V o L u m e I : a d

1986 edition used the German concept of the Schwerpunkt interchangeably as

either the center of gravity or the decisive point. As defined originally by

nineteenth-century Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz, how-

ever, the center of gravity and the decisive point (Entscheidungsstelle) were

two distinct and separate concepts. The confusion was not corrected until

the 1993 edition of FM 100–5, which stated clearly: “Decisive points are not

centers of gravity, they are the keys to getting at the centers of gravity.”

NATO never fully embraced the AirLand Battle doctrine, and, ironi-

cally, neither did the U.S. Air Force. In any event, the new doctrine never

had to be used in an actual war against the Warsaw Pact on the plains of

Northern Europe. AirLand Battle, however, greatly concerned the Soviets

and was just one more element of pressure in the 1980s that eventually con-

tributed to the collapse of the communist Soviet Union. The overwhelm-

ingly successful prosecution of the First Gulf War in 1991 was based on the

1986 edition of FM 100–5, which was arguably the single best official articu-

lation of American war-fighting doctrine ever published.

The 1993 edition of FM 100–5 actually shifted the emphasis away from

operations and conventional war fighting toward strategy and operations

other than war (OOTW). Even the term “AirLand Battle” was dropped in

favor of “Army Operations,” but that was more the result of bureaucratic in-

fighting between the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force. A new edition of FM

100–5 in 1998 was supposed to shift the emphasis back to the operational art,

but the final coordinating draft caused considerable internal controversy. The

new manual was finally issued in June 2001, under a new numbering system,

as FM 3–0 Operations. Although the term “AirLand Battle” is no longer offi-

cially in use, the U.S. Army continues to train and operate in accordance with

its principles.

David T. Zabecki

See also

Artillery; DePuy, William Eugene; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and

Formation of

References

Doughty, Robert A. The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946–76. Leaven-

worth Papers No. 1. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General

Staff College, 1979.

Herbert, Paul H. Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976

Edition of FM 100–5. Leavenworth Papers, Number 16. Leavenworth, KS: U.S.

Army Combat Studies Institute, 1988.

Naveh, Shimon. In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory.

London: Frank Cass, 1997.

Romjue, John L. From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doc-

trine, 1973–1982. Fort Monroe, VA: United States Army Training and Doctrine

Command, 1984.

Zabecki, David T., and Bruce Condell, eds. and trans. Truppenführung: On the German

Art of War. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001.

96

AirLand Battle

The overwhelmingly

successful

prosecution of the

First Gulf War in

1991 was based on

the 1986 edition of

FM 100–5, which

was arguably the

single best official

articulation of

American war-

fighting doctrine

ever published.

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The Balkan nation of Albania is located on the southeastern coast of the

Adriatic Sea. It is bordered to the north and east by Serbia and Montenegro,

due east by the former Yugoslavian republic of Macedonia, and to the south-

east by Greece. Albania, with a 1945 population of some 1.1 million people,

comprises 11,000 square miles. During 1941–1944, Albanian nationalist and

communist forces fought against one another as well as against German and

Italian troops in a struggle for control of the country. Between September

1943 when the Italian fascist regime was overthrown and Italy surrendered

to the Allies and November 1944 when Germany withdrew from Albania,

the communists slowly ground down nationalist forces in a brutal civil war.

The communists, rather ironically backed by the United States, Britain, and

Yugoslavian guerrillas led by Josip Broz Tito, established de facto control

over southern Albania by January 1944.

Enver Hoxha, a former French teacher and longtime Albanian commu-

nist, became chairman of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation, an

arm of the Albanian National Liberation Front, in January 1944. By May

1944 he was also the supreme commander of the National Liberation Army

(NLA). With the aid of British arms and Allied air cover, in October 1944 the

NLA moved north and captured the capital of Tirana. Hoxha was then

named prime minister, and in December 1944 he repaid Tito for his help by

sending Albanian forces to fight alongside Yugoslavian communist forces to

defeat ethnic Albanian forces in Kosovo.

During the early years of the Cold War, Hoxha systematically consoli-

dated his power and took on the added posts of foreign minister, defense

minister, and army commander in chief. He and his second-in-command,

Mehmet Shehu, terrorized remnant nationalist holdouts, stamped out any

potential opposition, and established a totalitarian communist government

that was among the most oppressive in the world. By mid-1946, all Albanian

industries had been nationalized. The Agrarian Reform Law led to the seizure

of the lands of large landowners and their redistribution to the peasants, and

the economy was fully centralized.

In July 1946 Albania signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with

Yugoslavia, but within a year the alliance collapsed in part because of Hoxha’s

fear that his nation would be annexed by Yugoslavia. When the Soviet-

controlled Cominform expelled Yugoslavia in June 1948 because of Tito’s

independent streak, the Hoxha regime became rabidly Stalinist and turned

to the Soviet Union for economic assistance. At the same time, Albanian

relations with the West deteriorated, especially after two British ships struck

Albanian mines in the channel between Albania and Corfu in October 1946.

Britain and the United States spent the next seven years trying in vain to

overthrow the Hoxha regime. These efforts only increased Albanian xeno-

phobia and convinced Hoxha that the West was not to be trusted.

In February 1949 Albania joined Comecon and began to trade exclu-

sively with Eastern bloc nations. Following the Soviet Union’s lead, Hoxha

Albania

97

Albania

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