natural (it is
not the mark,
the natural sign, or the index in the Husserlian sense) than
cultural,
not more physical than psychic, biological than spiritual. It is that starting from which a
becoming-unmotivated of the sign, and with it all the ulterior oppositions between physis and
its other, is possible.
In his project of semiotics, Peirce seems to have been more attentive than Saussure to the
irreducibility of this becoming-unmotivated. In his terminology, one must speak of a
becoming-unmotivated of the symbol, the notion of the symbol playing here a role analogous
to that of the sign which Saussure opposes precisely to the symbol:
Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other signs, particularly from
icons, or from mixed signs partaking of the nature of icons and symbols. We think only in
signs. These mental signs are of mixed nature; the symbol parts of them are called concepts. If
a man makes a new symbol, it is by thoughts involving concepts. So it is only out of symbols
that a new symbol can grow. Omne symbolum de symbolo. 9
Peirce complies with two apparently incompatible exigencies. The mis-take here would be to
sacrifice one for the other. It must be recognized that the symbolic (in Peirce’s sense: of “the
arbitrariness of the sign”) is rooted in the nonsymbolic, in an anterior and related order of
signification: “Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other signs,
particularly from icons, or from mixed signs.” But these roots must not compromise the
structural originality of the field of symbols, the autonomy of a domain, a production, and a
play: “So it is only out of symbols that a new symbol can grow. Omne symbolum de
symbolo.”
But in both cases, the genetic root-system refers .from sign to sign. No ground of
nonsignification—understood as insignificance or an intuition of a present truth—stretches
out to give it foundation under the play and the coming into being of signs. Semiotics no
longer depends on logic. Logic, according to Peirce, is only a semiotic: “Logic, in its general
sense, is, as I believe I have shown, only another name for semiotics (semeiotike), the quasi-
necessary, or formal, doctrine of signs.” And logic in the classical sense, logic “properly
speaking,” nonformal logic commanded by the value of truth, occupies in that semiotics only
a determined and not a fundamental level. As in Husserl (but the analogy, although it is most
thought-provoking, would stop there and one must apply it carefully), the lowest level, the
foundation of the possibility of logic (or semiotics) corresponds to the project of the
Grammatica speculativa of Thomas d’Erfurt, falsely attributed to Duns Scotus. Like Husserl,
Peirce expressly refers to it. It is a matter of elaborating, in both cases, a formal doctrine of
conditions which a discourse must satisfy in order to have a sense, in order to “mean,” even
((49))
if it is false or contradictory. The general morphology of that meaning 10
(Bedeutung,
vouloir-dire) is independent of all logic of truth.
The science of semiotic has three branches. The first is called by Duns Scotus grammatica
speculativa. We may term it
pure grammar. It has for its task to ascertain what must be true of
the representamen used by every scientific intelligence in order that they may embody any
meaning. The second is logic proper. It is the science of what is quasi-necessarily true of the
representamina of any scientific intelligence in order that they may hold good of any object,
that is, may be true. Or say, logic proper is the formal science of the conditions of the truth of
representations.. The third, in imitation of Kant’s fashion of preserving old associations of
words in finding nomenclature for new conceptions, I call pure rhetoric. Its task is to ascertain
the laws by which in every scientific intelligence one sign gives birth to another, and
especially one thought brings forth another. 11
Peirce goes very far in the direction that I have called the de-construction of the
transcendental signified, which, at one time or another, would place a reassuring end to the
reference from sign to sign. I have identified logocentrism and the metaphysics of presence as
the exigent, powerful, systematic, and irrepressible desire for such a signified. Now Peirce
con-siders the indefiniteness of reference as the criterion that allows us to recognize that we
are indeed dealing with a system of signs. What broaches the movement of signification is
what makes its interruption impossible. The thing itself is a sign. An unacceptable proposition
for Husserl, whose phenomenology remains therefore—in its “principle of principles”—the
most radical and most critical restoration of the metaphysics of presence. The difference
between Husserl’s and Peirce’s phenomenologies is fundamental since it concerns the concept
of the sign and of the manifestation of presence, the relationships between the re-presentation
and the originary presentation of the thing itself (truth). On this point Peirce is undoubtedly
closer to the inventôr of the word phenomenology: Lambert proposed in fact to “reduce the
theory of things to the theory of signs.” Ac-cording to the “phaneoroscopy” or
“phenomenology” of Peirce, manifestation itself does not reveal a presence, it makes a sign.
One may read in the Principle of Phenomenology that “the idea of manifestation is the idea of
a sign.” 12 There is thus no phenomenality reducing the sign or the representer so that the
thing signified may be allowed to glow finally in the luminosity of its presence. The so-called
“thing itself” is always already a representamen shielded from the simplicity of intuitive
evidence. The representamen functions only by giving rise to an interpretant that itself
becomes a sign and so on to infinity. The self-identity of the signified conceals itself
unceasingly and is always on the move. The property of the representamen is to be itself and
another, to be produced as a structure of
((50))
reference, to be separated from itself. The property of the representamen is not to be proper
[propre], that is to say absolutely
proximate to itself
(prope, proprius). The
represented is
always already a representamen. Definition of the sign:
Anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an object to which
itself refers (its object) in the same way, this interpretant be-coming in turn a sign, and so on
ad infinitum. . . . If the series of successive interpretants comes to an end, the sign is thereby
rendered imperfect, at least 13
From the moment that there is meaning there are nothing but signs. We think only in signs.
Which amounts to ruining the notion of the sign at the very moment when, as in Nietzsche, its
exigency is recognized in the absoluteness of its right. One could call play the absence of the
transcendental signified as limitlessness of play, that is to say as the destruction of onto-
theology and the metaphysics of presence. It is not surprising that the shock, shaping and
undermining metaphysics since its origin, lets itself be named as such in the period when,
refusing to bind linguistics to semantics (which all European linguists, from Saussure to
Hjemslev, still do), expelling the problem of meaning outside of their researches, certain
American linguists constantly refer to the model of a game. Here one must think of writing as
a game within language. (The Phaedrus (277e) condemned writing precisely as play—paidia