18 Early State and Democracy

Hence, it is quite possible to speak about a certain stratum of professional governors in Rome, and to provide such professional governors for the state was a tradition in many families. This layer gradually managed to use its official position for deriving some material benefits (Utchenko 1965: 125; Vipper 1995: 287–292).

The tendency of the Roman army towards becoming regular and professional has already been discussed.

b) Other changes

A new feature wide-spread in poleis and civitas, the reporting of the officials and supervision of their activity, should be noted. For example, every four years the senators in Rome were approved again in their positions on the basis of the decision of special officials. (About such supervision in the Roman Republic see e.g., Mommsen 1993: 42; Vipper 1995: 287–291).

It is also easy to notice in Athens and Rome the development and increasing importance of other new principles of management:

– delegation of power;

– new distribution of administrative functions (separation of decision-making from execution).

Besides, one can also point out some other changes in management. It was especially expressed in the development (sometimes even hyperdevelopment) of the procedure. It is necessary to note that the increasing complication of government inevitably leads to a certain formalization and complication of the procedural component of making, executing, and checking decisions as well as management in general (actually just this is the process of bureaucratization). However, in many city-states, including of course the polis and civitas, such formalization sometimes becomes more important and more complex than even in some classical states. Thus, in city-states there still was available an important element of bureaucratization.

A high degree of development of the procedural part is characteristic of Athens and Rome. In particular, in Athens decisions of the Assemblies were recorded and kept in archives. A citizen could protest this decision as ‘unlawful’ by submitting a special complaint within a year. There were some rules of speeches for orators, and the Assembly chairman could fine the orator for their violation. It is necessary to point out the officials' accounts (and not only financial) including those of every member of the Council of Five Hundred as well as obligatory check of those assuming the office (Kuchma 1998: 119–120).

In Rome somehow even a more complex procedure was used. While in Athens the majority of appointments were defined by lot, in Rome filling a post was always connected with competition during election campaigns. Therefore there was a special system of admitting candidates to elections and a number of special laws forbidding unfair methods of pre-election struggle. The sanction for such infringements was a ten years exile¹⁶. The majority of the officials were to submit reports after abdication as it was in Athens, and in case of detection of any abuses they could be punished (Kuchma 1998: 157–159).

In Rome a rigid hierarchy of magistrate positions bringing together its administrative system contributed to the final establishment of the bureaucratic states.

The officials both in Athens and Rome did not have any special rights for a post (justified by a tradition, kin ties, etc. as it used to happen in other societies). This right arose only as a result of delegation of authorities from the source of state power (the national assemblies, the Senate and etc.). Certainly it was a weak point but also an advantage. This may be the reason why there were practically no cases of separatism in the history of republican Rome and Athens (of course I mean only the Athens polity proper but not the Athenian navy).

It is necessary to note that development of the procedural part in bureaucratic societies usually resulted in the improvement of the system (form) of transmitting the orders through the hierarchical ladder of employees as well as through the procedure of control and report. Say, the order of inheritance to the throne, appointment for supreme posts in the state, the volume of power given to officials and so on, were regulated much more rarely. Probably it is connected with the fact that the right for the throne and for supreme power in monarchies was based not on acts of the law or juridical collisions but on sacralization of the ruler or on the fist law. Besides in monarchies the executive power did not want any restrictions upon its activity (consequently the state and legal intention did not develop in this direction).

On the contrary, in democratic states the citizens were always preoccupied with the problem of escaping subordination to the executive power. That is why they tried to secure themselves. Sometimes it got features of excessive complexity. For example, in Venice in 1268 the governor (doge) was elected in the following way. The Big Council chose thirty people from its staff who in their turn selected nine people to elect forty electors among the Council members and non-members. Then those forty people chose twelve to elect forty-five people who in their turn selected eleven and, at last those eleven defined forty-one people who finally named the doge (Skazkin et al. 1970: 249).

Non-conventional and new forms of social life regulation

It is possible to point out the following non-conventional and new forms of regulation of life in the polis and civitas:

increasing regulation of life by the Assembly, the Senate, officials including a growth of importance of compulsion and interdictions for the population outgoing from the officials;

amplification of the court's importance;

quite often reforms;

constant changes in laws.

