”Analyse av den aktuelle politiske og sosio-økonomiske situasjonen i Latin Amerika”

Colombia

The current political situation in Colombia is marked by the recent congressional and the upcoming presidential elections. The electoral process takes place on the background of the continuous internal armed conflict, which in the present context heavily affects the public agenda.

Actors

Traditionally, Colombia has been a two-party system with government changing hands between the traditional Conservative and Liberal Parties, which guaranteed – with some exceptions – the continuation of an uneven distribution of wealth and resources in the country. As the electoral system was changed with the Constitution of 1991, the possibility for the formation of new parties and coalitions opened. Current President Alvaro Uribe is the candidate for a right-wing coalition known as Colombia Primero (Colombia First), composed by five political parties (Partido de la U, Partido Conservador, Cambio Radical, Alas Equipo Colombia, and Colombia Democrática). The coalition obtained ample majority in both the Senate and the Chamber of Representatives during congressional elections last March. This means that, if reelected in May, President Uribe will not have to confront an unwilling congress to implement his political reforms and policies, some of which are highly controversial.

Since elected in 2002, Uribe has put much effort in implementing his “Democratic Security” policy as “a way to move forwards to democratic consolidation in Colombia”. The government praises itself for allowing political opposition actors to mobilize (such as trade unions or the democratic left). In the economic front, Uribe has favoured an open liberal economy and has negotiated a free trade agreement with USA together with Peru and Ecuador. However, the democratic security policy has been heavily criticized not only by the opposition but also by international organisations, human rights and civil society organizations for using the “fight against terrorism” to undermine civil liberties and the rule of law in Colombia even further.
In relation to the guerrilla groups active in the internal armed conflict, Uribe has one clear message: “Peace is born from the transparent, firm, efficient and constant exercise of authority”. The government had no doubts to use military force to impose the authority of the state upon what Uribe increasingly defines as “terrorist groups”, the FARC and ELN guerrillas (see below). The government obviously seeks a solution to the armed conflict on the basis of a military defeat over the guerrillas. Accordingly, only from a position of defeat will the guerrillas be willing to negotiate peace.
The government’s opposition in Congress is represented by members of the traditional Partido Liberal (Liberal Party), and the newer democratic left party called Polo Democrático Alternativo (PDA; Alternative Democratic Pole). The influence of the Liberal Party, whose presidential candidate is Horacio Serna, has been diminishing in the last decades. A different situation occurs with PDA, which represents a novel development in Colombian politics: the formation of a political and democratic oppositional left. PDA’s presidential candidate is Carlos Gaviria, former president of the Constitutional Court and Senator. PDA proposes to work for the establishment of a “Estado Social de Derecho”, or Social Rule of Law, as the only alternative to the historical crisis Colombia now lives. Although at the national level PDA is still to attract supporters, the capital Bogotá is a major PDA stronghold. In the 2003 municipal elections, PDA’s candidate Luis Eduardo Garzón was elected mayor of Bogotá in what has been described as the biggest electoral victory ever for the democratic left. Garzón obtained 46% of the vote. In Colombia the left has often been associated to guerrilla groups; the new democratic left proposed by PDA denounces armed struggle while endorsing a democratic and rights-based ideology.
The internal armed conflict: armed actors

The current internal armed conflict in Colombia goes back to the 1960-70s, to the formation of several leftist guerrilla groups, who turned to armed struggle in opposition to the two-party system dominated by powerful elites. Two guerrilla groups dominate the political-military scene today; Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN).

