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each line from left to right. This development is quite natural. Writing in the furrow fashion is
undoubtedly the most comfortable to read. I am even sur-prised that it did not become the
established practice with printing; but, being difficult to write manually, it had to be
abandoned as manuscripts multiplied. [Essay, p. 20]
The space of writing is thus not an originarily intelligible space. It begins however to become
so from the origin, that is to say from the moment when writing, like all the work of signs,
produces repetition and therefore ideality in that space. If one calls reading that moment
which comes directly to double the originary writing, one may say that the space of pure
reading is always already intelligible, that of pure writing always still sensible. Provisionally,
we understand these words inside metaphysics. But the impossibility of separating writing
and reading purely and simply dis-qualifies this opposition from the beginning of the game.
Maintaining it for convenience, let us nevertheless say that the space of writing is purely
sensible, in the sense that Kant intended: space irreducibly oriented within which the left does
not recover the right. One must also take into account the prevalence of one direction over the
other within the movement. For here it is the question of an operation, not just of a perception.
The two sides are never symmetrical from the point of view of the aptitude or simply the
activity of the body proper.
Thus the “return of the ox” is less suitable for writing than reading. Between these two
economic prescriptions the solution will be a labile compromise which will leave residues,
entail inequalities of development and useless expenses. Compromise, if one wishes, between
the eye and the hand. During the age of this transaction, one does not only write, one reads a
little blindly, guided by the order of the hand.
Should one still recall everything that such an economic necessity made possible?
This compromise is already very derivative, a late arrival, if one remembers that it prevails
only at a moment when a certain type of writing, itself charged with history, was already
practiced: linear phonography. The system of speech, of hearing-oneself-speak, auto-affection
that seems to suspend all borrowing of signifiers from the world and thus to render itself
universal and transparent to the signified, the phonè which seems to guide the hand, was never
able to precede its system nor, in its very essence, to be alien to it. It could only represent
itself as order and predominance of a temporal linearity by seeing itself or rather handling
itself, within its own self-reading. It is not enough to say that the eye or the hands speak.
Already, within its own representation, the voice is seen and maintained. The concept of
linear
temporality is only one way of speech. This form of successivity is in return imposed upon the
phonè, upon consciousness and upon preconsciousness from a certain determined space of its
inscription.
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For the voice is always already invested, undone [sollicitée], required, and marked in its
essence by a certain spatiality. 18
When I say a form is imposed, I obviously do not think of any classical model of causality.
The question, so often asked, of knowing if one writes as one speaks or speaks as one writes,
if one reads as one writes or conversely, refers in its banality to an historical or prehistoric
depth more hidden than is generally suspected. Finally, if one notes that the place of writing is
linked, as Rousseau had intuited, to the nature of social space, to the perceptive and dynamic
organization of the technical, religious, economic and other such spaces, one realizes the
difficulty of a transcendental question on space. A new transcendental aesthetic must let itself
be guided not only by mathematical idealities but by the possibility of inscriptions in general,
not befalling an already constituted space as a contingent accident but producing the spatiality
of space. Indeed we say of inscription in general, in order to make it quite clear that it is not
simply the notation of a prepared speech representing itself, but inscription within speech and
inscription as habitation always already situated. Such a questioning, in spite of its reference
to a form of fundamental passivity, ought no longer to call itself a transcendental aesthetic,
neither in the Kantian, nor in the Husserlian, sense of those words. A transcendental question
on space concerns the prehistoric and precultural level of spatio-temporal experience which
furnishes a unitary and universal ground for all subjectivity, and all culture, this side of
empirical diversity, as well as the orientations proper to their spaces and their times. Now if
one lets oneself be guided by inscription as habitation in general, the Husserlian radicalization
of the Kantian question is indispensible but insufficient. We know that Husserl reproached
Kant for having allowed himself to be guided in his question by ideal objects already
constituted into a science (geometry or mechanics) . To a constituted ideal space a subjectivity
constituted (into faculties) cor-responded naturally. And from my present point of view, there
is much to say on the concept of the line which so often intervenes in the Kantian critique.
(Time, the form of all sensible phenomena, internal and external, seems to dominate space,
the form of external sensible phenomena; but it is a time that one may always represent by a
line and the “refutation of ideal-ism” will reverse that order.) The Husserlian project not only
put all objective space of science within parentheses, it had to articulate aesthetics upon a
transcendental kinesthetics. Nevertheless, in spite of the Kantian revolution and the discovery
of pure sensibility (free of all reference to sensation), to the extent that the concept of
sensibility (as pure passivity) and its contrary will continue to dominate such questions, they
will remain imprisoned in metaphysics. If the space-time that we inhabit is a priori the space-
time of the trace, there is neither pure activity nor pure passivity. This pair of concepts—and
we know that Husserl erased one with the
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other constantly—belongs to the myth of the origin of an uninhabited world, of a world alien
to the trace: pure presence of the pure present, that one may either call purity of life or purity
of death: determination of being which has always superintended not only theological and
metaphysical but also transcendental questions, whether conceived in terms of scholastic the,
ology or in a Kantian and post-Kantian sense. The Husserlian project of a transcendental