glasnost
might have some real meaning in East
Germany. A rattled leadership in the GDR responded to demonstrations by
making more forceful use of the State Security Police than had been seen for
many years, and by forcing large numbers of dissenters into involuntary exile.
While the successful containment of dissent was undoubtedly an important
factor in East German political stability in the 1960s and 1970s, the position in
the new circumstances of the 1980s was far more volatile. As we shall see, the
shaping of dissent by the churches influenced its mode of expression and its
political impact in the 1989 revolution; but on its own, domestic dissent would
probably not have been able to break the bonds of communism in East Germany.
How far did political culture in East Germany diverge from that of the
West? It seems to be the case that, while the East Germans by no means became
a nation of committed communists, patterns of political orientation did diverge
notably from those evident in West Germany. Many East Germans were
prepared to conform in public, but also lived what many considered to be
‘perfectly ordinary lives’ in private spaces – family, friends, country cottage or
allotment – in what was termed a ‘niche society’ (Gaus). This retreatism, as a
response to a relatively intrusive and demanding state, was a rather different
phenomenon from the apolitical passivity which was possible for many West
German citizens. There was also a certain authoritarianism evident in the GDR,
which was arguably less a left-over from the Nazi and pre-Nazi past than a
response to current political circumstances. It was hard to learn modes of
democratic discussion of differing views, and democratic methods of conflict
management, in the context of GDR schools, factories, party or leisure
organisations. Similarly, the extensive organisation of every aspect of life
militated against a certain form of individualism and enterprise. Generalisations
about a ‘national’ political culture are as unwise in relation to East Germany as
to West. However, it is notable that there were marked differences of political
attitude to be discerned after forty years of the existence of the two states, with
many East Germans by the later 1980s criticising aspects of the functioning, or
inadequacy, of their system, but not simply presupposing the superiority of the
west. These differences in political patterns were related to marked divergences
between the economic and social structures of the two states, to which we now
turn.
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN WEST GERMANY
The most obvious difference between the two Germanies evident to any casual
observer in the 1980s was that between their standards of living. West Germany
was manifestly a prosperous, westernised, consumer-oriented society, in which
sleek, fast cars sped down well-maintained – if often overcrowded – motorways,
and where, despite increasing wails about such matters as the ‘death of the
forests’, the general atmosphere was one of cleanliness, a well-maintained
environment, and material plenty. East Germany, by contrast, would strike
visitors as relatively drab, colourless, polluted by the dirty smoke produced by
lignite (brown coal), with small and inferior cars bumping their way over pot-
holed, often still cobbled roads (with the exception of the well-maintained
motorways from West Germany to West Berlin), with housing generally in a
poor state of repair, and the choice in shops severely restricted, offering a limited
range of low-quality goods. These appearances partly reflected, and partly also
disguised, deeper realities and more complex truths.
Both Germanies in fact experienced what was called, in relation to West
Germany in the late 1940s and 1950s, an ‘economic miracle’. The phenomenon
in West Germany is well known. Starting even before the currency reform in
1948, and given a psychological as well as material boost by the Marshall Aid
programme, the German economy took off to achieve phenomenal growth rates
in the 1950s. Unemployment, which at the beginning of the decade was
relatively high (around 8 per cent) with the influx of refugees and returning
POWs, was turned by the end of the decade into a labour shortage. The rapid
growth tapered off at the end of the 1950s, so that the performance of the West
German economy came broadly into line with that of other western industrial
societies in the 1960s. It experienced a small recession in 1966–7, which was
effectively dealt with by the economic strategies of the Grand Coalition. West
Germany was highly dependent on trade, and on fuel imports, and was therefore
adversely affected by the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, as well as the general
recession of the later 1970s and 1980s. In the 1980s, the economy’s performance
was perhaps stagnant in comparison with earlier decades, with unemployment
remaining at a relatively high 8–10 per cent, and growth rates at a relatively low
2–3 per cent, but inflation – the main fear of many Germans since the 1920s –
being kept at one of the lowest levels in Europe.
Over the post-war period, there were three main phases of government
economic policy and approach. The first phase, under conservative government,
was master-minded by a former Professor of Economics, Adenauer’s Minister
Ludwig Erhard, and was characterised by the espousal of neo-liberalism and the
‘social market economy’. Understandably wanting to throw off the Nazi heritage
of state intervention in the economy, this view held that the state should
guarantee or facilitate the conditions for economic growth but refrain from too
much intervention and leave as much as possible to market forces. The ‘social’
qualification indicated a recognition of the need for certain provisions to protect
the weakest members of society from the full ravages of unrestricted market
forces. Many critics argued that the West German economy was neither ‘market’
nor ‘social’. Inevitably the state intervened in all manner of ways to guide and
direct the economy, as well as being quite a considerable employer in its own
right. The operations of a free market were further qualified by continuing
tendencies towards centralisation in the German economy, despite Allied
attempts to split up large concerns and introduce measures against cartels.
Decartelisation faced considerable opposition in West Germany, with Erhard’s
first Bill not being passed, and the 1957 version which was finally passed being
so watered down, with so many loopholes, that trends towards concentration in
West German industry could continue relatively unabated. Moreover, the policies
pursued in the 1950s, of low taxes, high interest rates and profits, low wage
increases for workers, a squeeze on domestic credit and the encouragement of
investment, not only contributed to the expansion of the economy but also
contributed to an increasing gap between rich and poor. Social inequalities were
increased by government policies, so that by the 1960s a very small proportion
of society held a very large proportion of wealth. Proponents of these policies
argued that, since the overall cake was getting so much larger so fast, such
inequalities did not really matter; in absolute terms, compared with their own
previous positions, all members of society were much better off. For most West
Germans in the 1960s, who remembered the ‘hunger years’ after the war, this
was probably infinitely more important than any overall analysis of relative
social inequalities.
