BÜHLER’S AND CASSIRER’S SEMIOTIC CONCEPTIONS OF MAN
79
and permeated through and through by definite modes of formation. »
(Cassirer, 1966, 14f., PSF 3, 18, PFS 3, 27)
Cassirer not only conceived these « modes of formation » as entirely
symbolic; he also associated the symbolic or semiotic foundation of
knowledge with the effectiveness of an « original imaginative power »
(Cassirer, 1975, 88, PSF 1, 21, PFS 1, 30). Every « unity of being » –
whether it is induced in perception or in thought – is considered the result of
a symbolic formation which is by no means restricted to a single-sided and
static schematism. Neither is « [t]he Philosophy of Symbolic Forms […]
concerned exclusively or even primarily with the purely scientific, exact
conceiving of the world », nor does it hold that « the ‘understanding’ of the
world » is proceeding passively – i.e., in the form of a « mere receiving » or
in the sense of a sheer « repetition of a given structure of reality » (all
quotations from Cassirer, 1966, 13, PSF 3, 16f., PFS 3, 25-26). Instead, the
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms takes for granted that the human under-
standing of the world « comprises a free activity of the spirit » (ibid.) which
is open to a plurality of symbolically shaped « world views » (Cassirer,
1968, 29, PSF 2, 39, PFS 2, 49).
According to Cassirer, the task of a Philosophy of Symbolic Forms is
to analyse and reconstruct the manifold outgrowths of exactly this essentially
free and formative activity. Consequently, « [t]he Philosophy of Symbolic
Forms […] is concerned with all the forms assumed by man’s understanding
of the world » (Cassirer, 1966, 13, PSF 3, 16, PFS 3, 25-26); it
« starts from the assumption that such [symbolic] categories must be at work
wherever a cosmos, a characteristic and typical world view, takes form out of
the chaos of impressions » (Cassirer, 1968, 29, PSF 2, 39, PFS 2, 49).
As John Michael Krois accurately posits, Cassirer’s philosophy is thus « not
merely yet another way of understanding the world, but a theory of under-
standing the world in the first place » (Krois, 1988, 21). It is, otherwise put,
just as much a theory of cognition as it is a theory of meaning.
As such, the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms is also designed to
function as a philosophy of man. « In fact », Cassirer claimed,
« we can […] predict that the fundamental answer to the question of the
‘essential concept’ of mankind […] can come only from a philosophy of
‘symbolic forms’. For these forms indicate to us the level of intelligence in
human action, and they contain the universal defining elements of this
level. » (Cassirer, 1996, 38f.)
The diversity of symbolic forms (myth, religion, art, language,
science, etc.) displays that man « does not have an immediate but a mediate
relation to reality, and this mediation is the very condition and the very
principle of his life » (Cassirer, 2005, 260). Other than animals, human
Mark A. HALAWA
80
beings do not immediately respond to outward stimuli. Instead, they are
constantly « constructing artificial worlds » (ibid.) by « wrapping [reality] in
certain signs and symbols – in the words of language, in mythical tales, in
artistic or religious images » (ibid.). Thus, if philosophy tries to
« follow up, step by step, the gradual evolution that leads from the first
dawnings of symbolic thought to its achievement, to its most perfect and
refined forms[,] […] we may hope […] to come to a philosophical concept of
man that comprises the whole of his fundamental faculties and his most
characteristic activities » (ibid., 251).
Of course, the present essay does not have enough room to trace every
single symbolic form that was once examined by Cassirer.
20
However, what
matters here can be gleaned even without a detailed inspection of Cassirer’s
extensive explanations about the «‘polydimensionality’ of the intellectual
21
world » (Cassirer, 1966, 13, PSF 3, 17, PFS 3, 26), for what is of prime
importance in the remarks at hand is the idea that – according to Cassirer –
any form of understanding the world is to be regarded as entirely symbolic.
What Cassirer’s discourse about the potency of the symbol principally
amounts to is the attempt to demonstrate that « any specific sphere of
symbols and signs – may these involve linguistic or mythical, artistic or
intellectual signs – is always backed by particular energies of formation »
(Cassirer, 1923, 200). Thus, « [t]o divest oneself of the sign not only in this
or that but in any form would imply the destruction of these energies
simultaneously » (ibid.).
Cassirer did not hide the fact that his talk of « particular energies of
formation » is substantially derived from Wilhelm von Humboldt’s
influential theory of language. At the same time, he found that « [t]he saying
of Humboldt that Language is to be treated not as an !"#$% but as an
!%&"#!'(
– not as an achieved work but as an energy – […] is not restricted
to language alone; it may be applied in the same sense to art, to religion, to
science » (Cassirer, 2005, 211), or to any other symbolic form.
By this means, Cassirer intended to highlight the active, energetic, and
productive character of all symbol-bound processes of knowledge. Different
than Bühler, who took the concept of the symbol pre-eminently as the by far
most efficient and productive means of (preferably linguistic) commu-
nication, he regarded the idea of symbolism as an absolutely indispensable
and uncircumventable reality-developing device. Neither is it to his mind
20
Krois registers that Cassirer mentioned the following outgrowths of man’s understanding
of the world as individual symbolic forms : myth, language, technology, law, art, religion,
science, history, and – at least once – economy (cf. Krois, 1988, 19).
21
The English translation mistakenly speaks of a « ‘polydimensionality’ of the cultural
world », whereas the German original reads « die ‘Mehrdimensionalität’ der geistigen
Welt » (Cassirer, 1929, 17).