Bilig 49. sayı

bilig 
 Vesna 2009 
 Výpusk: 49: 161-176 
© Popeçitel#skiy Sovet Universiteta Axmeta Wsavi 
 
Отражение общественной жизни Османской империи 
 в сочинении Нергиза «Мешакку-л-Ушшак» 
Бахир Селджук* 
Резюме
:  Нергизи,  считающийся  самым  важным  представителем 
художественной
  прозы  турецкой  классической  литературы,  в своей 
работе
  «Мешаку-л-Ушак»  собрал  десять  различных  историй  любви. 
Большинство
  этих  историй,  основанных  на  реальных  событиях, 
относятся
  к  периоду  и  окружению  самого  автора.  Поэтому,  данная 
работа
,  показывающая  наблюдательность  автора,  реально  отразила 
различные
 аспекты общественной жизни Османской империи 17-го 
века
.  
В
  данном  исследовании  на  основе  историй  «Мешаку-л-Ушак» 
определены
 
и
 
проанализированы
 
социальные
 
элементы
 
общественной
 жизни того периода. 
 
Ключевые
  Слова:  Нергизи,  Мешакку-л-Ушшак,  17-ое  столетие, 
Османская
 империя, общественная жизнь. 
 
                                           
*
 Адыяманский университет, педагогический факультет, кафедра турецкого языка / Адыяман 
 [e-mail]
  
 

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bilig
   Spring / 2009   Number 49: 177-190 
© Ahmet Yesevi University Board of Trustees 
A Proposal for the Classification of Objects  
Ö. Naci Soykan
*
 
Abstract: The main purpose of this paper is to make a classification of all 
probable objects from the standpoint of their appointment to a subject. An 
object of any kind is an object of my reason, my mind, my memory, my 
consciousness, my soul or my imagination. When a physical thing is in 
front of us we call that thing we obtain from it “intuition”. We call this 
object type of a physical thing that is provided by a single form of 
sensitiveness (by means of sight) an object of intuition. In the case of an 
event I do not witness personally but which is provided by means of 
media instruments such as newspapers or TV, it is also sensitiveness which 
provides me with the appearance of a physical thing on a two-
dimensional surface. We call this type, provided by all visual techniques, 
an object of appearance. When neither the physical thing from which I 
obtain the intuition nor its appearance is in front of me and when, instead, 
I create them in my mind, the representation I obtain we call a mental 
object. I feel a sense of pain that I receive from any part of my body or a 
sensation of joy in my soul as they are, not from any perspective. We call 
this type of object, perceived by the consciousness and the soul, a 
psychological object. The intellect or mind acquires representations and 
concepts from things outside the subject; reason creates its own concepts 
and objects. All mathematical-logical objects-concepts, operations made 
by them, definitions, demonstrations and constructions are of objects of 
reason. Here, we shall talk about yet another kind of object that is a 
combination of object of  reason and object of intuition. These objects, 
which exist in the sciences as principles, we call objects of inference, in the 
sense that they are objects which reason infers from objects of intuition or, 
in other words, objects created by reason through inference. We shall now 
speak of objects of imagination as a last kind in our classification. These 
objects are not objects of intuition or representations of something that the 
subject either found directly in itself (in its soul and/or body) or in 
something outside of itself. The object of imagination is an object that may 
always be visualized in all ways.  
 
Key Words: Classification, subject, object of intuition, object of 
appearance, mental object, psychological object, object of reason, 
object of inference, object of imagination. 
 
                                           
*
 Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University Faculty of Science and Literature Department of Philosophy / İSTANBUL 
  [e-mail] 

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bilig, Spring / 2009, Number 49 
 
178 
The main purpose of this paper is to make a classification of all probable 
objects from the standpoint of their appointment to a subject. A complete 
classification of objects should consider the concept of object in the largest 
sense. For this purpose, we take “object” to include all kinds of objects; from 
something in our consciousness that has no correspondence outside to the 
object of something standing before us and independent from us, to all 
objects created by the mind and imagination. Only then may we claim that 
our classification includes all probable objects. Now, “all probable objects” is 
an open-ended term. Our classification will be deserving of its assertion of 
completeness until someone can show us an object of the sort that may not 
have a place in our classification.  
Knowledge is to know something; to make it an object. There is a method of 
knowledge wherever an object is available. Consequently, our object 
classification will also serve as a classification of knowledge methods to form 
an epistemology. No complete classification is made for sciences, be it in 
respect to their objects, their methods, or from any standpoint whatever. 
However, neither is the idea of unity of sciences discarded. As every object 
method corresponds to a method of knowledge, our classification will also 
establish the desired unity on the basis of knowledge methods and serve as a 
classification of knowledge methods. 
Only if the thing known is a three dimensional thing standing before us and 
independent from us do we make a distinction between the thing in itself 
and its object or its appearance. In this sense, we are saying that we cannot 
claim to know the thing itself. We understand knowing to be knowing every 
single part of a thing as simple elements inseparable from knowing the thing 
itself. In other words, we are arguing that there is a complete overlap 
between the thing itself and its object. Though it is possible that a knowledge 
gave the self of such a thing, we do not have the means to prove this is so. 
As the thing is given and known as it appears to us, the question “Who 
knows whether that thing would not be given or known in a different manner 
by means of other knowledge instruments?” will remain forever unanswered. 
This existence of a gap - which we cannot know will ever be closed - 
between the object and the thing itself shows that every ontological attempt 
asserting to give the knowledge of the self of the being can only become a 
theory of knowledge and that the thing meant by the term “ontic” cannot be 
separate from the thing meant by the term “ontological”. After all, if “ontic” 
means relative to the thing itself, we cannot say this as we cannot be sure 
whether or not we know the thing itself. Nevertheless, somebody who is not 
satisfied by what we have said so far should tell us for example what the 
more the term “This is an ontic difference” says than the term “This is an 

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