With the fall of the Erhard government of 1963–6 and the economic
recession of 1966–7, government strategy in the Grand Coalition changed to one
of neo-Keynesianism, with tax reforms (including what was seen as a fairly high
VAT at 11 per cent) and heavy state investment in aspects of the economic
infrastructure, particularly motorway construction and the expansion of higher
education. The ‘Law for the Stabilisation of the Economy and Promotion of
Economic Growth’ of 1967, and the ‘concerted action’ between employers and
workers (from which in fact the latter withdrew in 1977), facilitated by the state,
recognised the importance of state intervention and conscious steering of the
economy. The early 1970s, under Social Democratic government, saw an
emphasis on research and economic planning, although by the later 1970s faith
in planning had given way to a more reactive form of crisis management. With
rising unemployment, as well as an unfavourable demographic structure – more
pensioners having to be supported by relatively fewer people in work – there
were major dissensions in the closing years of the Schmidt government over the
balance between taxation and welfare. The more right-wing FDP Economics
Minister Lambsdorff could not agree with the more welfare-conscious members
on the left of the SPD, contributing to the change of political allegiance and the
switch to the CDU-dominated government of Helmut Kohl. Under Kohl,
economic policy reverted from neo-Keynesianism to a renewed form of neo-
liberalism. It is notable however that Kohl’s government in the 1980s did not
produce the kind of radical economic restructuring and extensive privatisation
programmes favoured by a conservative colleague across the channel, the then
British Prime Minister Mrs Thatcher. Moreover, under Kohl, the traditionally
good strike record of German workers deteriorated, with rising strains in
industrial relations and an increasing number of strikes, provoking legislation
attempting to restrict strike action and its effects.
Industrial relations in West Germany were frequently presented in terms of a
harmonious ‘social partnership’ between employers and workers. The trade
union structure was relatively streamlined, with one union per factory,
simplifying industrial disputes, and one overall trade union organisation, the
DGB, representing seventeen member unions, in addition to the organisations for
white-collar workers and civil servants. The DGB was not formally affiliated to
any political party; the SPD, unlike the British Labour Party, was not historically
the ‘parliamentary wing of the labour movement’. There were measures of co-
determination and workers’ representation in industry. These were initially
introduced in 1951 and 1952, with co-determination in the coal and steel
industries and the formation of works councils for employees to have a voice in
certain matters affecting them. Co-determination measures were extended in
1976 to cover all large enterprises of over 1,000 employees. However, against
the picture of harmonious industrial relations, it must be pointed out that these
pieces of legislation – both in 1951–2 and in 1976 – were only pushed through
against considerable opposition on the part of employers, who felt they went too
far, and to the disappointment of trade unionists, who felt they did not go far
enough.
There was also prevalent a myth that affluent West Germany represented a
‘classless’ society, with differences of accent and fashion representing regional
differences in a still quite diverse federal state rather than differences in class (in
contrast to the class connotations of many regional accents in Britain).
Undoubtedly, structures of social inequality and their relationship to regional
diversity were different in West Germany and Britain, but that does not mean
that there were no important class differences in West Germany. A large number
of families with the aristocratic ‘von’ in their names could still be found in
leading roles in West German economy and society. Parental status – at all levels
in society – tended to be reproduced through the education system. Although
there were differences among the
Länder
, there were very few areas which
adopted a comprehensive school system, and most operated with a version of the
tripartite selective system. The existence of selective schools generally favoured
children of middle-class, professional backgrounds, who then proceeded to gain
qualifications in higher education, while children from working-class or rural
(and often Catholic) backgrounds tended to be held back and condemned at an
early age to under-achievement. Educational qualifications in West Germany,
despite a series of educational reforms, still tended to legitimate the inheritance
of parental social status. Against this, however, may be added a number of
qualifications. The economy as a whole shifted from being one in which the
majority were employed in industry to one in which white-collar and tertiary,
service-sector jobs expanded to overtake blue-collar employment. There was
therefore a considerable amount of ‘structural’ social mobility. Secondly, West
Germany provided a very high level of training for young people, so that all
sectors of the work-force were comparatively well educated and qualified for
their occupation. Women continued to be ‘under-achievers’ in West German
society, with progressively fewer females represented at higher levels of the
educational ladder (and a very small percentage indeed becoming, for example,
university professors). Those women who were in paid employment outside the
home were predominantly to be found in mainly low-status, low-paid,
impermanent and often part-time employment, readily laid off in times of
recession. Despite governmental efforts and the existence of quite vocal feminist
movements among a minority, the still prevailing general assumption was that
women should choose between family and career, and that those married women
with young children who did go out to work did so out of economic necessity
and to the detriment of the children’s well-being. Pre-school childcare provision,
particularly for the pre-Kindergarten age, was very limited, while the short
school day, with afternoons free, made provision for school-age children still
difficult in households with working parents.
Finally, the social structure of West Germany was further qualified by the
existence of a large ‘under-class’ of foreign ‘guest-workers’ (
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