to campaign contributions made by both current and prospective

state contractors, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(D)-(E), (2)(A)-(B), the CFRA is closely drawn

and survives First Amendment scrutiny.

c.

“Principals” of Contractors

If an artificial entity, rather than an individual, is awarded (or seeks) a state contract, the

CFRA bans contributions made by any “principal” of that entity.   See id. § 9-612(g)(1)(F), (2)(A)-

10

(B).  A “principal” is defined to include, among other things, (1) any member of the entity’s board of

directors,  (2) any “individual” who “has an ownership interest of five per cent or more” in the

11

entity, (3) the “president, treasurer or executive vice president” of the entity,  and (4) any “officer”

12

or “employee” of either a business entity or a nonprofit organization who “has managerial or

discretionary responsibilities with respect to a state contract.”

13

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“Principal” is also defined to include “a political committee established or controlled by an

individual described in [subparagraph (F)] or the business entity or nonprofit organization that is the

state contractor or prospective state contractor.”  See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(F)(vi).

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The definition of “principal” sweeps broadly and prevents a wide range of individuals from

contributing to campaigns for state office.  We have some doubts, therefore, as to whether the

provision is indeed closely drawn to achieve the state’s anticorruption interest.

Nonetheless, we are mindful of the teachings of the Supreme Court that we, as judges,

cannot consider each possible permutation of a law limiting contributions, and thus we “cannot

determine with any degree of exactitude the precise restriction necessary to carry out the statute’s

legitimate objectives.”  Randall, 548 U.S. at 248.  Moreover, in light of the troubling episodes

involving state contractors in Connecticut’s recent history, we are reluctant to second-guess the

judgment of the General Assembly when it defines which individuals associated with an artificial

entity are likely to attempt to exert improper influence over a state official.

We will, therefore, follow the “ordinar[y]” approach in evaluating the ban on principal

contributions and “defer[] to the legislature’s determination of such matters.”  Id.  The ban on

principals’ contributions strikes us as bordering on overboard, but the record shows that the dangers

of corruption associated with contractor contributions are so significant in Connecticut that the

General Assembly should be afforded leeway in its efforts to curb contractors’ influence on state

lawmakers.  

We thus conclude that, insofar as it applies to campaign contributions made by “principals”

of state contractors or prospective state contractors, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(F), (2)(A)-(B),

the CFRA is closely drawn and withstands First Amendment scrutiny.

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