466
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TOMOLYA János: Crisis in the Central African Republic
In June 2005, fighting between government and rebel forces in the north caused tens of thousands of people to flee
across the border into Chad; this continued in the ensuing years. There were several cease–fire agreements signed
between the government and various rebel groups, particularly in 2007 and 2008, but many of the agreements were not
completely im- plemented. The north was also subject to violence that emanated from conflict in the Darfur region of
neighbouring Sudan and spilled over the border, while in the south the population was increasingly terrorized by the
Lord’s Resistance Army, a Ugandan rebel group that had been using the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a base for
operations before a military offensive at the end of 2008 pushed them deeper into the Central African Republic and other
countries. [27: 7–11] The next presidential election, initially due in 2010, was repeatedly postponed. When it did take
place, on January 23, 2011, Bozizé and Patassé were both among the candidates. Polling did not go smoothly; before
the election results were announced, Patassé and other challengers to Bozizé had lodged complaints that the election
was rigged. When the results were announced in early February, Bozizé was declared the winner, with
66% of the vote.
Way to the current crisis ― Seleka Coup
In late 2012 a coalition of old rebel groups under the new name of Séléka renewed fighting. Two other, previously
unknown groups, the Alliance for Revival and Rebuilding (A2R) and the Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country
(CPSK) also joined the coalition, as well as the Chadian group FPR. [28] The group, which included factions of former
rebel movements, accused Bozizé of not implementing aspects of a previous peace agreement. It demanded his ouster
from the presidency and called for him to stand trial at the International Criminal Court. Seleka quickly advanced south
but stopped short of Bangui in December and entered into negotiations with the government. In January 2013 Seleka and
Bozizé’s administration agreed to a cease–fire and a power–sharing deal that addressed several rebel demands, such as
the release of prisoners and the withdrawal of foreign troops in the country. In addition, it provided for the inclusion of
some Seleka members in a new unity government and allowed Bozizé to finish his term, with new elections to be held
in 2016. Seleka quickly became disenchanted with the implementation of the deal, claiming that Bozizé failed to
honour important aspects of the agreement. In mid–March 2013 the group issued an ultimatum for Bozizé and, despite
some last–minute concessions from the president, resumed hostilities a few days later. Seleka advanced toward Bangui,
seizing the capital on March 24, and Bozizé fled the country. (See Figure 4.)
AARMS (13) 3 (2014)
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TOMOLYA János: Crisis in the Central African Republic
Figure 4. Rebel advance in CAR. [44]
Seleka then claimed control of the government. Seleka’s actions were widely condemned by the international
community, and the African Union suspended the country from the orga- nization and imposed sanctions on rebel leaders.
One of the rebel leaders, Michel Djotodia, claimed to be the de facto head of state and initially promised to uphold the
terms of the January power–sharing agreement. He then later announced that he was suspending the con- stitution and
dissolving the National Assembly and the government. Djotodia’s first attempt at forming a transitional government was
rejected by the opposition as well as by the Eco- nomic Community of Central African States (ECCAS; also known by
its French acronym, CEEAC) regional body, which called for the formation of a national transitional council that
would administer the country until elections could be held. Djotodia accepted ECCAS’s recommendations, and in April a
council was formed. Soon after, Djotodia was elected pres- ident of the interim body, but he was not inaugurated until
August 18, 2013. Djotodia and other Seleka leaders launched their uprising to gain access for northern peoples to
resource wealth ― particularly oil being exploited in their northern homeland by the China National Petroleum
Corporation. [29]
The interim government struggled to restore order and perform the normal functions of state. However it was
unable to fulfil the requirements of an efficient state. [30: 606–607] Meanwhile, Seleka rebels had been pillaging parts
of the country and engaging in horrific acts of violence, rape, and kidnapping. The primarily Christian civilian
population began to form militias, known as “anti–balaka” (Sango: anti–machete), to protect themselves against the
mainly Muslim rebels, which in turn degenerated into a cycle of violent attacks between Christians and Muslims, even
civilians, that left hundreds dead and thousands displaced. Analysts warned of the potential for the situation to further
degenerate into genocide should nothing be done to stop the violence. [31]