Plate 12.
War depicted as a beast ravaging Germany; an exemplar of a widespread critique of war as
such.
What were the effects of the war on German economy and society? A
powerful myth rapidly grew up of the devastation, death and destruction wrought
by the war. In the absence of comprehensive and reliable data, it is not easy to
put together a definitive picture. But certain points are clear. The impact of the
war was very variable, in both time and place. Some territories suffered far
worse effects than others, and different areas were affected at different times.
Averages tell us less than analysis of ‘black spots’, which were roughly
distributed in a swathe running from south-west to north-east. Even with these
cautions, historians cannot agree on precise figures. H. S. Steinberg’s estimate
that there was, if any change, a slight rise in German population from 15–17
million in 1600 to 16–18 million in 1650 has been generally discredited, but
there is still some debate about the extent of the decline. Geoffrey Parker
suggests that the population of the Holy Roman Empire declined by around 20
per cent, from 20 million in 1618 to 16–17 million in 1648, while Rudolf
Vierhaus proposes a drop from 15–16 million to 10 million. But if one considers
individual areas, destruction might be on a far greater scale. Particularly badly
affected areas might have lost over two-thirds of their population. Württemberg,
for example, had a population of perhaps 445,000 in 1622, declining slightly to
415,000 in 1634; but in the next five years it lost more than three-quarters of its
people, leaving a population of a mere 97,000 in 1639. Some areas of Germany
lost between one-third and two-thirds of their population, while other areas were
virtually unaffected. Explanations for population loss are also contested. The
greatest killer was undoubtedly epidemics (typhoid, the plague, veneral disease),
often spread by armies on the move. Certain common illnesses, such as
influenza, were more likely to be fatal because of malnutrition and lowered
resistance. There was also considerable internal migration and redistribution of
population, with villagers, for example, periodically fleeing to towns for safety.
Rural population losses have been put at about 45–50 per cent, compared with
25–30 per cent of the urban population. Not to be underestimated are the effects
of the war in disrupting agricultural production. The destruction of buildings and
livestock, the support of unpaid troops through foraging, the use of ‘scorched
earth’ policies to prevent the enemy’s armies living off the land, all caused
immense damage to an already fragile subsistence economy.
Assessment of the overall economic impact of the war is complicated by the
problem of separating the direct effects of war from the operation of longer-term
trends. Some German towns – such as the old Baltic Hanseatic towns, Rostock,
Stralsund and Wismar – were already declining in the later sixteenth century, as
a result of the reorientation of trade towards the Atlantic; and other towns
experienced rising or falling fortunes in the first half of the seventeenth century
which did not correlate neatly with the progress of the war. An internal economic
redistribution was taking place, with north-west Germany, and in particular
Hamburg, rising at a time of decline elsewhere. Rural depopulation in the east
may have been at least partly due to a pre-existing Junker policy of peasant
evictions and the creation of large estates. However, against all such (very
necessary) cautions, it must be remembered that towns such as Magdeburg
experienced radical destruction and effectively mass murder (setting fire to
churches into which women and children had been herded); and that the losses
of livestock, the disruption of normal agricultural activities, the repeated flight of
peasants from their land to urban safety, as well as the pillaging of soldiers, were
hardly good for agricultural production. One village cobbler, Heberle, records in
his diary that he had to flee from his home to Ulm on no less than thirty separate
occasions; he also documents in dispiriting detail the deaths of two of his
children (including a four-week-old son), his stepmother and three sisters, within
the three months from 19 September to 18 December 1634. Anyone born after
the 1600s would have hardly experienced life without the disruptions of war.
The scale and intensity of personal tragedies, and the loss of security and
stability for hundreds of thousands, should not be forgotten in the computerised
averages of twentieth-century historians. And even the most revisionist of
historians, seeking to refute the ‘death and destruction myth’, must concede that
Germany’s economy and population were at best stagnating – and most probably
were more seriously affected – at a time when England was developing as an
important trading nation and the population of England and Wales was rapidly
expanding. (The total population of England and Wales trebled between 1450
and 1750, with most of this occurring from the mid-sixteenth to the mid-
seventeenth centuries. Some historians suggest that it took the best part of a
century after 1648 for German population to regain pre-1618 levels.) Germany
was becoming an economic backwater, a process underway already in the later
sixteenth century but aided and consolidated by the deleterious effects of thirty
years of warfare on German soil.
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