It is worth mentioning that there was the so-called Board of archons of nine people in Athens. The main duty of six of them was to provide annual reports to the Assembly on contradictions and gaps in the law currently in force alongside with proposals on their rectification (Kuchma 1998: 120). It is worth marking out a huge role of the Roman praetors' lawmaking activity as they actually created a new type of law (Kossarev 1986: 21, 44–47);

– increasing importance of compulsion and supervision of execution including the institution of supervision over the activity of officials (exile, reporting);

– monitoring loyalty of the population through spying (the sycophants in Athens);

– large citizens' involvement in state activities.

All that led to a gradual change in various spheres of life including ‘control and regulation of some areas of social activity which in stateless societies are exclusive prerogatives of kin groups’ (Kurtz 1978: 183), for example family relations. In particular, Solon's laws are an excellent example of such interference. Besides one can observe the process of replacing traditions by political will, that is by assemblies' decisions, new laws, and new bodies. So one can observe a growth of the rational aspect in reforming the society regardless of traditions and other stagnancy. One of this process indicators is ‘people's deliberate choice of social intermediaries for forced regulation of civil cases’ (Kurbatov et al. 1986: 67).

Both the character of political life and means of its regulation are under change in the new state polis. While in the Homeric polis according to Andreyev (1976: 104–105), everybody struggled against everybody and the struggle of noble clans among themselves was in the first place (Koshelenko 1987: 45), in the democratic state the struggle between social and political but not patrimonial groups started to predominate. It was a new phenomenon, too. The new laws, bodies and procedural rules start becoming the means of regulation the leaders' and political groups' power and opportunity to provide a compromise between, and rotation of the officials.

It is important to note that in the Homeric polis according to some researchers, ‘there was almost no “legal basis” protecting a person and property’ (Koshelenko 1987: 45). Hence, the emergence of the state in this aspect also meant the enhancement of ‘a legal basis’ as a new instrument of life regulation. The court served as the drive gear in the work of this new instrument.

Ernest Gellner believed the state to be a specialized and concentrated force to maintain the order. ‘The state is that very institution or set of institutions specifically concerned with enforcement of the order. The state exists where specialized order-enforcing agencies, such as police forces and courts, have separated from the rest of social life. They are the state’ (emphasis added – L. G. [Gellner 1983: 4]). I have already mentioned that the early state is first of all connected with providing sovereignty and external safety. However, the Gellner's idea makes some sense.

Just in this aspect the ancient societies give us a good example proving that we are dealing with real states. While police was not a very important body, the court achieved a high degree of development and significance. The court acted as the major body for keeping the internal order and regulation of social life. Otherwise what would 6,000 judges do in Athens? 300 sessions of court per year is a large figure for a polis of 200,000 inhabitants (see Koshelenko 1987: 69). It is not casual that in societies where exchange relations are well developed, the court plays a much more important part than in others. It was not occasional that a special trade court and most likely, a special trade legislation were available there (Struve et al. 1956: 263). But the court preserved not the economic order only. In Athens in the classical and subsequent periods the court protected the democratic regime itself as a citizen could process a legal case against anybody whom he suspected to damage state interests. The court was even used as a body of international relations as for Athens it was a means of supervising the allies (Golubtsova 1983a: 363, 364).

Redistribution of power

Elsewhere, I have defined redistribution of power as the process of redistribution of power between the center and the periphery which makes it possible for the supreme power not only to control the periphery but also to redirect the streams of power functions and actions towards the center where a considerable proportion of power, as well as of material resources, is concentrated (Grinin 2003c: 56–59).

The redistribution of power in the early states (especially small ones) is connected with the struggle for superiority between different centers (bodies) of power or their unstable coexistence. In Athens the redistribution of power is expressed in the struggle of groups of population and bodies through which they can influence the state. Respectively some bodies get more rights and others lose them. For example, in Athens in the 5^th century B.C. we observe the increase of the National Assembly's role and decrease of that of the body of aristocracy, Areopagus, as well as of the aristocracy's positions in general. According to Aristotle, in the 7^th century B.C. the Areopagite Council took charge of the majority of the most important matters in the state peremptory imposing penalties and punishments on all breakers of order. But later, by the end of the 5^th century B.C. it had almost lost any political significance and had turned into a special court for trials of cases related to religion. Moreover, due to the change in the system of staffing, it also lost the role of the main body of the oligarchy (Aristotle 1997: 273; Koshelenko 1987: 44, 68). Frankly speaking, this process was irregular and rough. In particular, during the period of 478–462 B.C. the influence of Areopagus increased again and finally weakened as a result of activities of Ephialtes, Conon, Themistocles and others (see Aristotle 1997: 292–294; for the description of the struggle between noble clans and also between nobles and the demos in the 6^th century B.C., see Zelyin 1964).

