Land
der Dichter und Denker
(‘land of poets and philosophers’) for which German
culture is still renowned. New currents were developing – baroque and rococo
giving way to the Empire style, Romanticism displacing Enlightenment – but the
political framework remained that of a mediaeval patchwork, for all the internal
reforms within states. The major impetus for political transformation came not
from within, but from without: it came from the impact of the French
Revolution.
THE IMPACT OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
As we have seen, there were reforming movements within eighteenth-century
German states. In Frederick II’s Prussia and Joseph II’s Austria a number of
projects were underway to attempt to modernise their administration and
improve their economies. The relationships between absolutism and
Enlightenment may have been tangential and changing; but rulers and
bureaucrats were engaged in examining and implementing means of improving
territorial government. In Prussia, there were measures such as the
Generalland-
schulreglement
attempting to implement a uniform national system of primary
schooling in 1763, the
Landratsreform
of 1766, the administrative reform of
1770, the customs and excise reform of 1766, the limited agrarian reforms of
1765–70, as well as the codification of general Prussian law which was revived
in 1780 and published in its final form in 1794, firmly establishing the tradition
of Prussia’s being a
Rechtsstaat.
The army alone remained exempted from
reforming impulses after 1763. In Austria under Joseph II there were comparable
reforming impulses, particularly in connection with Joseph’s attempts at reforms
of the church and agrarian reform. In both Prussia and Austria, serious problems
arose in the course of these measures, in that they were often imposed with little
sense of a need for some measure of support; and often bureaucrats, who were
more aware of social realities than their rulers, had to circumvent and even
hoodwink the monarch in order to implement alternative strategies. Whatever
their respective achievements in power, both Frederick II and Joseph II left
ambiguous legacies in the wake of their semi-despotic, semi-bureaucratic, semi-
absolutist, semi-enlightened forms of rulership. The separation between state and
society was perhaps less great in some of the smaller German states, where
rulers did not have to contend with large, scattered, multinational and
multilingual populations (as were those of the Habsburg monarchy and, to a
slightly lesser degree, Brandenburg-Prussia), but rather with more easily
manageable and homogenous populations. In smaller states, reforms could in
any case be less oriented towards military power and state-building, and more
towards improving the living standards of the people.
There were also attempts to reform the Empire itself. Prussia’s apparent
disregard for certain constitutional provisions of the Empire, embodied in the
Peace of Westphalia, contributed to a widespread sense that the Empire itself
was in need of change; at the same time, the rise of Prussia as a challenger to
Austria and potential ally of other European powers led some of the smaller and
medium-sized German states to consider means of co-operating together as a
form of third, counter-balancing power. There were active moves to reform the
Empire in the course of the 1780s; however, these attempts had largely
foundered by the start of the 1790s. The moves by the smaller states to form a
‘Third Germany’ (as it was later called) were frustrated by the manner in which
Prussia dominated the League of Princes and simultaneously disregarded
Imperial interests in favour of its own power-political designs (as in the case of
Belgium); and attempts at church reform collided with Joseph II’s religious
reforms, as well as provoking considerable hostility in Rome. The Empire was
not irretrievably moribund by the beginning of the 1790s, but it was certainly
somewhat in disarray.
There was not, however, anything approaching a revolutionary situation in
Germany at the start of the 1790s. It is true that there were certain social tensions
(as always, but in changed forms, with harbingers of early nineteenth-century
problems). The population was beginning to expand, partly perhaps as a result of
agrarian reforms, partly for other reasons. Population expansion on the land was
associated with increasing numbers of paupers and beggars, and periodic social
unrest. There were also some intellectual grumblings of discontent, with the
beginnings of a barely political liberalism evident from the 1770s. But on the
whole, when the French Revolution broke out in 1789 the majority of Germans
were at first content to observe it with interest – particularly in the western
provinces – combined with a sense of superiority that Germany had not needed a
revolution in order to achieve reforms. From 1792, with the beginning of a war
between revolutionary France and the established powers of Prussia and Austria,
such distanced and often sympathetic interest became increasingly difficult. As
the French Revolution turned from an idealist declaration of freedom, equality
and fraternity into a regime of terror and an expansionist, imperialist
dictatorship, Germany was embroiled and affected in a variety of ways.
Attacked, overrun, occupied, reorganised, exploited, provoked, shaken up, by
1815 Germany emerged in very different shape; and the Holy Roman Empire,
which had served as its loose political framework for so many centuries, had
gone. The new settlement for Europe produced by the Congress of Vienna in
1814–15, which replaced the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, was to inaugurate a very
different period in Germany’s history.
In 1792 French armies invaded the territories of the Holy Roman Empire.
After a succession of easy French victories, by the end of 1794 all of Germany
west of the Rhine was under French rule, a situation which lasted until 1814.
Although a few historians (particularly East German) have scoured the archives
for evidence of German Jacobins, and others (mainly westerners) have searched
for early democrats or German nationalists, in the main it seems that most
German subjects simply allowed themselves to be obediently incorporated into
new regimes, with the somewhat untypical exception of a more or less quisling
republic in Mainz under Georg Forster. The French occupation had long-lasting
consequences in these areas. Administrative, judicial and legal systems were
reorganised; serfdom and feudal social relations were abolished; and the bone of
contention between France and Germany, over the question of whether the Rhine
was ‘France’s frontier’ or ‘Germany’s stream’, was given considerable flesh.
Disputes between France and Germany over the Saar, and Alsace and Lorraine,
were to reappear and dog Franco-German relations over the next century and a
half.
The small and medium-sized territories in southern and western Germany
were subjected to considerable territorial reorganisation after the cession of the
left bank of the Rhine was confirmed in the Treaty of Lunéville in 1801, partly
on the principle that they should be compensated for losses within the Empire. In
1803,
a
committee
of
the
Empire
concluded
the
so-called
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