Plate 41.
A West Berlin pensioner looks on as people hack out mementoes from the now defunct Berlin
Wall.
The party was not without its hangover. Nor had the ‘German problem’
simply disappeared with the opening of the borders. Rather, the true dimensions
of the question only began to become apparent in the winter of 1989–90. For one
thing, the stream of refugees continued to flow at a rate of between 1,000 and
2,000 a day – amounting to between a third and a half a million in a year.
Evidently some East Germans still felt they could make a better life for
themselves in the west, or did not trust the new leadership to institute
satisfactory and far-reaching reforms. The continuing influx of refugees posed
very serious problems for the West German economy and infrastructure, as well
as provoking a flare-up of social tensions associated with extremist political
movements. The welcome was considerably cooler than it had been for the early
refugees of the summer. For another, all manner of delicate international issues
were at stake, as Chancellor Kohl rather rapidly opened up the question of the
unification of the two Germanies. International debate revolved on the changed
roles of the Warsaw Pact and NATO in the new circumstances of a
democratising Eastern Europe, as well as the question of introducing market
elements into Eastern European economies, and the relationship of such changes
to the planned programme of integration of the European Community in Western
Europe. The German question was one with far wider implications.
In East Germany, processes of domestic political change continued rapidly.
Egon Krenz’s leadership of the SED was short-lived, and he was replaced by the
young, vigorous and relatively reformminded Gregor Gysi. The SED attempted
to adopt a new image, partly by purging the entire old guard leadership – some
of whom were to stand trial on charges of corruption, the extent of which had
shocked the East German public – and partly by adopting a new tag to its name,
adding ‘Party of Democratic Socialism’ to the initial ‘Socialist Unity Party’. But
such changes were less than convincing, and about half the former membership
of the SED had left by mid-January 1990. With a constitutional change to
remove the built-in leading role of the SED in the GDR, elections were called
for 6 May 1990, later brought forward to 18 March. New political parties began
to build up their organisations and programmes, including the New Forum
opposition group, Democracy Now, and Democratic Awakening, as well as the
recently founded East German SPD. The former puppet parties also began to
assert their independence: for example, the Liberals had failed to vote for Krenz
in his ratification as leader by the Parliament, and subsequently the Liberals
attempted to adopt an independent line. The character of mass demonstrations
began to change, with ever more strident demands for reunification with West
Germany, and with evidence of extreme right-wing activity (including
mobilisation on the part of the West German Republicans). The East German
leadership used evidence of mounting domestic unrest as a pretext to slow down
its disbanding of the hated security police (Stasi) but were eventually forced to
give way on this issue. Nevertheless, talks between the government – under the
leadership of the moderate communist Prime Minister Hans Modrwo – and
opposition groups showed considerable signs of strain, and by the beginning of
1990 the mood had changed considerably from the early, peaceful days of
bloodless revolution in the autumn of 1989.
By the time of the elections on 18 March, the collapse of the East German
economy and administration was accelerating. Despite the valiant efforts of the
fledgeling East German reform movements, which lacked both campaigning
expertise and basic resources, the right-wing outcome of the vote was effectively
determined by the entry of the West German political juggernauts. A vote for the
right-wing parties, including the East German CDU – for over forty years a
puppet of the Communists, now designated by Kohl to be an acceptable
conservative partner in democracy – was seen by many East Germans as the
quickest route to acquiring the West German Deutschmark on favourable terms,
and ultimately becoming a part of West Germany without having to leave East
German soil. Currency union of East and West Germany took effect on 1 July
1990, heralding the end of two separate, sovereign German states. In the event,
currency union inaugurated, not economic upswing and equalisation of
conditions, but rather mounting unemployment and rising social tensions in the
East. The unprecedented experiment of uniting a capitalist and a communist
economy, and seeking to adapt the latter to market conditions with loss of
protective subsidies and social benefits, was clearly going to produce a rather
bumpy ride.
Meanwhile, Gorbachev’s Soviet Union was continuing to undergo profound
domestic changes and renouncing its claims to domination over Eastern Europe.
Kohl took advantage of this possibly brief moment when there was an
international ‘window of opportunity’, and powered the process of political
unification at an accelerating rate. Faced with mounting domestic crises and a
collapsing coalition government, East German negotiators were in a weak
position concerning the conditions for unification. In the end, the East Germans
opted for unification as soon as possible after the ‘two-plus-four’ talks had been
completed and ratified by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe. On 3 October 1990, less than a year after the 40th anniversary of the
GDR, the GDR was no more. An enlarged Federal Republic had incorporated
the five newly constituted East German
Länder
, and, at a solemn unification
ceremony, the Germans acknowledged their responsibility for ensuring that their
united future would try to learn from the mistakes of their troubled past.
Chanceller Kohl reaped his political reward when, in the first general elections
to be held in united Germany in December 1990, the ruling conservative-liberal
coalition was confirmed in power to preside over the process of unifying in
practice what had been so rapidly, and unexpectedly, thrown together over the
previous months.
8
The Federal Republic of Germany since 1990
◈
The enlarged Federal Republic of Germany that emerged on 3 October 1990,
arising from the accession of the five new
Länder
(federal states) created out of
the former GDR, was a distinctively new and somewhat lop-sided entity. It
differed considerably from its West German predecessor, however much the
latter had determined the conditions of unification and provided the basic
constitutional and institutional framework for the unified Germany. The
differences had to do with an uneven domestic economic, social and political
profile, and with the dramatic changes in the wider context following the
collapse of communism and the end of a bi-polar Cold War world. From the
1990s, the Berlin Republic represented, for a range of reasons, a distinctively
new stage in German history. Moreover, in the early twenty-first century
significant changes in the European and international context decisively shifted
Germany’s role and standing in the wider world.
UNIFYING GERMAN SOCIETY
The unprecedented historical experiment of integrating a collapsed communist
state into a successful capitalist economy in the event proved far more difficult
than the optimists in the hour of unification had expected. Major and
unanticipated costs of reconstruction fell on west Germans in the form of
increased competition for jobs in an era of rising unemployment, and increased
funding for the modernisation of the east German infrastructure, with an
additional ‘Solidarity tax’. The old, affluent, relatively self-satisfied West
Germany which could agonise over its own past and proclaim it was the first
‘post-national nation’ found, too, that it was expected to take a more proactive
role not only on the European, but also on the international stage. In the short
term, as westerners moved in to the eastern Länder, reshaping political and
economic structures in their own image, east Germans found they were subject
to even greater immediate dislocations.
The earliest effects of the introduction of a capitalist economy were felt in
the spheres of employment and the privatisation of production and property in
the eastern Länder. With the introduction of western wages and prices, and
exposure to world markets and stronger competition, inefficient east German
enterprises with grossly outdated equipment and now unsustainably high staffing
costs were no longer viable. Unemployment levels rose rapidly and dramatically.
With the loss of state-subsidised and enterprise-based child-care facilities, and
with the domestic division of labour still based on ingrained assumptions about
gender roles, women were particularly badly affected by rising unemployment.
So too were people in middle age, who were considered too young to be able to
take premature retirement, and too old to be able to retrain and develop new
skills. On the other hand, for many younger people there were new possibilities
for education, training and career development. As far as property was
concerned, operating on the principle of restitution rather than compensation, the
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