BÜHLER’S AND CASSIRER’S SEMIOTIC CONCEPTIONS OF MAN
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possible to attain objective knowledge which is
not based on the above
mentioned « particular energies » of symbolism, nor is it conceivable that the
knowledge-abetting effectiveness of symbolism can ever be left behind; for
what Cassirer’s symbolism introduces into the operating range of epis-
temology is – among other things – first and foremost a general and
universal Gestalt principle which was similarly endorsed by Bühler within
the framework of his psychological investigations (cf. Bühler, 1913, 1960).
22
As Cassirer critically directed towards the metaphysics of Henri Bergson’s
philosophy of life (cf. Cassirer, 1966, 36, PSF 3, 43, PFS 3, 50), any
objective conception of something as something particular ultimately rests
on a primacy of symbolic mediation; «[…] all fact», Cassirer concluded in
accordance with Goethe, « is in itself theory » (ibid., 25, PSF 3, 31, PFS 3,
39), for it is impossible to ever perceive or recognise an entity which would
be given as an entirely « formless » object (cf. Cassirer, 1927, 99).
Although Cassirer admitted that the individual methods of thought,
which are displayed in the spheres of myth, religion, art, language, or
scientific knowledge, appear to have nothing in common at first sight, he put
considerable emphasis on the idea that any specific form of objective
knowledge is guided by a symbol-bound « structural principle » (Cassirer,
1966, 13, PSF 3, 17, PFS 3, 26) which is assumed to be « operative and
dominant in each particular sphere » (ibid.) of human life and action. What
unifies the undeniably and decisively peculiar « world views », which are
prevalent within myth, religion, art, language, science, etc., is the factuality
of their commonly shared symbolic or semiotic foundation. As Cassirer
noted in his 1941/42 « Seminar on Symbolism and Philosophy of
Language »:
« We do not deny the strong oppositions, nay, the contradictions and
antinomies that appear in the development of human thought and human
culture. But we think that in spite of this there is not only an enmity but a
close relationship between the fundamental functions that constitute our
mental and cultural life. They are, so to speak, different branches on the tree
of knowledge; and all these branches are nourished by a common root. But
we must not content ourselves with such metaphorical expressions. We must
try to indicate this common basis by finding out a general trait that is a
condition and a prerequisite of art and religion, of language and science. I
have tried to designate this general condition by introducing the term
symbolic form. » (Cassirer, 2005, 246)
Even though Cassirer expressly underlined that he did « not wish to
insist upon this name » (
ibid.), he firmly contended that a thorough inves-
tigation of the basic elements of human thought and cultural life inevitably
22
Krois complains about the circumstance that the significance of « Cassirer’s affiliation to
Gestalt theory […] has up to now been hardly realised » (Krois, 1988, 24).
Mark A. HALAWA
82
implies an elaborate study of the generic symbolic constitution of human
understanding. As a result, he vindicated a conception of symbolicity which
is significantly more fundamental than both Bühler’s notion of the symbol
and his semiotic or symbolic conception of man. As is plainly displayed by
the axiomatics of the Krise, Bühler conceived the concept of the sign in
general as well as the concept of the symbol in particular as a means of
interaction and communication in the first place. Moreover, he mainly went
back to semiotics (or in his words: to sematology) for the purpose of
formulating a general theory of language. In this context, the concept of
symbol represented the highest and most elaborated form of signification
which finally opens the door to the establishment of a full-fledged language
that is primarily characterised by its Darstellungsfunktion.
Cassirer, however, reflected on the functionality of symbolism for the
sake of clarifying the forces which stimulate and facilitate any process of
objective knowledge. Thus, what is of prime philosophical interest to him is
not – as is expressed in the axiomatics of the « Krise » – the extent to which
signs or symbols may serve as a means of mutual guidance and under-
standing; what he was concerned with the most is rather « the problem of
knowledge » (Cassirer, 1966, xiii, PSF 3, V, PFS, 7) in general. Within the
framework of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, this problem goes beyond
the scope of the problem of language. Thus, Cassirer poses the question of
meaning in a more general or fundamental manner as well. Albeit the
phenomenon of language is without doubt allotted a quite important role
within the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (cf. Göller, 1988), Cassirer
ascribed symbolism a value which exceeds Bühler’s idea about the repre-
sentational function of language. « Not only the realm of conceptual
thinking », Cassirer stated, but also « those of intuition and perception are
[…] conditioned » (Cassirer, 1966, 48, PSF 3, 57, PFS, 62) by symbolism,
whereas it should be added that Cassirer – once again just like Peirce and, at
the same time, unlike many contemporary philosophers – did not subordinate
the aspects of intuition and perception to language (cf. Krois, 2004, 16).
ii) The ubiquity of symbolicity within any form of intuition,
perception, and conceptual thought also shines through in Cassirer’s effort to
describe the most striking kinds of sign processes by introducing the triad of
expression (
Ausdruck),
representation (
Darstellung), and
pure significance
(reine Bedeutung) (cf. Cassirer, 1927). As our preceding remarks have
shown, Cassirer candidly borrowed the notion of the Darstellungsfunktion
from Bühler’s theory of language (cf. also Krois, 2004, 27). Moreover, he
was convinced that the unique potentiality of language cannot be com-
prehended unless its inclination towards the Darstellungsaspekt is taken note
of. Language « as a whole», he argued, « is only then constituted and