BÜHLER’S AND CASSIRER’S SEMIOTIC CONCEPTIONS OF MAN
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Bühler’s
Krise first before taking a closer look at some of the most essential
elements of his theory of language:
Bühler composed the Krise for the purpose of critically commenting
on the theoretical and methodological condition of contemporary psycho-
logy. When he published his detailed review of the situation, academic
psychology was still a relatively novel discipline. Therefore, psychology was
still eagerly searching for its theoretical and methodological foundations.
Like any science that deals with the functionality of the human mind and the
outgrowths of human behaviour, early academic psychology could of course
hark back to the works and thoughts of philosophers like David Hume, John
Locke, or Immanuel Kant, who had all now and then touched upon questions
that are of psychological interest. Nevertheless, most of Bühler’s contem-
poraries were unable to agree on a particular theoretical or methodological
framework that would serve as a generally accepted foundation of psycho-
logical research. As a result, this state of disagreement gave rise to the
establishment of a plurality of theories and methods that postulated their own
fundamental conjectures in an extremely dogmatic and mutually excluding
manner.
Bühler deplored this kind of ignorance and academic isolationism
very much. Although he was without a doubt a decidedly critical analyst
himself, he always looked out for productive interdisciplinary connectivities
by continuously reanimating « the will of acknowledgement towards other’s
achievements » (Bühler, 2000, 15). This synthetic aspiration basically shines
through in all of Bühler’s works. Still, it is presumably conveyed most
clearly in his Krise which traces both an intertheoretical and an
intermethodological path at the outset. In this book, Bühler deals with the
most influential psychological schools of his time, which were: a) Freud’s
psychoanalysis or experiential psychology, b) the American tradition of
behaviourism, and c) the so-called humanistic psychology or psychology of
thought. As Bühler points out, each approach focuses on distinct psycho-
logical aspects. Whereas psychoanalysis explores the realm of individual
experience (the
Erlebnisaspekt), behaviourism scrutinises the observable
scope of goal-oriented and meaningful behaviour (the Verhaltensaspekt).
Finally, humanistic psychology analyses the extent to which the aspects of
experience and behaviour correlate « with the structures of the objective
mind » (
ibid., 49) (the
Denkaspekt).
Unlike the majority of his fellow psychologists, Bühler demanded that
these three psychological aspects should not be treated separately from each
other. Even though he admitted that experiential psychology, behaviourism,
and humanistic psychology are all concerned with distinct objects of
investigation, he vigorously challenged the idea that any of the three
psychological aspects could be able to solve the problems of academic
Mark A. HALAWA
70
psychology all alone. The psychological life of man, he insisted, could only
be fully comprehend if one realised that the formations of the human mind as
well as the motives of human behaviour are always intertwined with the
three aspects of experience, action, and cognition. As he says in a central
passage of the Krise: « I propose the thesis that each of the three aspects is
possible and that none of them are dispensable within the one science of
psychology » (ibid., 49). What the Krise is driving at, then, is nothing less
than the attempt to unify the disparate field of academic psychology by
presenting the three psychological aspects as utterly irreducible elements (cf.
ibid., chap. III). Every aspect, Bühler says, « demands the other two for its
supplementation so that an enclosed system of scientific realisations can
come about » (ibid., 49). Accordingly, he who wants to overcome the
inhibiting crisis of psychology simply has to acknowledge that psychology
can only then examine its objects of scientific interest in a profound enough
manner if the habit of pitting the three psychological aspects against each
other is finally relinquished.
In Bühler’s mind, no other object or phenomenon can demonstrate the
necessity for a critical candidness towards the theoretical and methodical
diversity of psychological research more plainly than language. As he
repeatedly emphasised, the three psychological aspects are all operative
within the realm of language. Hence, the Erlebnisaspekt, the Verhaltens-
aspekt, and the
Denkaspekt do not only serve as irreducible elements of
psychology, they also function as three indispensable elements within the
scope of the theory of language. Thus, Bühler postulated that the formulation
of the axiomatics of psychology would inevitably entail the anticipation of
the axiomatics of language as well.
It is exactly this idea which makes up a principal theoretical core of
Bühler’s Krise. After critically examining the works of psychologists who
hypostasise one of the three psychological aspects,
6
Bühler puts forward
three axioms that are supposed to bring forth a « new axiomatic » of
psychology and the theory of language. These axioms are of particular
importance because they promise to establish an integrative and thorough
foundation of academic psychology; they are also extraordinarily significant
because they implicate several considerations that are of great semiotic,
linguistic, and anthropological interest. As can be seen in the upcoming
quotation, Bühler’s axiomatics is able to feature these diverse implications
6
This critical examination especially concerns Wilhelm Wundt’s theory of language.
Contrary to Bühler, who advocated a threefold conception of language, Wundt (similar to
Darwin) regarded the aspect of expression (the Ausdrucksaspekt) as the most crucial
attainment of language (cf. Bühler, 2000, 50-68). As will be seen in the following pages,
Bühler considered this particular view just as reductionistic as behaviourism’s inclination to
disregard the insights about the regularities of human cognition which were revealed by
humanistic psychology.