That is what the “more ingenious” Egyptians understood. They “were the first who made use
of a shorter method which is known by the name of hieroglyphics.” “The inconveniency
arising from the enormous bulk of volumes, induced them to make use of only a single figure
to signify several things.” The forms of displacement and condensation differentiating the
Egyptian system are comprehended within this economic concept and conform to the “nature
of the thing” (tn the nature of things) which it thus suffices to “consult.” Three degrees or
three moments: the part for the whole (two hands, a shield, and a bow for a battle in
curiologic hieroglyphs) ; the instrument—real or metaphorical—for the thing (an eye for
God’s knowledge, a sword for the tyrant); finally an analogous thing, in its totality, for the
thing itself (a serpent and the medley of its spots for the starry heavens) in tropical
hieroglyphics.
According to Warburton, it was already for economic reasons that cursive or demotic
hieroglyphics were substituted for hieroglyphics properly speak-ing or for sacred writing.
Philosophy is the name of what precipitates this movement: economic corruption which
desacralizes through abridging and effacing the signifier for the benefit of the signified:
But it is now Time to speak of an Alteration, which this Change of the Subject and Manner of
Expression made in the DELINEATION of Hieroglyphic
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Figures. Hitherto the Animal or Thing representing was drawn out graphically; but when the
Study of Philosophy (which had occasioned Symbolic Writing) had inclined their Learned to
write much, and variously, that exact Manner of Delineation would be as well too tedious as
too voluminous; they therefore by degrees perfected another Character, which we may call the
Running Hand of Hieroglyphics, resembling the
Chinese Characters, which being at first
formed only by the Outlines of each Figure, became at length a kind of Marks. One natural
Effect that this Running-Hand Character would, in Time, produce, we must not here omit to
speak of; it was this, that its use would take off much of the Attention from the Symbol, and
fix it on the Thing signified by it; by which means the Study of Symbolic Writing would be
much abbreviated, there being then little to do, but to remember the Power of the Symbolic
Mark; whereas before, the Properties of the Thing or Animal, used as
a Symbol, were to be
learnt: In a Word, it would reduce this Writing to the present State of the Chinese. (I: 139–40)
[Warburton, p. 115]
This effacement of the signifier led by degrees to the alphabet (cf. pp. 125–26) [pp. 109-111.
This is also Condillac’s conclusion (Sec. 134).
It is therefore the history of knowledge—of philosophy—which, tending to multiply books,
pushes toward formalization, abbreviation, algebra. By the same movement, separating itself
from the origin, the signifier is hol-lowed and desacralized, “demotized,” and universalized.
The history of writing, like the history of science, would circulate between the two epochs of
universal writing, between two simplicities, between two forms of transparence and univocity:
an absolute pictography doubling the totality of the natural entity in an unrestrained
consumption of signifiers, and an absolutely formal graphie reducing the signifying expense
to almost nothing. There would be no history of writing and of knowledge—one might simply
say no history at all—except between these two poles. And if history is not thinkable except
between these two limits, one cannot dis-qualify the mythologies of universal script—
pictography or algebra—without suspecting the concept of history itself. If one has always
thought the contrary, opposing history to the transparence of true language, it was no doubt
through a blindness toward the archeological or eschatological limits, starting from which the
concept of history was formed.
Science—what Warburton and Condillac call philosophy here—the epistémè and eventually
self-knowledge, consciousness, would therefore be the movement of idealization: an
algebrizing, de-poetizing formalization whose operation is to repress—in order to master it
better—the charged signifier or the linked hieroglyph. That this movement makes it necessary
to pass through the logocentric stage is only an apparent paradox; the privilege of the logos is
that of phonetic writing, of a writing provisionally more economical, more algebraic, by
reason of a certain condition of knowledge. The epoch of logocentrism is a moment of the
global efface-
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ment of the signifier: one then believes one is protecting and exalting speech, one is only
fascinated by a figure of the techè. By the same token, one scorns (phonetic) writing because
it has the advantage of assuring greater mastery in being effaced: in translating an (oral)
signifier in the best possible way for a more universal and more convenient time; phonic auto-
affection, dispensing with all “exterior” recourses, permits, at a certain epoch of the history of
the world and of what one calls man, the greatest possible mastery, the greatest possible self-
presence of life, the greatest possible liberty. It is this history (as epoch: epoch not of history
but as history) which is closed at the same time as the form of being of the world that is called
knowledge. The concept of history is therefore the concept of philosophy and of the epistémè.
Even if it was only belatedly imposed upon what is called the history of philosophy, it was
invoked there since the beginning of that adventure. It is in a sense unheard of until now—all
idealist, or conventionally Hegelian follies of an analogous appearance notwithstanding—that
history is the history of philosophy. Or if one prefers, here Hegel’s formula must be taken
literally : history is nothing but the history of philosophy, absolute knowledge is fulfilled.
What exceeds this closure is nothing: neither the presence of being, nor meaning, neither
history nor philosophy; but another thing which has no name, which announces itself within
the thought of this closure and guides our writing here. A writing within which philosophy is
inscribed as a place within a text which it does not command. Philosophy is, within writing,
nothing but this movement of writing as effacement of the signifier and the desire of presence
restored, of being, signified in its brilliance and its glory. The evolution and properly
philosophic economy of writing go therefore in the direction of the effacing of the signifier,
whether it take the form of for-getting or repression. Whether opposed or associated, these
two last concepts are equally inadequate. At any rate, forgetfulness, if one under-stands it as
the effacement of the power of retention by finitude, is the very possibility of repression. And
repression, that without which dissimulation would have no meaning. The concept of
repression is thus, at least as much as that of forgetting, the product of a philosophy (of
meaning).