FARC is the largest one, and controls extensive areas of the country. In 1998 conservative President Andrés Pastrana demilitarized a separate territory in the south-east of the country in order to initiate peace talks with FARC. Negotiations showed little progress, and the government broke peace talks in 2002, ordering FARC to leave the area. FARC guerrillas have been targeted by paramilitary forces since the early 1990s, and currently face up to strong military pressure by government forces. FARC guerrillas have been increasingly involved in drugs dealing since the 1990s, as a way to fund their armed struggle. Extortion and kidnapping have become part of FARC tactics. Some estimates show that FARC has 15-20000 guerrillas.
Although smaller in numbers (up to 5000 guerrillas), ELN had strong impact for their strategic targeting of infrastructure and hijacking operations. The group entered peace talks in 1998, but were ended by the government in 2002. The Uribe administration is currently exploring the possibility to engage in peace negotiations with ELN.
In addition to the FARC and ELN (which define their struggle as “political”), the Colombian armed conflict has a third actor: para-military forces. These groups originated in the 1980s as private armies or security forces for powerful drug lords and landowners, providing not only personal security but also getting rid of cumbersome enemies – competitors, public authorities, leaders of grassroots organisations, and human rights activists. Their use of brutality, violence and extortion is today well known. In 1997 an umbrella organization was formed, Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) to coordinate local and regional paramilitary groups. AUC does not have a political agenda, but legitimized its existence and recurrent use of violence by pointing to the weakness of the Colombian state in providing security for its population – particularly from guerrilla groups. President Uribe initiated talks with the paramilitaries for their possible demobilization and reintegration into society in 2004. The process was officially completed in April this year; it is estimated that 30000 paramilitaries have been demobilized across the country. This demobilization however, comes at a very high price.
The internal armed conflict has serious effects upon Colombian civil society. Civilians are continuously exposed to reprisal, forced displacement and the cross-fire between the fighting parties. At the same time, a large number of civil society organisations are actively working to protect the rights of civilians affected by the conflict. Peace and human rights groups in Colombia operate under constant pressure and danger not only by paramilitaries and guerrillas, but also by the own government forces. Other popular organizations such as indigenous and peasant groups also take part of the peace and human rights network in Colombia. An issue that has gained public attention in recent years is the effect of the armed conflict on the lives of women and girls. During the course of the conflict, all the armed groups – the security forces, army-backed paramilitaries and the guerrilla – have physically and psychologically abused or exploited women and girls. These violations, committed against civilians and armed group’s own combatants, have remained hidden by discrimination and impunity. Networks of women’s organizations, such as the Working Group “Women and Armed Conflict”, have been formed against the odds, aiming to put the issue on the political agenda and ultimately, to bring this situation to an end.

Issues & dynamics

The armed conflict and its consequences regarding the human rights situation and internal displacement are the most pressing issue in Colombia today. Violence and the systematic violation of human rights have been applied by all armed groups involved in the conflict – including government forces. The result is a situation of where the power of fear is imposed upon local populations. Through its “democratic security” policy, the government today boosts the decline of crime rates (homicides and kidnappings) in the country in the last years, particularly in large cities. Human rights organizations (HROs) salute this, but indicate that the situation in the countryside is still out of control, while new types of human rights violations are on the rise, such as arbitrary arrests. Furthermore, there has been an extraordinary increase in the numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs) in the last five years. According to the UN, there are approximately 3 million IDPs in Colombia today. Similarly, indigenous groups across the country have been strongly affected by the armed conflict, threatening their livelihoods and future survival.

While the government puts the blame for the IDPs crisis solely on guerrilla groups, the arbitrary role of the paramilitaries must not be ignored. HROs report the extensive use of land eviction practices in the countryside, by which paramilitaries force peasants and farmers to leave their property under the threat of death. In this manner, a great number of (today former) paramilitaries have come acquire houses and land – simply by force. The controversial Law of Justice and Peace, approved in 2005 to regulate the demobilization of paramilitaries, includes provisions that recognize land acquitted by illegal means as a form of “reparation” to former “paras”, whenever this contributes to their process of reintegration into civilian society. Furthermore, since in most cases original owners did not have formal property titles, the new owners have formalization processes on their side. This redistribution of property and resources in the Colombian countryside is a perversion of principles of restorative justice and reconciliation.
The armed conflict is unfortunately far from reaching a conclusion. President Uribe initiated in 2004 “Plan Patriota”, a military campaign against FARC guerrillas in the southern part of the country, in what has been described as the largest military operation in modern Colombian history. The government has acknowledged that part of the military campaign against rebel groups is being funded by USA through a military cooperation agreement known as “Plan Colombia”. The aim of Plan Colombia is to fight the war on drugs, by eradication of coca plants and stopping cocaine production; an estimate of 3 billion dollars have been invested for this purpose since 2000. Eradication methods include the use of extensive fumigation, with serious environmental and social consequences.
The above developments contrast with the economic growth experienced in Colombia in the last few years. Consumption, investment and export showed positive results in 2005, something with President Uribe adjudicates to the government security policy. The effect of economic growth upon poverty is still rather limited. According to official figures for 2005, 49% of the total population lived under the national poverty line. This corresponds to 22 million people, of which 6,5 million live in conditions of extreme poverty. Although this implies a reduction of 3% from the previous year, poverty in rural areas increased, from 67,5 % in 2004 to 68,2 % in 2005. In Colombia, poverty is closely linked to the extreme uneven distribution of resources, particularly land; a situation that is worsen by the armed conflict. About 13% of Colombia’s national territory is agricultural land. Of this area, 45 % is concentrated in the hands of just 0.3 % of the nation's landowners, with more than 500 hectares each. 20% belongs to 2.3 % of the landowners, with 100 to 500 hectares each, while 35 % of the land is distributed among 97.4 % of Colombian farmers, who have less than 100 hectares each. Smaller farmers and indigenous groups are more exposed to internal displacement and land evictions, thus worsening the problem of land distribution.
Natural Resources

