Volkspartei
, appealing to all
sectors of the populace, and proposing a moderate management of capitalism
with a human face rather than advocating radical socialist transformation.
Despite certain specific differences in policy – such as over
Ostpolitik
in the late
1960s and early 1970s, or over the management of economic recession in the
1980s – the two main parties in the Federal Republic converged into moderate
alternative managers of a capitalist welfare state. This is in marked contrast to
the more volatile oppositions in pre-Nazi Germany. Furthermore, the army,
which played a key political role in both Imperial and Weimar Germany, found
itself, in its new form since 1956, in a rather different position. It now had to
operate under parliamentary control and could not aspire to independent power.
There are similar contrasts between the Weimar and Bonn Republics in
respect of the political orientations of economic interest groups. Unlike the
Weimar Republic, where certain sectors of business perceived the democratic
political system as operating against their economic interests, the particular form
of West German corporatism by and large operated in a way perceived as
satisfactory by employers. Many policy decisions were developed through
processes of behind-the-scenes negotiations among major interest groups, such
as, on the employers’ side, the Confederation of German Industry, the Federal
League of Employers, and the German Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and
on the workers’ side, the League of German Trade Unions, the German
Employees’ Union, and the German Federation of Civil Servants, as well as a
strong farming lobby. West German corporatism was denounced by some critics
as a less than democratic process taking effective decision-making away from
the parliamentary arena; by other analysts, it was praised as an efficient means of
reaching acceptable and workable policy compromises by means of negotiation
among the parties affected prior to the formal legislative process. The fact that
the West German economy performed so much better than the Weimar economy
is undoubtedly also a major factor in the commitment of economic elites to Bonn
democracy.
How far did the West Germans become a nation of committed democrats? It
is generally accepted that Allied attempts at denazification and re-education had
minimal, and frequently contrary, effects. Evidence on popular opinion in the
1950s reveals widespread political apathy, combined with the persistence of
monarchist and right-wing sympathies. Gradually, a pragmatic support
developed for a system that appeared to be ‘delivering the goods’, only slowly
developing into a more principled support for a democratic system as such.
Many Germans in the 1950s and 1960s put material stability above political
freedom, although they also felt that in West Germany they were able to have
both, unlike in the East. Political participation for many was limited to the
obedient performance of civic duties – turning out to vote in large numbers,
compatible also (especially!) with an authoritarian regime. In the 1970s and
1980s more activist orientations emerged, evident in the proliferation of
‘citizens’ initiative groups’ and wider social movements such as feminism and
environmentalism, culminating in the formation of the Green Party. Yet it would
be a mistake to attempt to characterise ‘West German political culture’ in a
monolithic fashion. There were numerous subcultures, and the persistence and
renewal of right-wing movements (such as the Republicans) counter-balanced
pressures for the extension of participatory democracy on the left. Political
orientations must be seen not simply as a process of ‘national re-education’, but
as a diverse set of changing responses to current circumstances, salient features
of which may vary from positive early responses to the postwar economic
miracle through to negative responses to tensions concerning foreign workers.
Undue complacency about the functioning of a political system is never
possible: a wary eye must always be kept on potential dissent and dissatisfaction
at the margins.
The pattern of political development in communist East Germany was of course
very different. East European communist states have frequently been lumped
together by western observers and dismissed as ‘totalitarian’ one-party states.
Less willing to contemplate reform than Hungary or Poland, the GDR was often
viewed as particularly rigid. While restrictions on human rights and liberties –
such as freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom to emigrate –
cannot be denied, the East German political system in practice was somewhat
more complex than is implied by all-purpose labels. To understand the
peculiarities of politics in the GDR under Ulbricht and Honecker, it is necessary
both to analyse the formal political structure and to consider the dynamics of its
functioning.
Despite the formal resemblance between the East and West German
constitutions in 1949, real political differences were quite visible and the
divergences widened as time went on. The abolition of the
Länder
and the Upper
House have been mentioned above. In 1960, on the death of the first President,
Wilhelm Pieck, the role of President was replaced with a collective head of state,
the
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