The whole history of Athens can be represented as the process of redistribution of power from aristocracy and outstanding people to the demos and the poor: the Solon's reforms that strengthened the foundation of democracy; the distribution of funds to the demos; the law on exile (ostracism); the right of the population to participate in operation of courts; the obligation of rich people to give money for state affairs; the restriction on the number of people enjoying the right of citizenship; development of the system of informing about the citizens' loyality; introduction of death penalty for an attempt on democratic regime; introduction of payment for visiting national assemblies at the beginning of the 4^th century (for the latter see Kovalyov 1936: 289; Struve et al. 1956: 399), and so on.

Certainly, the process of redistribution of power from aristocracy and rich people to the poor cannot be really completed. However, in Athens it went too far and that was one of the reasons why the Athenian early state was unable to transform into mature one like the Roman.

The other lines in redistribution of power are also evident in the history of Athens (as well as of Rome). In particular, it is worth mentioning the struggle of the National Assembly against concentration of too much power in hands of any bodies or people. The famous law on exile (ostracism) was aimed at it. Either the struggle of groups meant additional bodies or additional representation. For example, the tribunes of the plebs (tribuni plebis) in Rome were of this kind. The other point was the satisfaction of the democratic layers' demands to introduce the written fixation of legislation as it was with Drako's code in Athens and the Law of the Twelve Tables in Rome (Frantsev 1956: 672; Kuzishchin 1994: 56).

In Athens and in some other large poleis since the 5^th century the process of redistribution of power had started moving in the classical direction because of the growth of their significance as centers of the Delian League (the Athenian navy) and the Peloponnesian League. In this case, the redistribution of power from the allies to such poleis is observed. However, this process did not go too far.

The classical process of redistribution of power from the periphery to the center began in Rome on an earlier stage than in Greece states and made it possible to reinforce the state mechanism and make it steadier. However, in Rome there was also a struggle for determination of the bodies' authorities and for the predominant role among those bodies. From this point of view it is interesting to trace the development of the Senate that gradually transformed the national assemblies (not so powerful as the Greek ones) into a secondary body though formally these assemblies remained the supreme power holder. Theodor Mommsen wrote: ‘Little by little the Senate had actually appropriated the right to cancel the decisions of a community under the pretext that the community later on would approve its decision, but the consent of a community normally was not asked after that’ (Mommsen 1993: 42; see also Andreyev 1989: 73; Utchenko 1965: 85). The power of the Senate had become extensive, especially since 354 B.C. when it included the supreme magistrates upon the termination of their service. ‘War and peace, contracts, an appointment of the commander-in-chief, organization of colonies, all the finance management issues were in the Senate's competence, the Senate did not interfere only judicial cases, military issues, and current administration’ (Mommsen 1993: 42) as it was the prerogative of magistrates.

In Rome the process of redistribution of power then developed according to the empire pattern when Rome joined Italic territories one by one and one province after another. Respectively Rome as the victor appointed absolute governors, redistributes lands, imposed taxes and plundered that territory (especially provinces), and so on. Eventually in Rome the concentration of power over huge conquered territories, as well as the concentration of slaves in Italy, reached such a high level that the whole state structure could not survive. A reorganization was required. So in the late 2^nd and during the whole 1^st century B.C. Rome saw attempts of radical reforms, dictatorships, civil and allied wars, slave revolts, reprisals and proscriptions – all that what finally led to such changes.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my gratitude to Dmitri M. Bondarenko for his invaluable help with the preparation of this article. Needless to mention that neither he, nor any of the other colleagues of mine should be held responsible for any defects in this article.

NOTES

¹ If not indicated otherwise, all the quotations from Berent are taken from (Berent 2000b), from Shtaerman are from (Shtaerman 1989).

² Of course, there is not enough evidence on the domestic affairs and political history of the Delphic polis. However there are some points able to prove this assumption: the great role the Delphic oracle played in the community life, the control over the temple property and lands exercised by so-called Amphictyonic League (Delphic Amphictyony that consisted of representatives of different Greek tribes); the small size and military weakness of this polity and also the other states' interference in its affairs (Gluskina 1983a).

³ For such poleis only would be right the statement of Claessen (2002: 104) that poleis as well as chiefdoms and large big-man conglomerates were earlier forms of organization than state.

