Vilfredo Pareto’s Sociology
28
Italy’s
clientelismo. Such organisational inefficiencies favour political reversals
towards greater centralisation. The resulting drives to reconcentrate sovereignty
produce greater reliance upon force as a control strategy and also create fertile ground
for personality cultism. Governments which move in this direction do however
become compelled to take on fewer tasks, eventually succumbing to ‘entropic
asphyxiation’ whereby they fail to perform even key tasks well. Inefficiencies now
arise in such areas as the delegation of authority and the rewarding of performance.
This creates pressure for a further political reversal, this time in the direction of
greater decentralisation.
Notably, Pareto’s political cycle employs Machivelli’s lion and fox typology by
treating these two positions as corresponding not just to alternative control strategies
but also to changing elite psychologies which are considerable for their functional
adaptation
to these strategies, and indeed for their correspondence to changing
principles of elite recruitment and leadership selection under changing conditions.
Powers’ mention of the ‘cult of personality’ as a correlate of Machiavelli’s ‘force’ is
particularly interesting; it represents a yearning for ‘strong leadership’ which chapter
four will reveal to be an important feature of conservative-authoritarian personality.
Next we may consider Powers’ explanation of interaction between the social
sentiment and economic cycles (Powers 1987, 122). Once more Powers presents us
with interlocking mechanisms, this time to show why these two cycles are likely to
synchronise. The argument here is that economic prosperity will tend to correlate
positively with relaxed social prescriptions, whilst economic austerity will tend to
combine with more restrictive social prescriptions. Beginning with the upswing of
both cycles, Powers’ argument is that increasing productivity
favours increasing
social complexity and opportunity in life, which increasingly brings traditional
beliefs into conflict with actual experiences. As social prescriptions relax, consumer
hedonism becomes more permissible, which allows productivity to develop further
to satisfy escalating consumer demands. This however results in consumer debt,
within the context of a more general scarcity of capital which might fund further
economic productivity increases. This produces economic contraction, which
means levels of socioeconomic attainment increasingly fall below socioeconomic
aspirations. Calls for tougher social
prescription then grow louder, as a means to
close this gulf, with the result that consumption once more becomes unacceptable
and consumer industries contract sharply. The consumer economy then gives way
once more to a capital-producing economy which allows both private savings and
capital which might be used for larger scale business investment to accumulate to the
point where the cycle can begin afresh.
Importantly, this cycle alludes to much more than it mentions directly. The
question of how personality structure is likely to vary with level of social complexity
is a difficult one which the next chapter will explore in far more detail, in order to
place Pareto’s theory on a more solid footing. Among the many aspects of social
complexity which are potentially relevant here are increased
social mobility and
broadening cultural horizons, increased educational opportunity, technological
innovation, and indeed increased flux within economic production itself. All of
these factors and many more besides, can undermine traditional work-related
sources of identity, thereby producing that confusion over social and moral norms
Pareto’s ‘Psychologistic’ Sociology
29
which the above theory requires for consumer hedonism to emerge as a stimulus
for unsustainable economic growth. We have heard this argument before, of course.
The dilemma of whether a new kind of person might result from increased social
complexity has already been mentioned in this chapter
as having led renaissance
literature to ponder the caricature of the Machiavellian confidence trickster.
Next, Powers describes Pareto’s thoughts on interaction between social sentiment
and political organisation (Powers 1987, 138). He begins with the observation that
the inefficiencies and brutalities of centralised authority generate resistance and
resentment. This promotes the political control strategy of co-optation, which stimulates
hedonistic sentiment amongst the elites, who now pressurise government to extend
even more ‘largesse and patronage’ towards them. Once this co-evolution of hedonism
and patronage has generated crippling inefficiences and expenses, governments are
compelled to backtrack towards greater centralisation of sovereignty and use of force.
Focusing more closely upon this co-evolution
of patronage and hedonism,
Powers observes that extensions of patronage stimulate hedonism in part through
their undermining of work ethic. This is because patronage encourages people to
think of ‘success’ less in terms of personal accomplishment and more in terms of
‘who one knows’. Furthermore, Powers comments that ‘the more people get, the
more they think they deserve’; and, of course, ‘people would rather get things the
easy way’. Thus, increasing numbers within the elites expect and demand special
treatment. Hence taking stock of likely psychological correlates to the interaction
between political and social sentiment cycles, two plausible
themes emerge which
will both be placed upon firmer ground later within this book. The first is the link
between conservative personality and work ethic, which Powers relates to times of
strict social prescription and political centralisation. We will see in the last chapter
that scales to measure work ethic (founded upon Weber’s theory of protestant work
ethic (Weber 2002)) and conservative personality correlate positively; furthermore,
‘anti-hedonism, asceticism and disdain for leisure’ have all been identified as
important dimensions of work ethic (just as Weber had earlier flagged these as
motivational puritan virtues shared by Benjamin Franklin and other early capitalist
entrepreneurs). The second is the link between liberal personality and what might be
termed ‘entitlement thinking’, which Powers relates to political decentralisation and
that loosening of social prescription which stimulates hedonism.
Chapter four will
link entitlement thinking to the intertwined psychological themes of psychopathy and
narcissism. More fully, we will see that these combine further with Machiavellianism
to form what is now termed a ‘dark triad’ of tightly interconnected, socially aversive
personality traits, which taken together yield a plausible psychological foundation
for Pareto’s Machiavellian-liberal ‘fox’.
Finally, Powers’ account of interaction between Pareto’s economic and political
cycles (Powers 1987, 140) begins at the bottom of both cycles. Political centralisation
inhibits business, which stimulates drives towards political decentralisation and its
attendant usages of co-optation for the purposes of political control. As more and
more businesses are shielded
from competition by patronage, however, they will
be able to produce inferior products and sell these at higher prices. This eventually
results in a widening gulf between quality and cost right across the consumer
economy, which helps send processes of political decentralisation into reverse.