Plate 40.
Soldiers of the East German People’s Police stand guard as the Berlin Wall starts to go up,
August 1961.
In 1961, radical steps were taken to alter a situation which, following the
recent land reform and associated food shortages, had become critical. On the
morning of 13 August, Berliners awoke to find the division of their city
finalised, with streets crossed by tangles of barbed wire, guarded by soldiers, and
more permanent walls of concrete and bricks rapidly being erected. Families and
friends were divided by what might have been thousands of miles rather than a
few yards. Again, although there were protests from the west, it was clear that
western powers were not prepared to risk conflict with the Soviet Union over
Berlin: the final, concrete division of the city proceeded unhindered.
Curiously, however, this sealing of the last means of escape perhaps
improved conditions for East Germans in the 1960s. This was the decade of the
‘scientific-technological revolution’, when opportunities for fulfilling careers in
the GDR appeared to be opening up. In 1963 the ‘New Economic System’ was
introduced, permitting some decentralisation of economic decision-making, and
providing achievement incentives for those with certain technical skills and
qualifications. Perhaps because there was no alternative, people started coming
to terms with a system which they now simply had to accept. Many had also
experienced remarkable social mobility, as a result of educational and social
policies and new opportunities. In West Germany, on the other hand, the 1960s
saw the rise of movements highly critical of West German materialism,
affluence, and unwillingness to confront the past. The economic recession of
1965–6 precipitated the collapse of Erhard’s CDU government, the weak
successor to Adenauer, and the CDU, under Kurt Georg Kiesinger as Chancellor,
went into a ‘grand coalition’ with the SPD. The student movement in particular
articulated a sense of protest and unease, and there was a perceived need for
‘extra-parliamentary opposition’ with the lack of any real opposition in
parliament. Student protest reached a peak in 1967–8, when following the
shooting of a student on a demonstration in Berlin a polarisation of popular
opinion was fostered by a conservative tabloid press. This period also saw the
rise of active right-wing movements, with the highly nationalist NPD gaining
representation in several
Land
parliaments, although failing to gain national
representation. But in 1969 a new period in West German history was
inaugurated when the SPD managed – after considerable post-election
bargaining – to form a coalition with the now more liberal FDP, and to become,
for the first time in the two decades of the Federal Republic’s history, the
dominant party of government.
The coming to power of West German SPD Chancellor Willy Brandt,
formerly Mayor of Berlin, coincided with an era of detente in superpower
relations. It now suited both the USA and the USSR that relations between the
two Germanies should be eased; a position that coincided with Brandt’s own
desire to see an easing of tensions and a facilitation of human contacts between
the two Germanies. Brandt’s so-called
Ostpolitik
originated in the later 1960s
and was continued after the regime change in the GDR where, in 1971, Ulbricht
was replaced as Party leader by Erich Honecker. Against considerable domestic
opposition from the CDU/CSU, Brandt was able to push through a series of
treaties and agreements which culminated in the ‘Basic Treaty’ between East and
West Germany in December 1972. This was ratified (again with opposition) in
May 1973. In September 1973 both Germanies were accepted as full members of
the United Nations. From then on, the two Germanies formally recognised each
other’s existence, not as entirely foreign states but in a special relationship
(perceived somewhat differently on each side). This was symbolised by the
exchange, not of ambassadors, but of ‘permanent representatives’. From 1973 to
1989, inner-German relations were concerned less with an apparently receding,
almost metaphysical question of potential reunification and rather more with the
improvement of relations between the two countries, which were recognised to
be separate states but having a unique relationship.
The West German Social Democratic government, in coalition with the FDP,
lasted from 1969 to 1982. This period, after Brandt’s initial foreign policy
successes, was marked by mounting economic problems and domestic
difficulties. Energy crises, starting with the oil crisis of 1973, had adverse effects
on West Germany’s economy, as did the world economic recession of the later
1970s and 1980s. At the same time, the radical movements of the later 1960s
dissolved into separate strands: alongside relatively harmless retreatist
subcultures there developed the more disturbing terrorist movement led by
certain extremists in the ‘Red Army Faction’ (RAF, also known as the Baader-
Meinhof gang after two of its early leaders). After Willy Brandt’s resignation as
Chancellor in 1974 (following a spy scandal), the more right-wing Helmut
Schmidt took over, facing attacks from the left wing of his own party particularly
over environmental, nuclear and defence issues. Schmidt also experienced
serious difficulties with the SPD’s increasingly right-wing coalition partner, the
FDP, in attempting to agree budget proposals in the face of rising unemployment
and an overstretched welfare state. In 1982 the FDP finally employed the
constitutional device of a ‘constructive vote of no confidence’ in the current
Chancellor to switch their parliamentary allegiance to the CDU/CSU. Helmut
Kohl of the CDU thus became West Germany’s conservative Chancellor by the
changed votes of a few members of parliament belonging to a minority party.
