”Analyse av den aktuelle politiske og sosio-økonomiske situasjonen i Latin Amerika”

Venezuela

The current political situation in Venezuela is marked by the consolidation of the reform process initiated by President Hugo Chávez, whose dynamic and uncompromising character has the country in the regional and international scene. Through his "Bolivarian Revolution", his commentaries not only on national issues but also on the electoral processes in neighbouring countries, his support to the nationalization of gas industries in Bolivia, and lately, the US ban of arms sales to Venezuela, the president emerges as a hero of anti-imperialism and Latin American integration for some, and a loud populist "caudillo" for others. Some observers have noted that there is not necessarily a correspondence between what “Chávez says and what Chávez does”. With presidential elections six months from now (3 December 2006), media campaigns in favour and against Chávez will be intense; discerning between rhetoric and “facts” can become increasingly difficult.

Actors

Hugo Chávez Frías, the presidential candidate of “Patriotic Pole” (PP, Polo Patriótico), an electoral coalition against traditional political parties, was elected president of Venezuela in 1998. The coalition included Chávez’ own left-leaning Movimiento Quinta República (MVR) and several other smaller left-wing parties. They presented a comprehensive social and political reform agenda, one that emphasized anti-poverty and anti-corruption measures. In the 1998 election’s PP obtained 60% of the vote, a substantial mandate even when electoral turnout was no more than 56%. Since the beginning of his government, Chávez has undertaken numerous referendums and elections, called for a constitutional assembly, and established a new national constitution. The president also faced a 2-day coup in 2002, and a recall referendum in 2004, asking the Venezuelan public whether he should be removed from office or not. With an unprecedented voter turn-out of 70%, 59% of eligible voters said they wanted Chávez to continue. In spite of various attempts to cast doubt over the legitimacy of his mandate, President Chávez had managed to rally popular support for what he calls the “Bolivarian Revolution”, a national project of structural change for the country.
The opposition is today led by what used to be the main traditional political parties in Venezuela before Chávez, both founded in the 1940s. “Democratic Action” (AD, Acción Democrática) is a social democratic party which still enjoys some support among voters; it has become discredited by years of corruption, nepotism and mismanagement of the country's economy. Of the nine popularly elected presidents that have held office since the end of military rule in 1958, five have been from AD. The Venezuelan Christian Democratic Party (COPEI, Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente) used to alternate power with AD, but its reputation deteriorated dramatically in the 1990s, and has not managed to refashion itself into a credible opposition force.
Both AD and COPEI belong to the sector known as “abstencionistas”, for abstaining to participate in the congressional elections in December 2005. Opposition parties that did participate in congressional elections are known as “participacionistas”. Aware of their limited political strength, opposition parties have made initial moves to join forces behind a single presidential candidate in the upcoming elections. However, it is uncertain whether the opposition will be able to overcome both internal differences and competition among themselves.
The political scene in Venezuela includes a number of popular based organizations which account for much of the popular support the Chávez government enjoys. One of them is the “Bolivarian Circles” (Círculos Bolivarianos), small local groups aimed to put in practice principles of “participatory democracy” established by the national constitution. These groups operate autonomously from the government, but are – at the same time – intended to facilitate contact between citizens and the state through the discussion of local problems, the formulation of specific demands to the authorities, and ultimately, finding a solution to the problem. Public economic support is provided for local projects such as health posts, schools, transportation, play-grounds, and radio stations. Circles are locally-based, but they have a national network-like organization. Although not directly linked to MVR, large numbers of Bolivarian circles’ members have been present in support demonstrations for President Chávez, giving ground to the argument that they are politically tied to the government. Opponents contend that the groups resemble Cuba’s Committees for Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) and serve to further the “Cubanization” of Venezuelan society (AFP 18 Jun 2001). The Circles started around 2000 and have continued to form across the country and abroad.
The Urban Land Committees (CTU, Comités de Tierras Urbanas) have not received much attention in the political analysis of current Venezuela, yet because of the numbers of people involved, as well as the type of practice they engage into, their role in the process of change is at least as important as the Círculos Bolivarianos and the “misiones” (see below). They embody the three key issues of the current Venezuelan process: ownership, participation, and state-community relations. The CTUs are locally-based organizations seeking the legalization/formalization of property rights over the houses where CTU member families live. While this is the original purpose, once organized CTU members are free to make use of the organization to solve a number of community issues, even engaging into community projects. CTU’s are entitled to government funding for housing and small infrastructural projects suggested by members themselves. The community is involved directly in the supervision of the work and the use of funds. The participatory mechanisms involved in CTU’s work have become a valuable experience in the practice of citizenship. There are currently 5,212 CTUs operating in poor urban areas across the country, each with an average of 147 families; in other words, an estimate of 5.7 million people (more than 1/5 of Venezuela’s population).
Another influential actor in Venezuelan politics is the media. Powerful economic groups in opposition to Chávez are behind private media agencies and networks. The government response has been the creation of its own media networks. The result is a polarisation of meaning in public debate, and a constant struggle to formulate and reformulate the political agenda. International influential media actors have also been drawn into polarized interpretations. This makes it increasingly difficult to make a clear and objective judgement of what is going on in the country.
Issues & Dynamics

