Gastarbeiter
). The
supply of relatively cheap and mobile labour in the form of refugees dried up
with the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, and in a period of labour shortage
migrant workers from the Mediterranean countries, particularly Turkey, were
attracted into the West German economy in the 1960s. Foreign workers were
attractive to West Germany because they had cost nothing to educate, their taxes
contributed to West Germany’s expanding welfare system, they were
predominantly unskilled and non-unionised, and could therefore be employed to
do the ‘dirty’ jobs which Germans did not like to do, as well as being employed
on temporary contracts with little respect for workers’ rights. With the economic
recession of the 1970s and 1980s, the foreign workers – many of whom had not
simply stayed to earn high wages for a few years and then returned home, but
had rather settled and brought, or founded, families – began to turn into more of
a perceived problem. There were problems of rising unemployment, and a series
of incentives to get foreign workers to leave Germany was introduced. There
were also social problems, with rising racial hostility (evident, for example, in
high votes for right-wing parties in local elections in Berlin and Frankfurt in
spring 1989), and questions concerning the social integration of immigrants’
children, for whom Germany was as much ‘home’ as an unknown country far
away, but whose language and customs were different from those of their
German neighbours. Any account of West German society as ‘classless’ must be
seriously blinkered in respect of around one-tenth of the population of late 1980s
West Germany.
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN THE GDR, 1949–89
Already by 1949 there were major differences between the socioeconomic
structures of East and West Germany. These differences were to become more
marked after the formal foundation of the two Republics.
Collectivisation of agriculture – following the expropriation of estates in the
occupation period – proceeded in two main stages in 1952–3 and 1959–60.
There were three different types of co-operative, and by the end of the 1960s the
bulk of East German agriculture was organised in collective forms in which land,
livestock, machinery and tools were all in common ownership. The 1970s and
1980s saw some changes in the organisation of agriculture, with increased
specialisation – between, for example, fruitgrowing, crop-farming, and livestock
production – and intermediate levels of organisation to coordinate the production
plans of individual enterprises in the light of nationally determined goals.
Although not as efficient as West German agriculture (which benefited from a
powerful farming lobby as well as the EEC’s Common Agricultural Policy), East
German agriculture was relatively productive and the GDR was nearly self-
sufficient in basic foodstuffs (although with limited consumer choice, for
example in fruit). The contrast between the serried ranks of combine harvesters
moving in formation across large collectivised East German fields and the
single, often still horse-drawn carts visible across the landscape of peasant
Poland was highly striking to any visitor in the 1980s. A further quite important
source of supply of, for example, eggs, in East Germany came from the small
private plots and allotment gardens which were actually encouraged by the state
in the 1980s as a supplement to the main collectivised production.
The organisation of East German industry went through a number of stages.
Private ownership of the means of production was squeezed out fairly rapidly, so
that the bulk of production was owned either by ‘the people’ (that is, the state) or
in some form of joint ownership with state participation. The 1950s were
characterised first by a Stalinist emphasis on heavy industrial production
(although some concessions were made to consumerism in the wake of the 1953
Uprising) and secondly by the pronouncement and attempted implementation of
a succession of Plans. Central planning was however bedevilled by a variety of
problems, including unrealistic goals and a focus on production of quantity
without reference to quality or saleability of goods. In 1963, in the climate of
new economic ideas in the USSR, the New Economic System was announced,
which introduced a measure of decentralisation in the economy, with greater
decision-making possible at intermediate levels, and the use of profits and bonus
incentives as important levers. Since profits were now important, quality became
a consideration and goods had to be saleable. There were a number of problems
with the New Economic System (which necessitated three sets of price reforms),
including a lack of managerial experience among those now expected to take
more responsibility. In 1967 it was amended to become the ‘Economic System of
Socialism’. However, these experiments were quietly terminated in the late
1960s, in the wake of the Czechoslovakian Prague Spring of 1968, when fears
were widespread among Eastern European leaders that political decentralisation
and democratisation might be an unwelcome concomitant of economic
decentralisation. (It should be noted that in the GDR Ulbricht had made quite
sure that the dispersion of economic decision-making was not accompanied by
any political democratisation, in contrast to the situation in Czechoslovakia.) In
the 1970s, under Honecker, there was a recentralisation of economic planning.
There were a number of changes in the organisation of East German
industrial production under Honecker. Following the economic recession of the
late 1970s and early 1980s – from which East Germany suffered because of its
dependence on trade and fuel imports – there were new attempts at the co-
ordination of research, technological development, and production, with more
sensitive economic levers at intermediate levels of economic planning, while
overall control remained centrally with the Politburo and Council of Ministers.
Despite setbacks and difficulties, the East German economy in fact
performed remarkably well. Although wrenched from its natural economic links
with the western areas of the former German Reich and forcibly integrated with
the less developed economies of the COMECON bloc, and although initially
suffering more from dismantling and reparations policies, the East German
economy nevertheless rose to attain, by the 1980s, the highest per capita
production of the Eastern bloc and to become, according to World Bank figures,
the twelfth most important trading nation in the world. It was not particularly
favourably endowed with natural resources: it was heavily reliant on the inferior
domestic brown coal for energy, and although it moved towards nuclear power
the GDR was also reliant on the USSR for oil imports. In contrast to most of the
rest of Eastern Europe (with the exception of western Czechoslovakia), the GDR
was already an industrialised country before being incorporated in the
communist bloc. Traditional strengths included vehicle and machine production,
as well as chemicals, optical and electronic enterprises. By the 1980s, there were
developments in such areas as microelectronics and computers, although the
GDR remained well behind the west and could in the main only hope to export
computers within Eastern Europe.