Experiencing some unease with this situation – as did many West Germans –
Kohl made use of the same constitutional device (although engineering loss of
the vote) to make possible an early general election in 1983: the outcome of this
was in fact to confirm Kohl’s government in office. West Germany thus entered
a third major political period in its post-war history, with the conservative
government following the preceding lengthy periods of Social Democratic rule
(1969–82) and conservative rule (1949–69, in the last three years in the Grand
Coalition).
Under the leadership of Erich Honecker from 1971 to 1989 East Germany
too entered a new stage of development. Following the rapid social
transformations and the combined utopianism and repression of the Ulbricht era,
Honecker’s GDR was marked by an apparent willingness to recognise at least
some of the difficulties of the present and to seek longer-term means of resolving
sociopolitical problems. While the economy was recentralised in the 1970s, a
new and continued emphasis was given to the question of consumer satisfaction
and the increased availability of highly desired goods such as television sets and
cars. An initial apparent liberalisation in the cultural sphere did not last beyond
1976, when the enforced exile of the critical singer and guitarist Wolf Biermann
provoked a storm of protest among many East German intellectuals. Renewed
constraint was evident in most cultural spheres in the later 1970s, with the
significant exception of the East German Protestant churches, who reached a
remarkable agreement with the state in 1978, consolidating their role in East
German society and at the same time providing a protected space for the
discussion of alternative views. In the 1980s there was further rapprochement
between the two Germanies, with improved communications for the populations
of the two states, enhanced possibilities for travel to the west by East German
citizens, and the historic visit by Erich Honecker to the Federal Republic in
1987. Despite signs of increased repression in the late 1980s, with an ageing
political leadership evidently rattled both by the proliferation of dissenting
voices at home and the impact of reforming impulses emanating from
Gorbachev’s Soviet Union, East Germany had apparently matured as a country
in which many rather apolitical Germans found it possible to lead an at least
passable existence.
The apparent resolution of ‘the German question’, and the permanence of
the division of Germany – and Europe – was suddenly thrown into question
when a wave of revolutions swept eastern Europe in 1989–90. In the context of a
crumbling Soviet empire, and a dismantling of the post-war settlement of central
Europe, the system of communist rule which had held sway in East Germany for
forty years was toppled. But before considering the dramatic end of the post-war
period, it is worth exploring in more detail certain aspects of the political and
socioeconomic systems of the two Germanies in the period up to 1989, and
examining the extent to which they had developed from a common past into two
very different societies with diverging cultures and identities.
POLITICS IN THE TWO GERMANIES, 1949–89
What accounts for the relative stability of the two Germanies from 1949 to
1989? Part of the answer obviously lies in the changed international system. No
longer was Europe a system of powerful, expansive, imperialist states, as in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Rather, it was divided into western
and eastern spheres of influence, under the more global claims to domination of
the superpowers, the USA and the USSR. Germany’s unleashing of two world
wars pulled America into European affairs and, after the Second World War,
divided Germany became the pawn and front line of the new Cold War between
the leaders of the capitalist and communist worlds. Yet to explain this period of
German history in terms purely of a changed international context is not
sufficient. Domestic factors too must be invoked to explain the greater stability
of communist East Germany than neighbouring Poland or Czechoslovakia in the
years before 1989, or the less crisis-prone performance of West German
parliamentary democracy than that of post-Fascist Italy. We must start by
considering in more detail aspects of the political systems of the two Germanies.
West Germany’s democracy (and that of united Germany after 1990) had
certain unique constitutional features. The voting system combined proportional
representation with ‘first-past-the-post’ constituency representatives: each voter
had two votes, one for a named candidate and one for a party. Votes cast for the
former elected constituency representatives in the British manner; votes for the
latter entitled parties to seats in parliament, with individuals taken from
previously drawn-up party lists, according to the proportion of votes the party
received, provided that it was at least 5 per cent of the total. This ‘5 per cent rule’
was designed to ensure that small parties could not easily gain a national
platform – as the Nazis did in the Weimar Republic – and that there would not be
perpetual difficulties with post-election bargaining among a multiplicity of
parties to form unstable coalition governments (again a problem in Weimar
democracy). For the most part, these provisions appear to have worked: small
parties were progressively absorbed in the 1950s, so that a two-party system,
with the smaller FDP as a third party generally holding the balance of power,
emerged. There were notable exceptions, such as the rise of the Greens to
national representation in the
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