Bausoldat
) or failing to participate satisfactorily
in the Free German Youth movement might jeopardise a chosen career.
East German women had a more equal position in society than did West
German women, although they were still far from ‘emancipated’ by the late
1980s. Slightly over 50 per cent of the East German work-force was female, and
the normal expectation was that even married women with young children would
engage in paid work outside the home. There were very high levels of childcare
provision in the GDR, with crèche and kindergarten places and after-school
provision for the vast majority of children. There were also very generous
maternity leave provisions in the attempt to halt what was in the 1970s a
worrying decline in the birth-rate. However, there were criticisms of the quality
of life for both working mothers and their children in East Germany, with long
hours in the factory (or place of childcare) followed by long hours of domestic
housework (or experience of tired, harassed and unhappy parenting). Divorce
rates were relatively high (although so too were rates of marriage, perhaps
indicating high expectations) and women were financially more independent of
their partners than in West Germany. However, women were disproportionately
to be found in lower-paid and lower-status jobs, and were represented in
declining numbers the higher up any hierarchy one looked (large numbers of
teachers, few school heads, for example). They had higher levels of trade union
and political party membership than did West German women, but were still not
to be found at the pinnacle of politics (with the notable exception of the former
Minister of Education, Margot Honecker, wife of Erich Honecker). East German
feminism (if one may give such a label to what were in fact diffuse tendencies)
changed from an emphasis in the early 1970s on being able to do men’s work to
a desire in the late 1980s to be able to be different from men, having realised that
the former aim simply represented the imposition of a ‘double burden’ on
women in a still unequal, gender-divided society.
It is clear that East Germany did not attain some of its own proclaimed
ideological goals, particularly with respect to social equality, not to mention the
classical Marxist doctrine concerning the eventual withering away of the state.
The latter in fact grew in importance, with an ubiquitous and frequently
repressive presence associated with a marked bureaucratisation and inhibition of
personal freedoms in all sorts of areas of life. It is nevertheless clear that by the
end of the 1980s the two Germanies had diverged into markedly different
societies.
How far did the cultures of the two Germanies diverge? Both Germanies,
after somewhat faltering starts (with the exception of returning exiles such as
Bertolt Brecht) contributed new classics to the German literary heritage: in the
Federal Republic, writers such as Günter Grass and Heinrich Böll attained
international reputations, while in the GDR Christa Wolf and Stefan Heym are
but two of those whose writings were translated and recognised beyond German
frontiers. While many of the issues German writers had to deal with in the two
Germanies were similar – particularly the question of the Nazi past – their
answers were interestingly different; and, over the years, other concerns became
increasingly important as East and West German writers confronted current
realities in their different societies and sought to advocate ways of thinking and
behaving often at odds with prevailing orthodoxies. In East Germany, literature
had a heightened political significance; it was also, interestingly, aided by the
existence in West Germany of a common language community where East
German works could be published and receive a wider circulation – often
evading censorship and filtering back into the GDR. At the level of more popular
culture, there were similarities and differences: the youth culture of the GDR
was more constrained than that in the Federal Republic (although jeans and rock
concerts were spreading in the Honecker era). Sport was conventionally held to
constitute a major source of East German national pride; but even in this area,
there were divisions between elitist sponsorship for the select few, and relatively
poor facilities for the masses, whose West German counterparts were far better
served by ubiquitous sporting facilities of a high standard. There were even
instances of football hooliganism in the GDR (notably against Erich Mielke’s
Dynamo team in East Berlin: Erich Mielke was Minister for State Security and
his unpopularity was reflected in the severely limited number of ‘fans’ for his
team). Differences in patterns of leisure were marked, with a far greater range of
facilities and freedom of choice – including foreign travel – in the Federal
Republic than in the GDR.
Yet for all their divergences, the two Germanies remained tied by a
common historical heritage as well as by a wide range of current
interconnections, economic, political and social. While very different, they yet
remained related; neither could be considered satisfactorily without reference to
the other, giving each of these sovereign states a unique status in the modern
world as part of a divided country. However stable each part appeared, the
division remained; and the gash across central Europe, resulting from conflicts
for which Germans had to bear primary responsibility, was one which caused
pain to countless others in non-German countries too.
THE REVOLUTION OF 1989 AND THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY
In the later 1980s, extraordinary changes began to appear in the system which
had held sway in eastern Europe for forty years. An economically weak and
politically overstretched Soviet Union was no longer able to sustain massive
defence spending on a par with the USA, and was keen to defuse international
tensions in order to deal with mounting troubles on the domestic front. Under the
reforming leadership of Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, processes of
democratisation and economic restructuring were introduced that were to have
radical implications for the entire post-war settlement of Europe. Under the non-
interventionist eye of a Soviet Union which was relinquishing its hold on the
former satellite states of Eastern Europe, processes of political democratisation
were allowed to proceed in Poland and Hungary which brought to an end their
respective Communist Parties’ monopolies on power. Hopes for reform in East
Germany under Honecker were disappointed by the increasing repression
evident in his last years of power, but attention was focussed on a possible
reformist successor.
