Once more, then, we definitely have to oppose Saussure to himself. Be-fore being or not
being “noted,” “represented,” “figured,” in a “graphie,” the linguistic sign implies an
originary writing. Henceforth, it is not to the thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign that I shall
appeal directly, but to what Saussure associates with it as an indispensable correlative and
which would seem to me rather to lay the foundations for it: the thesis of difference as the
source of linguistic value. 18
What are, from the grammatological point of view, the consequences of
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this theme that is now so well-known (and upon which Plato already reflected in the
Sophist) ?
By definition, difference is never in itself a sensible plenitude. Therefore, its necessity
contradicts the allegation of a naturally phonic essence of language. It contests by the same
token the professed natural dependence of the graphic signifier. That is a consequence
Saussure himself draws against the premises defining the internal system of language. He
must now exclude the very thing which had permitted him to exclude writing: sound and its
“natural bond” [lien naturel] with meaning. For example: “The thing that constitutes language
is, as I shall show later, unrelated to the phonic character of the linguistic sign” (p. 21) [p. 7].
And in a paragraph on difference:
It is impossible for sound alone, a material element, to belong to language. It is only a
secondary thing, substance to be put to use. All our conventional values have the
characteristic of not being confused with the tangible element which supports them. . . . The
linguistic signifier . . . is not [in essence] phonic but incorporeal—constituted not by its
material substance but the differences that separate its sound-image from all others (p. 164)
[pp. 118-19]. The idea or phonic substance that a sign contains is of less importance than the
other signs that surround it (p. 166) [p. 120]
Without this reduction of phonic matter, the distinction between language and speech,
decisive for Saussure, would have no rigor. It would be the same for the oppositions that
happened to descend from it: between code and message, pattern and usage, etc. Conclusion:
“Phonology—this bears repeating—is only an auxiliary discipline [of the science of language]
and belongs exclusively to speaking” (p. 56) [p. 33]. Speech thus draws from this stock of
writing, noted or not, that language is, and it is here that one must meditate upon the
complicity between the two “stabilities.” The reduction of the phone reveals this complicity.
What Saus-sure says, for example, about the sign in general and what he “confirms” through
the example of writing, applies also to language: “Signs are governed by a principle of
general semiology: continuity in time is coupled to change in time; this is confirmed by
orthrographic systems, the speech of deaf-mutes, etc.” (p. 111) [p. 16].
The reduction of phonic substance thus does not only permit the distinction between phonetics
on the one hand (and a fortiori accoustics or the physiology of the phonating organs) and
phonology on the other. It also makes of phonology itself an “auxiliary discipline.” Here the
direction indicated by Saussure takes us beyond the phonologism of those who pro-fess to
follow him on this point: in fact, Jakobson believes indifference to the phonic substance of
expression to be impossible and illegitimate. He thus criticizes the glossematics of Hjelmslev
which requires and practices
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the neutralizing of sonorous substance. And in the text cited above, Jakob-son and Halle
maintain that the “theoretical requirement” of a research of invariables placing sonorous
substance in parenthesis (as an empirical and contingent content) is:
1. impracticable since, as “Eli Fischer-Jorgensen exposes [it],” “the sonorous substance [is
taken into account] at every step of the analysis. * But is that a “troubling discrepancy,” as
Jakobson and Halle would have it? Can one not account for it as a fact serving as an example,
as do the phenomenologists who always need, keeping it always within sight, an exemplary
empirical content in the reading of an essence which is independent of it by right?
2. inadmissible in principle since one cannot consider “that in language form is opposed to
substance as a constant to a variable.” It is in the course of this second demonstration that the
literally Saussurian formulas reappear within the question of the relationships between speech
and writing; the order of writing is the order of exteriority, of the “occasional,” of the
“accessory,” of the “auxiliary,” of the “parasitic” (pp. 116-17; italics added) [pp. 16-17]. The
argument of Jakobson and Halle appeals to the factual genesis and invokes the secondariness
of writing in the colloquial sense: “Only after having mastered speech does one graduate to
reading and writ-ing.” Even if this commonsensical proposition were rigorously proved—
something that I do not believe (since each of its concepts harbors an immense problem)—
one would still have to receive assurance of its pertinence to the argument. Even if “after”
were here a facile representation, if one knew perfectly well what one thought and stated
while assuring that one learns to write after having learned to speak, would that suffice to
conclude that what thus cornes “after” is parasitic? And what is a parasite? And what if
writing were precisely that which makes us reconsider our logic of the parasite?
In another moment of the critique, Jakobson and Halle recall the im-perfection of graphic
representation; that imperfection is due to “the cardinally dissimilar patterning of letters and
phonemes:”
Letters never, or only partially, reproduce the different distinctive features on which the
phonemic pattern is based and unfailingly disregard the structural relationship of these
features (p. 116) [p. 17].
I have suggested it above: does not the radical dissimilarity of the two elements—graphic and
phonic—exclude derivation? Does not the inadequacy of graphic representation concern only
common alphabetic writing, to which glossematic formalism does not essentially refer?
Finally, if one
xxx fotnote start xxx
•
Jakobson and Halle, Fundamentals of Language, loc. cit., p. 16.55
xxx
fotnote slutt xxx
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accepts all the phonologist arguments thus presented, it must still be recognized that they
oppose a “scientific” concept of the spoken word to a vulgar concept of writing. What I would