A major, if hidden, source of East German economic strength, in contrast to
other COMECON countries, lay in East Germany’s special relationship with
West Germany. Lack of tariffs and favourable trade and credit agreements
rendered the GDR a secret extra member of the EEC. About a third of East
German trade was with non-COMECON countries, and of this about a third was
with West Germany (i.e. about 8 per cent of the GDR’s overall foreign trade).
Apart from favourable terms and credits, East Germany thus also secured a
reliable source of supplies which helped to avoid certain bottlenecks in
production common in East European economies. Moreover, East Germany
received a large amount of western hard currency, through the unique links with
West Germany, from such matters as West German subvention of motorway
access to West Berlin, the payment of road tolls by travellers, and large
compulsory currency exchanges for visitors to the GDR, West German support
of certain projects (such as the West German churches contributing to the
restoration of churches in East Germany, or the equipment in East German
church hospitals), the money sent by westerners to their East German friends and
relatives, and so on. West German loans on very favourable terms at crucial
moments also helped East Germany, which managed to weather the economic
crises of the early 1980s somewhat more smoothly than other East European
economies. Whatever comments may be made about East Germany’s relatively
well-educated, skilled and efficient work-force as a factor in East German
economic success, the unique relationship with West Germany must not be
ignored in any explanation of East Germany’s relatively successful economic
record.
However, this success, while evident in a range of statistics such as annual
growth rates and GNP per capita, also posed something of a puzzle for the
western visitor. For the appearance of everyday life in East Germany was
somewhat drab and far from the affluence enjoyed by a majority of West
German citizens. Standard of living comparisons between the two Germanies
indicate improvements on the consumer front, at least in quantitative terms, in
East Germany in the 1970s and 1980s. Increasing numbers of East German
households possessed televisions, fridges, washing machines and cars – although
if one compares in qualitative terms, most Germans in both East and West would
have admitted the superiority of a Mercedes or BMW over a Wartburg or
Trabant. The problem in the area of consumer durables in the GDR lay not so
much in the lack of money – although prices were high relative to average
earnings – as in the limited availability of goods, with long waiting lists for new
cars, and second-hand cars frequently costing as much as new ones because of
their immediate availability. (Privileged members of GDR society were however
able to queue-jump, and usually obtained even western cars with ease.) A further
problem lay in the stratified system of shopping. While basic necessities of life
were available at cheap, subsidised prices, more desirable goods might be
obtained at much higher prices, but still in East German currency, in the chains
of Exquisit and Delikat shops, or, for western hard currency, in Intershops
(which were initially only open to western visitors). Effectively the existence of
the latter divided East Germans between those who had access to western
currency and those who did not. Whatever grumblings and criticisms there might
be among East Germans (such as that the choice in ‘fruit and vegetable’ shops
was between cabbages and more cabbages), there was no actual want.
Employment was guaranteed – even if not appropriate to qualifications – and
prices for food and housing were low. Nevertheless, even in the area of food and
drink East Germany did not come very well out of comparisons with the west: in
the late 1960s, East Germans ate less meat and dairy products than their western
relatives; in the 1980s, the increasingly health-conscious West Germans ate less
meat and more fruit and vegetables than the East Germans, who, despite having
overtaken westerners in meat consumption, still seemed to come out worse in the
comparison. One important implication of East German economic performance,
combined with periodic consumer concessions in moments of political
insecurity, was that there was not the material basis of mass popular discontent
such as was seen at intervals in Poland. On the other hand, it was not sufficient
to deter large numbers of East Germans from fleeing to what they hoped would
be a better life in the west when Hungary opened its borders with Austria in the
summer of 1989. Nor did it prevent large numbers from taking to the streets and
demonstrating in favour of increased freedom of speech, travel, and human
rights in the autumn of 1989. ‘Bread and circuses’ policies could not in the end
satisfy desires for a more democratic society.
East Germany’s social structure diverged quite notably from that of West
Germany. East Germany’s population – with fluctuations – remained almost
static (in the late 1980s somewhat below the 17 million mark) in contrast to West
Germany’s population expansion of around 50 per cent since the end of the war
(to around 62 million). East Germany’s citizens remained residents of medium-
sized towns and smaller communities, with a relatively low population density,
contrasted with West Germany’s higher degree of urbanisation. Inequalities of
income were less marked in East Germany than in West Germany: the GDR has
been characterised as a ‘society of small people’, without extremes of wealth or
poverty. The negligible private ownership of means of production in the GDR
meant that it was, in formal Marxist terms, a ‘classless’ society. However, it was
not a society without privileged elites. In particular, elites in the GDR were
primarily political, in contrast to the differing, if overlapping, multiplicity of
elites in the Federal Republic of Germany. Yet groups other than the top
politicians in the GDR enjoyed certain privileges and comfortable life styles: the
GDR was not a society without inequality.
There was greater social mobility in East than West Germany, with early
policies of sponsorship of people from under-privileged, working-class and
peasant backgrounds. The education system until the late 1960s had the
promotion of workers’ and peasants’ children as one of its specific aims,
although in the 1970s this gave way to an emphasis on the sponsorship of talent
irrespective of social background. The comprehensive school system in the GDR
emphasised the importance of work experience, and there was a range of routes
to higher education such that those who did not take the academic route through
the upper school (leading to the equivalent of the German
Abitur
or the British A
level qualifications) might still gain access to further and higher education in
other ways. A prerequisite for social mobility in the GDR, however, was at least
political conformity if not active commitment. While educational qualifications
were increasingly characteristic of the most privileged group, the political elite,
no non-conformist young person would be able to proceed smoothly through the
education system whatever his or her talents. Even a ‘non-political’ subject such
as medicine would be closed to young people who stepped too far out of line at
school; and often the children of pastors were forced to study theology rather
than other vocational subjects of their choice. Opting for alternative military
service as a ‘building soldier’ (
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