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mechanized war in Europe or a light infantry war in some other part of the

world. Although the mechanized war in Europe was the least likely scenario,

it was also the most dangerous. U.S. military doctrine had to be revised to

be able to defeat America’s strongest and most dangerous enemy.

Initially, the sights of the American military were fixed at the tactical

level—“Win the First Battle”—with little consideration beyond that. There

also was a recognition that the next major conflict would be a “Come As You

Are War.” Under the direct guidance of General William E. DePuy, the first

commander of the newly established U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com-

mand (TRADOC), the initial expression of this doctrinal rethinking was

the 1976 edition of FM 100–5, Operations. The new manual introduced the

notion of active defense, a highly questionable substitute for the tested

defensive concepts of mobile defense and defense in depth. In focusing on

the lethality of modern weapons, the new doctrine stressed the effects of

firepower by devoting the preponderance of space to a discussion of its

effects. The new FM 100–5 did not ignore maneuver, but it did relegate that

element of combat power to the mere function of movement to deliver fire-

power rather than gain positional advantage.

The 1976 edition of FM 100–5 was wildly controversial even before it had

been fully distributed to the field. The critics of DePuy’s doctrine rejected it

as too mechanical, too dogmatic, and too mathematically deterministic. None-

theless, DePuy’s efforts were a major contribution to the post-Vietnam U.S.

Army because, for the first time in many years, officers were again thinking

and writing about doctrine. The resulting debate fueled a renaissance in

American military thinking.

The immediate reactions to the 1976 edition resulted in the notion of

follow-on forces attack (FOFA), which in turn led to recognition of the oper-

ational depth of the battlefield. That led directly to the final acceptance by

the American military and NATO of the concept of the operational level of

war, as distinct from the tactical or the strategic. The Soviets had formally

recognized this level of warfare as early as the 1920s and had aggressively

worked to define and expand the theory of operational art ever since. The

West had long rejected the concept as little more than yet another crackpot

element of Marxist thinking, but the Soviets had been right all along on this

point.

The principal guiding force behind the development of AirLand Battle

doctrine was General Donn A. Starry, who assumed command of TRADOC

in July 1977. Working directly under Starry, Major General Donald R. Morelli,

TRADOC’s deputy chief of staff of doctrine, closely supervised the team of

doctrine writers, which included Lieutenant Colonels Leonard D. Holder,

Huba Wass de Czega, and Richard Hart Sinnerich. Classical German military

thought had a great deal of influence on the development of the new doc-

trine. Even in the 1976 edition of FM 100–5, General DePuy had instructed

the doctrine writers to study carefully the current capstone doctrinal manual

of the West German Bundeswehr. That manual, HDv 100/100, Truppen-

führung (Command and Control in Battle), was based closely on the manual

of the same name first introduced in 1932 with which the German Army

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fought World War II. Through the influence of the German manual, such

standard German doctrinal concepts as Auftragstaktik (mission orders) and

Schwerpunkt (center of gravity) became firmly embedded in American mili-

tary thinking.

The 1982 edition of FM 100–5 marked the U.S. military’s first formal

recognition of the operational level of war and introduced the concepts of

AirLand Battle and Deep Battle. AirLand Battle doctrine took a nonlinear

view of combat. It enlarged the battlefield area, stressing unified air and

ground operations throughout the theater. It recognized the nonquantifiable

elements of combat power and restressed that maneuver was as important as

firepower. Most significantly, the doctrine emphasized the human element

of war, “courageous, well-trained soldiers and skillful, effective leaders.” An

undercurrent to this last theme, of course, was the fact that the United States

had only recently abolished conscription and was then in the process of

building an all-volunteer, professional army. AirLand Battle doctrine identi-

fied the keys to success in war, which included indirect approaches, speed

and violence, flexibility and reliance on the initiative of junior leaders, rapid

decision making, clearly defined objectives and operational concepts, a clearly

designated main effort, and deep attack.

Depth was one of the keys. A commander had to fight and synchronize

three simultaneous battles: close, deep, and rear. The deep battle, of course,

would be the enemy’s rear battle, and vice versa. A well-coordinated attack

deep in an enemy’s rear might in fact prove decisive. This marked the first

recognition in American military doctrine that the battle might not neces-

sarily be decided along the line of contact.

One of the most controversial features of the 1976 edition of FM 100–5

had been the elimination of the venerable Principles of War, first adopted by

the U.S. Army in the early 1920s. The 1982 edition restored the Principles of

War but then went one step further by introducing the Four Tenets of Air-

Land Battle: initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization. Initiative is the

ability to set the terms of the battle by action and was identified as the great-

est advantage in war. Depth has components of time, space, and resources.

Agility is the ability to act faster than the enemy to exploit his weakness and

frustrate his plans. Synchronization ensures that no effort will be wasted,

either initially or as operations develop.

Some critics complained that the Four Tenets of AirLand Battle were

unnecessary additions to the Principles of War or were ultimately an attempt

to replace them. But as other analysts pointed out, the Four Tenets were for

the most part combinations of two or more of the Principles of War. Synchro-

nization, for example, combined economy of force and unity of effort. Initia-

tive combined offensive, maneuver, and surprise.

The 1982 FM 100–5 was a major milestone in American military thought,

but it was far from a perfect document. After its release to the field the debate

continued, and the doctrine writers continued to refine the document. The

1986 edition of FM 100–5 contained no significant changes or innovations,

but it presented a far better discussion of the doctrine and corrected some of

the minor errors in the 1982 edition. Some errors still remained, however. The

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