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immediately. This raised enormous anxiety
within the British Jewish
community and in Britain as a whole. It was also true that more than 100,000
Russian and Polish Jews had settled in Britain, and there was thus good reason
to suspect that the Romanian Jews would not continue their journey to America
either, especially if they were ‘encouraged’ to stay in Britain. The number of
Romanian Jews who actually settled in Britain before the First World War was
in the region of 5,000.
In Britain, there were no separate measures taken or special policies
adopted because of the Jewish immigrants from Romania: the Romanian
migrant inflows were treated as a part of the bigger picture. It is doubtful
whether the non-Jewish individuals and organisations
were capable of
distinguishing between Romanian, Russian, and other Eastern European Jewish
immigrants, or if they were able to analyse the typical features of immigration
from different Eastern European countries. As for the Foreign Office, it could
not meddle in the immigration problems. Migration was mentioned a few times
in diplomatic correspondence, in the context of foreign intervention, but the
topics were not linked in a particularly articulated manner.
In these cases, the
threat of immigration to Britain was given as one of the possible reasons for
exerting diplomatic pressure; these hints were made either by the British
representatives in Romania or by the British Jewry in their correspondence with
the Foreign Office.
The Anglo-Jewry’s reactions to immigration were ambiguous and
interesting. The basic belief of the Anglo-Jewish elite was that immigration
should be discouraged because England could not absorb large masses of
immigrants. The major Jewish organisations in London practised a firm policy
designed to curb Romanian Jewish settlement in England. They sent destitute
migrants back to the continent and gave financial
aid only in selected and
closely inspected cases. Everyone, including the Zionists and other dissenters
from mainstream elite opinion, agreed that emigration from Romania should be
arranged properly and that it should not be directed to Britain. Dissenting
opinions referred only to the allegedly heartless and penny-pinching attitudes
of the Jewish community leaders towards the migrants. It was never seriously
suggested that all Jews from Romania who wanted to land in Britain should be
welcomed to do so.
British reactions to the American note of 1902 were either welcoming (in
the Foreign Office and among the general public)
or overjoyed and grateful
(within the Jewish community). The British government was at this point so
favourably disposed towards the note as to write a ‘supplement’ to it, inquiring
whether the other European Powers would be willing to interfere in the
Romanian matter. The answer was negative, and this restrained British efforts
in the following years. Hay’s note did not have any real consequences except
for a somewhat more relaxed policy towards the Jews in Romania, although this
might be contributed to international opinion in
general and not to the note
alone.
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The international political situation as a factor
After several rather uneventful and quiet years around the Romanian Jewish
question, the Romanian Peasant Revolt of 1907 led to much speculation on the
role of the Jews in the revolt. It was soon blighted, however, by wider aspects
of the Romanian Jewish question as well as by the inflammable political
situation in the Balkan area. From 1908 to 1913, there were two occasions, both
arising from the international political issues, in which
the Jewish question was
discussed or was about to be discussed in the official international forum. The
first occasion was the proposed conference on Balkan matters in 1908 – neither
the Jews of Romania nor even Romania itself were involved in the Balkan
turmoil, but the British Jews pushed for the inclusion of the Jewish question at
the conference. Although its attempt was not very realistic, the Conjoint waged
a particularly intense campaign at this stage to help the Romanian Jews.
However, the British government was not inclined to pressure Romania
with the Jewish issue when Romania was already in trouble. After 1907, this
may have been a consequence of the general political situation and alliances; the
British did not want to irritate Romania so that it would anchor itself more
firmly in the Triple Alliance camp. This attitude was not visible in the first years
of
the century, which was understandable as Britain had not concluded any
arrangements with Russia and France at that stage and was therefore less
worried about developments in the German and Austrian bloc.
Even if the Romanian Jewish problem was not in any way connected to
the proposed - but not materialised - conference of 1908, the situation was quite
different in 1913, during the Balkan Wars. At that time, the change of the
Romano-Bulgarian border directly involved Jewish interests, since a smallish
number of Bulgarian Jews in Southern Dodrudja
- well under one thousand -
were about to become Romanian subjects. This led to a full-blown campaign of
Jewish diplomacy. The question seemed to be more about principles than
practicalities: the key argument was that the territory of ‘religious oppression’
should not be allowed to expand.
The Dobrudja dispute also offered a convenient opportunity to raise the
whole Romanian Jewish question anew in the international arena. The
opportunity was fully exploited by the Conjoint Committee leaders. The
Conjoint Committee made repeated references to the Berlin Treaty, arguing that
the new arrangements in the Balkans required a reaffirmation of the principles
of the Berlin Treaty.
In late 1913 and in summer 1914, the Conjoint Committee considered the
replies they had received from the Foreign Office to be very encouraging. When
the First World War broke out, however, nothing
concrete had resulted from
the allegedly promising sentiments.
Objectives and results
The main objective of the Conjoint Committee was to work for the
emancipation of Romanian Jews. This goal was related to the Treaty of Berlin: