Vilfredo Pareto's Sociology : a Framework for Political Psychology

Vilfredo Pareto’s Sociology
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Powers is suggesting here that although a decentralised polity is better placed to 
address the regulatory concerns which arise within a rich and highly developed civil 
society, prospects for fair and effective regulation are reduced by the appearance of 
ever more extensive and elaborate networks of patron-client ties between political 
and economic interests. Although Powers does not draw direct attention to the role 
of psychology here, we can at least say that periods of political decentralisation and 
economic growth are characterised by ever more complex patterns of patron-client 
interaction between political and economic elites. This favours the emergence within 
both political and economic elites of Machiavellian types who possesses particular 
skills in negotiating these inter-elite ties, but who nonetheless utilise these skills to 
work towards self-aggrandissement and undermine the common good. It is perhaps 
fitting that a final comment on this matter should bring all three cycles together by 
adding that such activities will involve exploitation of Rogow and Lasswell’s ‘gray 
zone’ of confusion and disagreement over norms, which we can expect to see widen, 
both as the social sentiment cycle moves towards relaxed social prescription, and as 
the political system, the economy and civil society more generally grow complex.
Having sketched out some of the principal dynamics which drive and synchronise 
the political, economic and social cycles, the following theoretical overview becomes 
possible. Elite culture and psychology, Pareto thought, are sociologically significant 
not just as products of, but also as partial determinants of, political, economic and 
social forms. His approach appears similar in certain key respects to the theory of 
‘social character’ found in Erich Fromm’s (1942) ‘Character and the Social Process’. 
Fromm’s ‘social character’ consists of facets of character common to a group of 
people; these things being far more sociologically significant than peculiarities of 
individual character. Fromm saw social character as determined by the basic life 
experiences commonly encountered within a society, including fundamentals of 
personality structure which tend to endure throughout the individual lifespan. 
Fromm also regarded social character as a far more important influence than 
logic and reason, upon how we think, feel and behave. Although Pareto could not 
begin to equal the psychological richness of Fromm’s psychoanalytic and humanistic 
analysis of social character, he had at least stressed this essential point. In fact, he 
devoted what many might consider inordinate attention within his ‘Treatise’ to his 
idea that ‘non-logical’ actions greatly outnumber those which are justifiable in terms 
of a logical relation between means and ends. He did this for good reason. It is a 
necessary precondition for both Fromm and Pareto to regard social character as a 
‘productive force’ which influences fundamental social forms so that these may in 
turn mould the social characters of future generations.
Taking this approach, Pareto believed that prosperous, entrepreneur driven 
economic orders will tend to align with decentralised, democratic political systems 
and liberal social attitudes because these phenomena are all advantaged during the 
‘individualised’ phase of the historical cycle by synchronising forces (Fromm’s 
‘social characters’ functioning as ‘productive forces’) which are embodied within 
the modes of thought and behaviour common to the foxes and speculators who are 
then most able to fill the ranks of the elites. Likewise, austere anti-entrepreneurial 
economic orders, strong, centralised political systems and religious-conservative 
social orders tend to align together as societies pass through their ‘crystallised’ phases 

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Pareto’s ‘Psychologistic’ Sociology
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because synchronising forces manifest themselves within the modes of thought and 
behaviour of the lions and rentiers who are now better adapted to upward mobility 
within the elites (see Pareto 1935, §2206–36 on the ‘Cycles of Interdependence’).
This overview of the historical cycle also provides clues concerning how Pareto 
theorised the changing psychological composition of elites. Following Machiavelli’s 
astute belief that individuals tend not to abandon acquired habits, he appears to have 
assumed that those psychologically in tune with the times will, over the course of 
years if not generations, gravitate to fill the highest elite control positions. These 
will be individuals who possess characteristics which are optimal for the successful 
handling of these control positions within any given phase of the historical cycle. 
This is easily rephrased in simple functionalist terms. Individuals rise through the 
elites according to their degree of ‘functional adaptation’ to current conditions, or, 
putting this differently, according to how well they meet the ‘needs of the system’. 
This functionalist thinking was especially evident within Pareto’s theory of the 
‘circulation of elites’ which first appeared in his (1896–97) ‘Cours d’économie 
politique’ (Meisel 1965, 10). This argues that for elites to endure as societies move 
through the historical cycle they must remain ‘open’ to influxes of individuals with 
appropriate ‘talents’ in order to avoid becoming vulnerable both to internal decay 
and to overthrow by rival elites. Van Den Berghe (1978, 166) refers to various 
historical studies which support his argument. Closed hereditary aristocracies, he 
says, have indeed proven vulnerable to sclerosis. Many long enduring traditional 
societies have, on the other hand, learned to survive by finding ways to maintain 
healthy levels of elite circulation. Imperial China’s entrance exams for accession to 
the mandarin class, Van Den Berghe says, provide a classic example. The Ancien 
Régime of eighteenth century France, he adds, suffered a fate which it could have 
avoided, were it not for its ‘relative closure’ against the growing bourgeoisie (see 
also Pareto 1935, §2057–2059).
Regarding all such adaptive psychological characteristics, Pareto did however 
restrict himself to generalities, attributing the loose and arbitrary manner in which 
he used terms conveying psychological references to his determination to avoid 
rooting his sociology in early, uncertain theories of depth psychology (see Meisel 
1965, 27). It has also been suggested that Pareto realised psychology was a field of 
study outwith his competence, and he had no wish to appear as a dilettante (Madge 
1964, 76, 90; Szacki 1979, 262). And yet, Pareto’s penchant for crude psychological 
generalisation also reflected his requirement to deal with psychological attributes 
defined so generally as to apply right across those incredibly diverse historical 
contexts, from the ancient Greek tyrannies right through to early twentieth century 
Europe, which are analysed in the ‘Treatise’. 
2.7  Pareto and Parsons: Similar Theories of Social System?
Pareto gained notoriety for his obsession with human irrationality. One of his early 
critics, Emory Bogardus, aptly referred to his ‘error complex’ (Meisel 1965, 26). 
Talcott Parsons called him a ‘knocker’ rather than a ‘booster’ (Parsons 1949, 293). 
Raymond Aron described him as ‘a man who thinks against’, adding that ‘because 

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