Deutscher Bund
) was established in place of the
Holy Roman Empire. The Confederation was made up of thirty-eight states
(thirty-nine after 1817): thirty-four monarchies and four free cities. The
Confederation’s boundaries were basically the same as those of the Holy Roman
Empire. It did not correspond with the ethnic/cultural population of Germans in
central Europe, since some non-German minorities (such as Italians and Czechs)
were included, while some German populations were excluded. The King of
England, in his capacity as ruler of Hanover (until 1837) was one of the princes
participating in the Confederation. The Confederation was not itself a federal
state (
Bundesstaat
), but rather a loose federation of states (
Staatenbund
). It had
no common head of state, no administrative or executive organs, no common
legal system, no common citizenship, and was able to make only precious few
common decisions. The Federal Diet which met at Frankfurt was essentially a
congress of ambassadors representing the interests of their own separate states.
These states themselves emerged as relatively strong political units, at least
in comparison with their eighteenth-century predecessors. Territorially, there was
considerable reorganisation. Obviously, the new states were enlarged by the
absorption of smaller political units. Prussia in particular gained by its initially
rather unwilling acquisition of the Rhineland and Westphalia. This was intended
as a means of turning Prussia into a strong power between France and Russia. In
the process, it doubled Prussia’s population and gave the previously
economically rather backward state the benefit of mineral riches and areas more
advanced in commerce and industry. On the other hand, the disadvantage from
Prussia’s point of view was that it had to give up some of its land gains in the
east (from the second and third partitions of Poland). But in the long term, the
effective moving of Prussia westwards further shifted the balance of power
between Prussia and Austria in favour of the former. Prussia became both more
representative of German interests, and more important as a protector of
Germany in central Europe. This was by no means necessarily a step towards a
historically inevitable national unification under Prussian domination, however.
The territorial states emerged from the Napoleonic period strengthened not only
in sheer size, but also in a number of other respects. Rulers enjoyed full
sovereignty as well as actual power. Partly as a result of, and partly in response
to, the exigencies of the Napoleonic period, in many states the administrative
and legal systems had been reformed and made more efficient. Where serfdom,
guild privileges, and restrictions on the mobility of labour had been abolished,
they were not restored. In the course of the nineteenth century, many such
enlarged states – such as Bavaria – built up powerful local myths and traditions,
inventing and sustaining a strong regional particularism which would by no
means be easily submerged in a united Germany.
The political impact of the French Revolution on Germany was profound and
ultimately irreversible. There is more ambiguity about its effects in other
spheres. Economically, the French continental blockade against England
probably did not last long enough to be of much help to Germany’s economic
development. While the preconditions for later economic takeoff were
established in the abolition of a variety of feudal restrictions on trade and labour
mobility, the Napoleonic Wars probably on the whole retarded immediate
economic development except in the Rhenish provinces directly administered by
the French. Culturally, it is usually asserted that the Wars of Liberation served to
turn the cultural nationalism of Herder into a new political nationalism. Yet this
is probably overstated: there were only the most limited, partial stirrings of a
political nationalism at this time, with local loyalties arguably very much more
important. Another area where generalisation must be tempered with
qualification is that of the response of Germans to revolution. German
intellectuals are frequently characterised as having turned from sympathetic
interest in the French Revolution to a recoiling in horror as it turned to terror. A
long-standing and deep-seated fear of revolution is then supposed to have
dogged German political culture throughout the next century at least. While this
may roughly describe the response of a few individuals (rulers as well as
intellectuals), it should by no means be held to be true of all Germans; nor can
subsequent patterns of political orientation in Germany be so easily explained.
The latter arose, as always, in response to a multiplicity of changing
circumstances, and while political views develop within the context of existing
traditions and institutional frameworks, the historical interaction of a range of
factors at any given time must be examined to elucidate the relative importance
of each element.
Map 6.
The German Confederation in 1815.