⁴ On the exceptionally tight connection of the development of navigation, commerce, the demographic growth and statehood in ancient Greek poleis during the pre-classical period see e.g., Kurbatov et al. 1986: 40–43.

⁵ By the way, one cannot help mentioning the resemblance of the state structures in Carthage and Rome (as well as their similarity with Greek poleis), and this fact is pointed out by many researchers (Harden 1971: 72; Tsirkin 1987: 105–106; Vipper 1995: 266–267). This resemblance was already noticed by Aristotle (see Dovatur 1965: 12).

⁶ According to Roussel's opinion, in Rome a more distinctly expressed state system proper appeared very early with the conception of the Senate and some magistrates' particular power (especially of the supreme ones with their typical imperium). This power could be opposed to the citizens' will (Roussel 1976; also see Koshelenko 1983: 23).

⁷ It is quite possible that the Phoenician city-states existed longer but they were monarchic and not republican polities.

⁸ In any case, considerable social inequality supported (or authorized) by the state, was present in every early state. Actually, theorists of the early state emphasized the presence of at least two such classes (the rulers and the ruled) in the early state as its obligatory attribute (Claessen 2002: 103; Claessen and Skalník 1978a; see also Majak 1989: 95–96).

⁹ According to Erenberg's calculations, in 360 B.C. in Athens there were 85–120,000 citizens (of all ages and both sexes), 25–50,000 metics (including women, children and old men), and 60–100,000 slaves (see Koshelenko 1983: 35; for some other points of view regarding the population of Athens in the 5^th–6^th centuries B.C. see also Struve et al. 1956: 241). Summing up different calculations Koshelenko writes that the majority of students consider slaves to constitute from one quarter up to 43 % of the population in Attica (1987: 57–58).

¹⁰ This is Berent's indistinct position revealed both in the articles and his doctoral thesis. He definitely refers to Athens and other poleis as to non-state polities but hesitates either to reject Sparta's state status or to recognize it as a state for rather doubtful reasons (see: Berent 1994: 181–200). In any case he regards Sparta as the exception among other poleis, and that would require a special discussion (Berent: 228).

¹¹ Some Italian republics of the 13^th–15^th centuries can be regarded as another variant when a foreigner was invited as a military leader, judge, etc. usually for a year. He brought all his staff (including notaries, judges, etc.) and property with him, and the city paid his service and charges. So a significant part of the executive power was annually replaced too (Skazkin et al. 1970). In the Novgorod republic they had something similar when a prince with his retinue were invited.

¹² For example Russkaja Pravda (Russian Law) of Yaroslav the Wise (11^th century) recognized the blood feud (Shmurlo 2000: 112); the same can be said about the laws of Moses in Israel (Anners 1994: 32–33).

¹³ For example, in the 4^th century B.C. in Rome the laws of Licinius and Sextius were adopted which limited the possession in a public field up to a norm of 500 jugers (approximately 125 ha [Kovalyov 1936: 81; Nemirovsky 1962: 261]). At the end of the 2^nd century B.C. the Gracchi brothers have renewed with some amendments (about them see Nechay 1972: 187) the action of such restrictions. In the result of the defeat of the Gracchi the law of Spurius Torius was adopted in 111 B.C., according to which revisions of community-state lands were forbidden, and land allotments became a private property of their owners (Kossarev 1986: 61). Theretofore, from the legal point of view the right for property to all lands (except small sites handed over as the property to the citizens) belonged to the state (Luzzatto 1954: 53).

¹⁴ In this respect the supreme power in Athens and Rome corresponds with the tasks which Carneiro (2000: 186) regards as indispensable for a government of a state, namely: to have power to (1) draft men for war or work, (2) levy and collect taxes, and (3) decree and enforce laws.

¹⁵ By the way, the number of professional officials in highly bureaucratic countries could be not so large. For example, at the beginning of the 19^th century in China the number of civil officials was about 20,000 people, of military ones – 7,000 (Kryukov et al. 1987: 34). More than 300 million people lived in China at that time (ibid: 63). If we compare it with the above cited data on Athens we can see that the latter could compete with the most bureaucratic states in the ratio of functionaries in the state machinery and population.

¹⁶ They did not manage to overcome bribery of the voters. It became rampant by the end of the Roman Republic's existence, so people came to elections already bribed; the amount that made it possible to achieve supreme magistracies was known beforehand. It was one of the most vivid expressions of the crisis of the republican regime (see Utchenko 1965: 117).

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