The economy and the extraction of natural resources in this country develop against the background of the internal armed conflict. The ELN guerrilla has specialised in “taxing” oil pipelines, while the FARC guerrilla has specialised in kidnapping and ransom of people involved in the resource extraction business. On the other hand, the paramilitary forces “protect” the companies; payment for their “services” thus becomes a de facto “taxation” of these industries.

The extraction of natural resources still plays an important role in the economy. The country is the second most import source of coal in Latin America (Table 4). The gigantic mine of El Cerrejon at the Atlantic coast stands for most of the production. Today Colombia covers about 5 % of the world coal exports. Gas production and consumption has doubled in the last decade due to a pro-active governmental policy, and today gas production is close to the Bolivian level (Table 3). Oil is at about 500.000 barrels/ day (Table 2), but declining as existing fields are drying up. The government has changed the legislation to be more flexible in order to attract exploration and investments by multi-national companies. Earlier, international companies had to enter into joint ventures with 50 % of the findings going to the state company Ecopetrol. Then a royalty of 20 % of produced volumes had to be paid for the joint venture. Now, the share of findings is reduced to 30 %⁵ and the royalty paid to the state from the joint venture is between 8 and 20 % depending on the profitability of the project. The institutional reorganisation of the sector also implied that state control functions are now separated from the production side through the National Hydrocarbon Agency. The tax on net company income is 35 %, the same as in other Colombian sectors. Total revenue from oil and gas is USD 1.2 bill. per year (Table 8).
Trends

In the upcoming presidential elections, President Uribe is likely to be re-elected and be given the chance to fulfil what he has initiated. Re-election will mean the continuity and consolidation of the current administration’s policies. Opinion polls show that there is certain optimism among the population concerning the country’s future.

In the recent municipal election only 40% of almost 26 million eligible voters exercised their right to vote. This is well below the Latin American average for electoral participation. This absence cannot be explained by “apathy” only; the limitations to political participation imposed by the armed conflict upon large sectors of the population should also be considered. There is a large proportion of citizens in Colombia who are practically disenfranchised, and whose situation becomes invisible because of their lack of political representation. Civil society organizations, particularly peace and human rights groups, provide a line of access to marginalised groups; and are targeted by armed actors for doing what they do.
The rise of the democratic left in the last decade can be considered as an alternative to the traditional way of doing politics in Colombia. PDA could gather support among those currently not voting, but ideological and administrative barriers must first be overcome (public campaign, and not the least, formal voter registration). If the international community and donors cannot contribute to the end of the conflict in Colombia, it can at least assist the victims of the humanitarian crisis the national government refuses to acknowledge.
Colombia in the region. Together with Peru and Ecuador, Colombia negotiated a free-trade agreement (TLC) with USA in 2005. The agreement needs to be ratified by Congress this year, something which is likely to happen given the governments parliamentary majority. Colombia has been subject to criticism from Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in relation to the TLC, and had also received complaints from Bolivia, due to possible implications for Bolivian exports to Colombia (guaranteed in the framework of the Andean Community). Colombia has declared itself in support of the Andean Community, and supported Peru in denouncing Venezuela’s involvement in national affairs at the OAE recently.
Postscript. As expected, President Alvaro Uribe won the presidential elections on May 28 2006, with 62% of the votes. PDA has become the second largest party in the country, with 22% of votes. The liberal party reached less than 12% of votes. However, electoral turnout was very low: only 45% of eligible voters participated in this year’s elections. Low voter participation does not sustain clear mandates. A main challenge for the Colombian political system in general, and progressive political parties in particular, is to mobilize all those potential voters who opt not to exert their right to vote.