Germany in 1815 was obviously a very different place from Germany in
1648. Yet in outward appearance, it was not so very different: a still largely
agricultural land, a land of villages, undulating pastures and deep forests, of
mediaeval towns and castles, princely palaces, majestic churches and
monasteries. All this was to change in the coming century. The French
Revolution had rocked Germany politically; but in the following century, the
industrial revolution was to effect even more momentous changes. With
Germany’s curious political heritage, the interactions between political crises
and socioeconomic transformations were to have immense reverberations, still
echoing in the late twentieth-century world.
5
The age of industrialisation, 1815–1918
◈
The years from the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to the end of the First World War
and the collapse of the German Empire in 1918 saw fundamental changes both
in Germany and in Europe more generally. From an agrarian society, Germany
was transformed into a booming centre of industrial capitalism; and competition
among states in Europe became competition among imperial powers for colonies
across the world. The attempted solutions to the European balance of power
embodied in the Vienna settlement were relatively successful in maintaining
European peace for the better part of the nineteenth century; but with the
unification of a ‘small’ Germany, under Prussian domination, in 1871, and with
Germany’s rapid industrialisation and entry into competition for empire at the
turn of the century, this balance was shattered. The First World War which
erupted in 1914 inaugurated changes which were to have implications
throughout the twentieth century, rendering Germany a very different place from
what it had been in the eighteenth century.
RESTORATION GERMANY, 1815–48
The period from 1815 to the outbreak of the revolutions which swept the
German states in March 1848 is conventionally labelled either the ‘restoration’
or the ‘pre-March’ (
Vormärz
) period. Both labels are to an extent misleading.
Conditions after 1815 did not represent a simple restoration of pre-Napoleonic
political or socioeconomic patterns; nor can the period prior to 1848 be viewed
solely as a prelude to the revolutionary upheavals. Yet, even so, the period from
1815 to 1848 is in many ways a transitional one, in respect of cultural as well as
political and socioeconomic developments.
Politically, the German Confederation cannot be seen simply as a step
towards ultimate national unification. If anything, the territories had now
increased their powers at the regional level, for a number of reasons: rulers
possessed sovereignty as well as enhanced power with the rationalisation of
administration, the improvements in bureaucracy and government, and the
processes of centralisation of state power inaugurated in certain states in the
Napoleonic period. Regional particularism, especially among the larger south
German states, was to bedevil the course that national unification ultimately
took. But of profound importance for this course was the strengthening of one
state in particular: Prussia. With the acquisition of the Rhenish and Westphalian
territories, Prussia gained not only in territorial size and population but also,
crucially, in economic power and potential. Not only was Prussia now more
equal to Austria in simple demographic terms; Prussia also was poised to
outstrip Austria in economic development, a major factor in the century of
industrialisation. Constitutionally, however, both Prussia and Austria remained
relatively conservative. Prussia did not gain a united parliament, and although
reforms were continued in certain provinces (with the western provinces, which
were not engaged in a programme of reform, nevertheless continuing to be more
progressive), centrally the programme of reforms was dropped by King
Frederick William III. Major reformers had been dismissed from office by 1819–
20. In Austria, the absence of a perceived need for centralisation in response to
territorial or other changes, and the earlier reforms under Joseph II, added up to a
programme of conservatism and inactivity in the post-Napoleonic period.
Conditions in the smaller German states varied tremendously. A number of states
gained constitutions at this time – Bavaria and Baden in 1818, Württemberg in
1819, Hesse-Darmstadt in 1820 – although with the exception of Württemberg,
where estates and ruler jointly agreed the constitution, this was by way of an act
of gracious donation on the part of rulers. Nevertheless, despite the highly
restricted property franchise – and the generally less than democratic ideas of
liberals, who preferred professional rule for the people to mob rule by the people
– it is clear that a debating chamber such as that of the lower house in Baden
could provide at least a platform for practising political speech-making.
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