The reforms that President Chávez introduced in Venezuela since he initiated his mandate in 1998, but particularly since 2000, when the new constitution was in place, have been strongly contested because they imply profound changes in both the distribution of wealth, and the type of democracy “as usual” Venezuelans had got used to. Natural resources, particularly the administration of the oil industry will be discussed in more detail in the next section. Here, we will focus on the socio-political aspects of the "Bolivarian Revolution".

A former military lieutenant, President Chávez staged a coup to overthrown the government in 1992; the coup failed, and he had to spend two years in prison for the attempt. The declaration of emergency state among the legislative and judicial branches of government in 1999, bear similarities with a "self-coup" (like the one Fujimori staged in Peru in 1992), as it led to the granting of special powers to the presidency in order to reform what needed be. The rushed up process to establish a constitutional assembly and draft a constitution in two months, was interpreted by many as an attempt to de-institutionalize the state in favour of an authoritarian regime. Yet the National Constitution of 1999 is, to judge by many jurists, a legal document that advances the civil, social, political and economic rights of the people of Venezuela. At the same time, the constitution not only dropped the prior traditional arrangement of dual legislative powers, opting instead for a new single-chamber National Assembly; it also reduced the legislative branch's powers in a substantial way, transferring these to the president of Venezuela. It is the concentration of power in the presidential figure that gives ground to criticisms about authoritarianism and the danger of clientelism.
Particularly after the failed coup of 2002 and the take-over of PDVSA (see below), the opposition has done as much as it could to question the legitimacy of the presidential mandate. The last attempt was the congressional elections of 2005, where the opposition decided to boycott the elections as a form of protest against they argued were "conditions of foul-play." A few days before the elections, five opposition political parties had withdrawn from the election; AD and COPEI were joined by Justice First (Primero Justicia), Project Venezuela (Proyecto Venezuela) and New Time (Un Nuevo Tiempo). These political parties represent the majority of the opposition forces in the country. Not surprisingly then, MVR reached majority in congress, with 114 seats out of 160. The rest were divided among various leftist and participacionista parties. The surprising element was, however, voter turn-out of only 25%. This has been interpreted in several ways. For the opposition, this is a sign of a weak mandate. For Chávez supporters, the opposition plotted this in order to undermine the vote as undemocratic, after seeing their low standing on the polls. Some observers point to the weakness of democratic practices, while others see the proof of the complete deterioration and popular mistrust in party politics. For both the opposition and the government, it will be crucial to "get people out and voting", in order to get a mandate without any shadow of doubt.
The Chávez' government has claimed that its aim is to undertake structural change, fight poverty, and create a participatory and democratic society. According to official figures, 25% of the Venezuelan population lived with less than USD 2 a day in 2002. The government's social policy is currently being implemented through Misiones Sociales (Social Missions), which can be defined as social programs that address specific social programs, identifying clear objectives, target groups/beneficiaries, and mechanisms to meet the challenge. All misiones share the common objective "to include all those men, women and children who have been excluded from the Venezuelan social system". The programs work in the areas of education, health, housing, employment, nutrition, and technology. The programs are fully funded by the government, and are very popular among their respective targets population. Misión Robinson, for example, is an adult literacy program which aims to end illiteracy in the country; and Misión Barrion Adentro provides health services to local communities. Other misiones have been more controversial, like “Misión Frias”, which aims to organize and re-train former army soldiers, known as “reservistas”. According to government sources, the misiones have been very successful in achieving their main objectives. The opposition instead, is very critical – not necessarily to the achievements – but of their potential to (re)create patronage relations between the president and local populations; it mistrusts the broad and locally-based way misiones operate for their potential political use and abuse. Observers have pointed out the widespread use of Bolivarian rhetoric in the misiones; this particular discourse and rhetoric, which emphasizes inclusion and participation in a national project has proved highly appealing among popular sectors in Venezuela
Natural Resources

