MYSTICISM
331
3.
Yet, I repeat once more, the existence of mystical states absolutely
overthrows the pretension of non-mystical states to be the sole and
ultimate dictators of what we may believe. As a rule, mystical states
merely add a supersensuous meaning to the ordinary outward data
of consciousness. They are excitements like the emotions of love
or ambition, gifts to our spirit by means of which facts already
objectively before us fall into a new expressiveness and make a new
connection with our active life. They do not contradict these facts
as such, or deny anything that our senses have immediately seized.
1
It is the rationalistic critic rather who plays the part of denier in
the controversy, and his denials have no strength, for there never
can be a state of facts to which new meaning may not truthfully be
added, provided the mind ascend to a more enveloping point of view.
It must always remain an open question whether mystical states
may not possibly be such superior points of view, windows through
which the mind looks out upon a more extensive and inclusive
world. The difference of the views seen from the different mystical
windows need not prevent us from entertaining this supposition.
The wider world would in that case prove to have a mixed constitu-
tion like that of this world, that is all. It would have its celestial
and its infernal regions, its tempting and its saving moments, its
valid experiences and its counterfeit ones, just as our world has
them; but it would be a wider world all the same. We should have
to use its experiences by selecting and subordinating and substituting
just as is our custom in this ordinary naturalistic world; we should
be liable to error just as we are now; yet the counting in of that
wider world of meanings, and the serious dealing with it, might, in
spite of all the perplexity, be indispensable stages in our approach
to the final fullness of the truth.
In this shape, I think, we have to leave the subject. Mystical
states indeed wield no authority due simply to their being mystical
states. But the higher ones among them point in directions to
which the religious sentiments even of non-mystical men incline.
They tell of the supremacy of the ideal, of vastness, of union, of
1
They sometimes add subjective audita et visa to the facts, but as these are usually
interpreted as transmundane, they oblige no alteration in the facts of sense.
332
THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
safety, and of rest. They offer us hypotheses, hypotheses which we
may voluntarily ignore, but which as thinkers we cannot possibly
upset. The supernaturalism and optimism to which they would
persuade us may, interpreted in one way or another, be after all the
truest of insights into the meaning of this life.
“Oh, the little more, and how much it is; and the little less, and
what worlds away!” It may be that possibility and permission of
this sort are all that the religious consciousness requires to live on.
In my last lecture I shall have to try to persuade you that this is the
case. Meanwhile, however, I am sure that for many of my readers
this diet is too slender. If supernaturalism and inner union with
the divine are true, you think, then not so much permission, as
compulsion to believe, ought to be found. Philosophy has always
professed to prove religious truth by coercive argument; and the
construction of philosophies of this kind has always been one favorite
function of the religious life, if we use this term in the large historic
sense. But religious philosophy is an enormous subject, and in my
next lecture I can only give that brief glance at it which my limits
will allow.
PHILOSOPHY
333
LECTURE XVIII
PHILOSOPHY
T
HE subject of Saintliness left us face to face with the question,
Is the sense of divine presence a sense of anything objectively
true? We turned first to mysticism for an answer, and found that
although mysticism is entirely willing to corroborate religion, it
is too private (and also too various) in its utterances to be able to
claim a universal authority. But philosophy publishes results which
claim to be universally valid if they are valid at all, so we now turn
with our question to philosophy. Can philosophy stamp a warrant
of veracity upon the religious man’s sense of the divine?
I imagine that many of you at this point begin to indulge in guesses
at the goal to which I am tending. I have undermined the authority
of mysticism, you say, and the next thing I shall probably do is to
seek to discredit that of philosophy. Religion, you expect to hear
me conclude, is nothing but an affair of faith, based either on vague
sentiment, or on that vivid sense of the reality of things unseen of
which in my second lecture and in the lecture on Mysticism I gave
so many examples. It is essentially private and individualistic; it
always exceeds our powers of formulation; and although attempts
to pour its contents into a philosophic mould will probably always
go on, men being what they are, yet these attempts are always
secondary processes which in no way add to the authority, or warrant
the veracity, of the sentiments from which they derive their own
stimulus and borrow whatever glow of conviction they may them-
selves possess. In short, you suspect that I am planning to defend
feeling at the expense of reason, to rehabilitate the primitive and
unreflective, and to dissuade you from the hope of any Theology
worthy of the name.
To a certain extent I have to admit that you guess rightly. I
do believe that feeling is the deeper source of religion, and that