In the event, the revolution which swept away the old regime in East
Germany came initially not from pressures from within, but was sparked by a
regime crisis occasioned by changes elsewhere. In the summer of 1989, Hungary
– under its new reformist leadership – began to dismantle the fortified boundary
with Austria. The Hungarians also chose to waive the East German visa
restrictions on travel to the west. Around 220,000 East German holidaymakers
were in Hungary in August: perhaps one-tenth of them decided to take the
opportunity of the opening of the borders to flee to the west, taking with them
only what possessions they had on them. The reception in the west was initially
ecstatic: refugee camps were set up to look after the resettlers, offers of work
came flooding from German employers, and in a party atmosphere there was talk
of ‘reunification of the Germans on West German soil’. Other East Germans,
seeing the nightly West German television reports, decided to seize the
opportunity to make the break too: some left for Hungary via Czechoslovakia,
others sought refuge in the West German embassies in Prague and Warsaw. Soon
the movement had reached crisis proportions. The staffs of the embassies could
no longer deal with the thousands seeking refuge and demanding to leave for the
west; the host governments were embarrassed in their relations with both East
and West Germany; the West German government began to worry about the
capacity of the West German economy and housing situation to absorb the tens
of thousands of immigrants; and the East German government was only too well
aware that this damaging haemorrhage of citizens amounted to a major crisis,
not only affecting the functioning of the economy (as in the 1950s), but also
striking at the very heart of the regime’s claims to legitimacy. Attempts at
containment by closing all the country’s borders – not only imprisoning East
Germans within Eastern Europe but confining them, as it were, to a form of
‘house arrest’ in East Germany itself – were clearly impracticable and an
admission of failure.
The situation was somewhat complicated by the fragile health of Erich
Honecker, who underwent major surgery for a gall-bladder problem in the
summer, and who was rumoured to be suffering from cancer (later confirmed).
Virtually ignoring the problems of his country, Honecker proceeded with plans
to celebrate the GDR’s fortieth anniversary in October 1989. Meanwhile, there
was a growing movement among a number of groups in the GDR, the largest of
which was New Forum, to confront directly and explicitly the problem of
why
so
many East Germans wanted to leave, rather than simply attempting to prevent
them from leaving. An important feature of these early voices for reform was the
rejection of the West German system, and the demand to move forward to some
form of humane, non-Stalinist, truly democratic socialism. Voices demanding
internal debates with a view to constructive reform of the system became ever
more insistent, particularly with the organisation of weekly mass demonstrations
in Leipzig, and, on a smaller scale, in other major cities. Initially, there was some
fear that such mass demonstrations would simply be suppressed by force (as in
China earlier in the year), and it took considerable courage and discipline to
come out and demonstrate in a peaceful and organised manner. The role of the
church was very important here, with its organisation of non-violent protests,
peaceful candle-lit vigils, prayer meetings and discussions. In the event, there
was a major turning point on 9 October, when the authorities renounced the use
of force to suppress the Leipzig demonstration, and effectively conceded the
legitimacy of demands for dialogue. From then on, demonstrations continued to
grow.
In the face of these challenges, and prompted by Gorbachev (who had visited
the GDR for the rather hollow fortieth anniversary celebrations), the East
German leadership attempted to effect what was in the nature of a ‘last
revolution from above’ to ward off the threat of worse disturbances from below
and to attempt to regain control of an increasingly untenable situation. At a
meeting of the Politburo on 18 October, Honecker was replaced as SED leader
by Egon Krenz, a hard-liner who had long been billed as Honecker’s ‘crown
prince’. With unfailingly smiling face, Krenz returned from a brief visit to
Moscow (calling in on Poland on the way back) to preside over an initial phase
of reform in East Germany. People were less than convinced by the sincerity of
this recently converted reformer (with cartoon captions such as ‘The shark has
pretty teeth, my dear’ – a reference to the prominent display in Krenz’s smile),
and demands for more radical changes continued and grew, with increasing size
and confidence of the demonstrations. At the same time, the stream of refugees
to the west continued, now taking a much shorter route over the Czech border.
It was clear that the ‘Iron Curtain’ across Europe was now riddled with holes.
The East German leadership’s attempt to defuse pressure by announcing very
limited travel concessions (four weeks a year, under permit) satisfied no-one.
Suddenly, at the end of a press conference on Thursday 9 November, a weary
government spokesman admitted that newer, more far-reaching freedoms to
travel effectively meant that the Berlin Wall no longer served its former purpose.
The effects of the announcement were electric.
West and East Berliners rushed to the Wall; soon even the East German
border guards gave up the attempt to stamp permits or issue visas; a euphoric
party atmosphere rapidly developed. By midnight, people were dancing on the
top of the Wall, helping each other over – in both directions – and drinking
bottles of champagne, as Berliners were reunited over what was rapidly
becoming merely a piece of concrete, rather than the ultimate boundary of the
habitable universe. In the following days and weeks, the borders between the
two Germanies and the two parts of Berlin were increasingly opened up, with
new crossings being opened and attempts being made to ease the pressure of
traffic in both directions. An extraordinary period ensued, in which huge
numbers of East Germans rushed to take the opportunity to see what life was
really like in the other, forbidden, affluent Germany – and returned home again
to the East, laden with bananas, oranges, and what other few goods they could
buy with their limited western currency.
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