Venezuela is the mayor producer of gas and oil in Latin America and a considerable player in the world market, with 4 % of total oil production and 2.4 % of the gas reserves. The resurrection of OPEC after the low price level in the end of the 1990s could actually be credited to Chávez personally for his willingness to keep production levels low and to negotiate within the organisation (whereas his predecessors had more or less abandoned the cartel).

The history of the petroleum sector started in the early 1900s with international companies drilling mainly in the state of Maracaibo. The industry was nationalized in 1975 and the state company Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) was put in charge of production and the collection of rents. This state monopoly on production was discharged in 1995 as part of the structural adjustment program in the country. The technical capability of PDVSA was reduced over time as international companies became more involved in the production, mostly through service contracts, as preferred by the government. Ideally this means that national governments control the oil and pay only for the provided services. However, most analysts agree that the companies were able to withdraw an unintended large share of the natural resource rents, e.g. by inflating costs and misreporting volumes and prices. What was left of the resource rent went into the coffers of PDVSA. However, the company profits did not automatically enter the state budget. Surplus was redirected to both good (and bad) causes on the will of company directors and individual politicians.
PDVSA was at first left untouched by Chávez’government intervention. Analysts tend to credit both the military coup in spring 2002 and the general strike afterwards, to high-ranking PDVSA officers who wanted to pre-empty a de facto governmental takeover of this company and the petroleum industry. However, as both failed, Chávez fired the directors and there workers who had actively participated in the strike, about 40% of the total staff. With full control over PDVSA, a de facto increase of taxation to the companies took place through a tighter control of the company’s financial reports for their service contracts and a rise in net taxation for company profits from 18 to 50 %. However, in smaller fields foreign companies previously were allowed to be the operator at most beneficial terms. This spring the Venezuelan government announced a national take over of 35 such fields. The contractors were ordered to give 51 % of the companies share in a given field to PDVSA by creating a joint venture, this joint venture were supposed to renegotiate the deal within a short period. Elf of Italy and Total of France did not reach an agreement within the time limit, and their total activity has therefore been confiscated by the state. The companies seem to prefer further negotiations rather than filing international legal actions.
The opposition to Chávez is not any longer in a position of power. Petroleum taxation systems and methods of operation are not being seriously discussed in Venezuela as a result of the polarisation of the political situations. In some sense Chávez inherited a “state within the state” PDVSA system where the company is both the producer and regulator (furthermore tax collector and revenue spender) on behalf of the state. The president however seems eager to keep the system as it is rather than segregating the production and regulator functions. Profits are still kept outside the state budget, directly at hand for good causes, and the president probably exercise considerable influence upon the incumbent president of PDVSA, Rafael Ramirez Carreño, who is at the same time the Minister of Energy and Mines in the Venezuelan government. The oppositions asserts that PDVSA has contributed to a private slush fund of USD 20 billion for the president, making it easier for him to make political contribution to other countries (or the famously sponsoring of the samba school that won this years competition in Rio de Janeiro). The “Misiones” is mostly funded directly from PDVSA rather than over the state budget.
The natural gas deposits are poorly developed compared to its potential (table 3) given that the consumption demand is low and the refining sector is still in its infancy. The viability of the proposed inter-continental gas pipeline system (see discussion below) must be compared to the alternative of keeping the resource unexploited.
The international engagement by the Chávez government has been highly controversial since the very beginning of his presidency. The early “oil for doctors” swap with Cuba was heavily criticized by the opposition who saw sales at world market prices as better alternative. However, it might also be regarded as a stroke of genius to go beyond the OPEC production quota since Cuba can be regarded as outside the world market due to the inability to pay in hard currency. High oil prices have led to a huge influx of foreign currency in the country, and Venezuela is probably spending more than what is recommendable to develop the economy of the nation. The lack of transparency in governmental finances implies that it is hard to know how the surplus is invested. Long term savings in international funds are seemingly not preferred by the government; support to political friends abroad seems hence to be a reasonable option in a situation where the country gets more money than it could possibly spend. What the opposition calls “non-patriotic spending” has found some resonance also within the president's own supporters, making populist calls to spend the money on the needed at home, something which is ironically being resisted by Chávez.
Trends

