PHILOSOPHY
337
and no more; if this be the fact, then will I confess that there is no
specific science about God, that theology is but a name, and a protest in
its behalf an hypocrisy. Then, pious as it is to think of Him, while the
pageant of experiment or abstract reasoning passes by, still such piety is
nothing more than a poetry of thought, or an ornament of language, a
certain view taken of Nature which one man has and another has not,
which gifted minds strike out, which others see to be admirable and
ingenious, and which all would be the better for adopting. It is but the
theology of Nature, just as we talk of the philosophy or the romance of
history, or the poetry of childhood, or the picturesque or the sentimental
or the humorous, or any other abstract quality which the genius or the
caprice of the individual, or the fashion of the day, or the consent of
the world, recognizes in any set of objects which are subjected to its con-
templation. I do not see much difference between avowing that there
is no God, and implying that nothing definite can be known for certain
about Him.”
What I mean by Theology, continues Newman, is none of these things:
“I simply mean the Science of God, or the truths we know about God, put
into a system, just as we have a science of the stars and call it astronomy,
or of the crust of the earth and call it geology.”
In both these extracts we have the issue clearly set before us:
Feeling valid only for the individual is pitted against reason valid
universally. The test is a perfectly plain one of fact. Theology based
on pure reason must in point of fact convince men universally. If
it did not, wherein would its superiority consist? If it only formed
sects and schools, even as sentiment and mysticism form them,
how would it fulfill its programme of freeing us from personal
caprice and waywardness? This perfectly definite practical test of
the pretensions of philosophy to found religion on universal reason
simplifies my procedure to-day. I need not discredit philosophy by
laborious criticism of its arguments. It will suffice if I show that as a
matter of history it fails to prove its pretension to be “objectively”
convincing. In fact, philosophy does so fail. It does not banish
differences; it founds schools and sects just as feeling does. I believe,
in fact, that the logical reason of man operates in this field of
divinity exactly as it has always operated in love, or in patriotism,
or in politics, or in any other of the wider affairs of life, in which
our passions or our mystical intuitions fix our beliefs beforehand.
It finds arguments for our conviction, for indeed it has to find
them. It amplifies and defines our faith, and dignifies it and lends it
338
THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
words and plausibility. It hardly ever engenders it; it cannot now
secure it.
1
Lend me your attention while I run through some of the points
of the older systematic theology. You find them in both Protestant
and Catholic manuals, best of all in the innumerable text-books
published since Pope Leo’s Encyclical recommending the study of
Saint Thomas. I glance first at the arguments by which dogmatic
theology establishes God’s existence, after that at those by which it
establishes his nature.
2
The arguments for God’s existence have stood for hundreds of
years with the waves of unbelieving criticism
breaking against them,
never totally discrediting them in the ears of the faithful, but on the
whole slowly and surely washing out the mortar from between their
joints. If you have a God already whom you believe in, these argu-
ments confirm you. If you are atheistic, they fail to set you right. The
proofs are various. The “cosmological” one, so-called, reasons from
the contingence of the world to a First Cause which must contain
whatever perfections the world itself contains. The “argument from
design” reasons, from the fact that Nature’s laws are mathematical, and
her parts benevolently adapted to each other, that this cause is both
intellectual and benevolent. The “moral argument” is that the moral
law presupposes a lawgiver. The “argument ex consensu gentium” is
that the belief in God is so widespread as to be grounded in the
rational nature of man, and should therefore carry authority with it.
As I just said, I will not discuss these arguments technically. The
bare fact that all idealists since Kant have felt entitled either to
scout or to neglect them shows that they are not solid enough to
serve as religion’s all-sufficient foundation. Absolutely impersonal
1
As regards the secondary character of intellectual constructions, and the primacy of
feeling and instinct in founding religious beliefs, see the striking work of H. F
IELDING
, The
Hearts of Men, London, 1902, which came into my hands after my text was written. “Creeds,”
says the author, “are the grammar of religion, they are to religion what grammar is to speech.
Words are the expression of our wants; grammar is the theory formed afterwards. Speech
never proceeded from grammar, but the reverse. As speech progresses and changes from
unknown causes, grammar must follow” (p. 313). The whole book, which keeps unusually
close to concrete facts, is little more than an amplification of this text.
2
For convenience’ sake, I follow the order of A. S
TÖCKL
’s Lehrbuch der Philosophie, 5te
Auflage, Mainz, 1881, Band ii. B. B
OEDDER
’
S
Natural Theology, London, 1891, is a handy
English Catholic Manual; but an almost identical doctrine is given by such Protestant theo-
logians as C. H
ODGE
: Systematic Theology, New York, 1873, or A. H. S
TRONG
: Systematic
Theology, 5th edition, New York, 1896.