The main issue for Venezuelan politics today, and the source of concern for observers at home and abroad, is how to use political will and muscle, without falling into authoritarianism. The reform process initiated by President Chávez is highly contested precisely because of the profound implications it has for national power elites. The propaganda war is very intense, and both sides are extremely active. President Chávez will continue to find support for his reform program among poor sectors of the population. He is a populist leader in the sense that he appeals to the masses by using common populist techniques, such referring to the country's great potential truncated by powerful elites; the real power of the people; and the vision of an alternative nation-building project. One may like or dislike the president's personal style, but cannot ignore the fact the he has been elected by a large constituency – time and again, and that his government is implementing much needed social, economic and political reforms in Venezuela. The challenge for the president will be to keep a pace with the people's sense of ownership of the Bolivarian Revolution; does Chávez really mean it when he says that it is "theirs, the people's" revolution, and not "his"? And how sustainable would the changes be – without him in office? These are open ended question for the time being.

Venezuela in the region. Venezuela has become more active in the regional scene since the beginning of the Chávez administration. Chávez has been inspired by the pan-americanist ideals of Simon Bolívar, and become a promoter of Latin America cooperation and integration. In 2001 he introduced “ALBA” (Alternativa Bolivariana para las Américas), as a proposed alternative to the U.S.-sponsored Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA, ALCA in its Spanish initials), differing from the latter in that it advocates a socially-oriented trade block rather than one strictly based on the logic of deregulated profit maximization. Although many countries share the ideals of ALBA, the only members so far are Venezuela, Cuba, and only recently, Bolivia. The point of contention lies in Venezuela’s critical role to “American imperialism”. For President Chávez regional integration should aim to stand independently from US influence, both politically and economically. This position has gone beyond the rhetorical, and entered the field of international relations with neighbouring countries, affecting also other attempts of international integration and cooperation.
The most recent target of Chávez’ criticism on regional affairs has been the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), from which Venezuela withdrew in April 2006, after accusing Colombia and Peru of betraying Latin American integration by signing bilateral trade agreements with USA. The timing for the withdrawal put CAN in a very difficult position; in May, CAN was to initiate dialogues with the European Union towards a cooperation agreement. The meeting in Vienna took place, but the original agenda had to be postponed until internal issues are clarified. It is worth noting that Venezuela has recently become an associated member of MERCOSUR.
Another aspect of Venezuela’s regional presence is President Chávez involvement in electoral processes in other countries, through open support to specific candidates, or public comments about electoral processes. Diplomatic relations between Peru and Venezuela have suffered the most, as both countries have recalled their ambassadors after Peru complained for Chávez’ intervention in internal affairs. Initial support for MAS in Bolivia has now transformed into collaboration with President Morales. Observers in Peru indicate that for the time being, Chávez’ support to candidate Humala in Peru might be doing more harm than good for the nationalist’s electoral campaign.
For some observers Chávez is a source of instability in the region, as his leadership could polarize South America between the “radical left” (also called “irresponsible” and “populist”) countries lead by Venezuela, and the “moderate” social democratic, centre-left countries led by Brazil. Hopefully, Chávez’ attempts to integrate the region will not contribute to further polarization.